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THE DUTY TO WARN IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY: 
CONTOURS AND CRITICISM 
Although a product is unerringly designed, manufactured and assembled, in- 
jury or damage occasioned by its intended or reasonably foreseeable use may 
subject the seller to liability. Such liability may be found if the product has a 
potential for injury that is not readily apparent to the user and carries no warnings 
of the risk or, where appropriate, instructions as to the efficacious use of the 
product without harm.' The seller's obligation to warn of product hazards and 
to give instructions on how such hazards may be avoided is a fairly recent de- 
velopment in the law of tort and sales.2 
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; B.A., 1971, University of Penn- 
sylvania; M.A., 1972, London School of Economics and Political Science; J.D., 1976, Georgetown 
University Law Center. The author extends his gratitude to Gloria Pagonico for her unflagging com- 
mitment to the preparation of the manuscript for this article. 
Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 743 F.2d 195 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1396 (1985) 
(even where properly designed, a product may be in an unreasonably dangerous condition if the 
manufacturer fails to warn of latent dangers in the use of or operation of the product); Ragsdale 
Bros., Inc., v. Magro, 693 S.W.2d 530 vex. Civ. App. 1985) (the liability of the seller can extend 
to nondefective products released into commerce without adequate warnings of dangerous propensities 
or adequate instructions for safe use). See Johnson v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 274 Cal. App. 
2d 331, 79 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1969); Alfieri v. Cabot Corp., 17 A.D.2d 455, 235 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1962), 
aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 1027, 245 N.Y.S.2d 600, 195 N.E.2d 310 (1963); Biller v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 
34 111. App. 2d 47, 180 N.E.2d 46 (1962). 
2 It was only at the turn of the century that in buyer-seller transactions significant departure 
from the general rule of caveat emptor was recognized. Prior to that time, the dominant rule of law 
that required the purchaser "to take care of his own interests" is described in reverential tones by 
the Court in Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall) 383, 388-89 (1870): 
No principle of the common law has been better established, or more often affirmed, both 
in this country and in England, than that in sales of personal property, in the absence of 
express warranty, where the buyer has an opportunity to inspect the commodity, and the 
seller is guilty of no fraud, and is neither the manufacturer nor grower of the article he 
sells, the maxim of caveat emptor applies. Such a rule, requiring the purchaser to take care 
of his own interests, has been found best adapted to the wants of trade in the business 
transactions of life. And there is no hardship in it, because if the purchaser distrusts his 
judgment he can require of the seller a warranty that the quality or condition of the goods 
he desires to buy corresponds with the sample exhibited. 
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A seller's responsibility for providing adequate warnings may be found under 
principles of strict liability, negligence, and warranty. In the aggregate, these 
duties are well described as a seller's informational obligation. Under strict lia- 
bility, a seller's failure to warn may result in liability if the warning deficiency 
renders the product "unreasonably dangerous," which is more dangerous than 
would be expected by the ordinary con~umer .~  Under negligence principles, a 
supplier may be liable for injury or damage incident to a failure to warn ade- 
quately when it knows or should know that the product is likely to pose an 
unreasonable risk without warnings, but fails to exercise reasonable care to inform 
users of that risk4 In warranty, an inadequate warning may also render a product 
unsuited for the ordinary purpose for which it is used, constituting a breach of 
the implied warranty of mer~hantability.~ 
The duty to warn is perhaps the most widely-employed claim in modern prod- 
ucts liability litigation. This development is aided by the recognition that nearly 
any product capable of causing injury can or could be rendered less hazardous 
by conveying effective warnings or instructions to the user or to one administering 
the use of the product. Nevertheless, when a product poses a substantial danger 
that can be eliminated from its design at a modest cost, even accompanying the 
product with a warning that is arguably sufficient should not preclude a finding 
of manufacturer l iabi l i t~.~ Furthermore, when a product has no conventional util- 
ity or only a frivilous utility, but poses a significant risk of personal injury, the 
seller probably should be liable in damages for any harm caused by its introduction 
into the market, without regard to the warnings that might accompany it.' Thus, 
Bore1 v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 869 (1974) (interpreting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A comment i (1965)). 
Gracyalny v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 723 F.2d 1311, 1317 n.11 (7th Cir. 1983) (interpreting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 388 (1965)). 
' E.g., Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1984) (verdict of plaintiff 
on breach of implied warranty of merchantability count alleging failure to warn of tampon's risk of 
causing toxic shock syndrome); Streich v. Hilton-Davis, 692 P.2d 440 (Mont. 1984) (manufacturer's 
failure to warn of adverse side effects of potato sprout suppressant could violate implied warranty 
of merchantability). 
See Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 44 (Alaska 1979), modified, 615 P.2d 621, 
on rehearing, 627 P.2d 204 (1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981), overruled on other grounds, 
Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1985). In a personal injury action involving a handgun, 
the court comments: "Where the most stringent warning does not protect the public, the defect itself 
must be eliminated if the manufacturer is to avoid liability." Id. at 44 (citations omitted); Uloth v. 
City Tank Corp., 376 Mass. 874, 384 N.E.2d 1188 (1978) "If a slight change in design would prevent 
serious, perhaps fatal, injury, the designer may not avoid liability by simply warning of the possible 
injury." Id. at 1192. The rule in strict liability permitting a manufacturer to avoid liability for a 
product's hazards by giving warnings or directions as to its use applies only if the product is safe 
for use if the warning is followed. D'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co., 552 F.2d 886, 893 (9th Cir. 
1977). 
' Cf. Frandii Alonso Jr., (Mylar Star Kites), 1 Consumer Prod. Safety Rep. (CCH) 175,109 
(1976) (initial decision); Proposed Order set aide on other grounds, 11977-79 Transfer Binder] Con- 
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if there is shown a manufacturer's duty to redesign, that duty should not be 
discharged merely by providing warnings concerning the misdesign. 
To be adequate under any theory of liability, a necessary warning, by its size, 
location and intensity of language or symbol, must be calculated to impress upon 
a reasonably prudent user of the product the nature and extent of the hazard 
involved.* The language used must be directg and should, where applicable, de- 
scribe methods of safe use.1° An adequate warning should also be timely and 
should advise of significant hazards from reasonably foreseeable misuse of the 
productll and, where appropriate, antidotes for misuse.12 
sumer Prod. Safety Dec. (CCH) q75,155 (1977). In this action the Consumer Product Safety Com- 
mission weighed the allegation that long-tailed aluminized kites created a risk of electrocution if they 
came into contact with high voltage lines. The kites were sold with the warning: "Never fly your 
dragon, or any other kite, near power lines or during wet weather." The Administrative Law Judge 
rejected as insufficient the manufacturer's offer to add an additional warning label to the kites, and 
to distribute warning literature, observing: "[tlhere is no guarantee that adequate instructions against 
flying kites near power lines will invariably be obeyed, even by adults." Initial Decision, Id. at 60,075. 
Affirming the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact concerning the existence of a hazard, the 
Commission concluded that the purely aesthetic value of the kite's aluminized surface, with no com- 
pensating benefit to the kite's performance sufficient to justify the risk, required affirmance of the 
finding of a substantial product hazard. 2 Consumer Prod. Safety Dec. (CCH) 175,155 at 60,290 
(1977). 
Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402 (1st Cir. 1965), a case involving two 
Spanish-speaking farm workers who perished from exposure to insecticide dust. In affirming jury 
- -  - 
verdicts for the survivors, the appellate-court commented that, notwithstanding the fact that cautionary 
language on the insecticide conformed with Department of Agriculture regulations, a jury might rea- 
sonably find that a product to be used by persons who did not read English should convey a more 
effective warning by skull and bones or other comparable symbols or hieroglyphics. Id. at 405. 
E.g., Dougherty v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 540 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1976), finding that a warning 
that exposure to the fumes of a degreasing compound could cause drowsiness or nausea was inadequate 
in light of fact that extended exposure could cause death. 
lo Edwards v. California Chem. Co., 245 So. 2d 259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 247 
So. 2d 440 (1971) (recommendation of proper procedures for using a product, such as wearing of 
gloves, or respirators, is part of adequate warning); Murray v. Wilson Oak Flooring Co., 475 F.2d 
129 (7th Cir. 1973) (information for safe use inadequate for vagueness). 
Hill v. Husky Briquetting, Inc., 54 Mich. App. 17, 220 N.W.2d 137, affd, 393 Mich. 136, 
223 N.W.2d 290 (1974) (indoor use of charcoal briquettes); Bean v. Ross Mfg. Co., 344 S.W.2d 18 
(Mo. 1961) (potential for myriad misuses of drain cleaner). 
l2 See Rumsay v. Freeway Manor Minimax, 423 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (suggesting 
a duty to advise user of insecticide that no antidote exists for consumption). The policies underlying 
lhe duty to warn in products liability require the conclusion that the emphasis is on prompt pres- 
entation, rather than the reluctant withholding of safety-related information. "A duty to warn attaches, 
not when scientific certainty is established (concerning risk), but whenever a reasonable man would 
want to be informed of the risk in order to decide whether to expose himself to it." Johns-Manville 
Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So. 2d 242, 251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), review denied, 467 So. 2d 
999 (1985) (citations omitted). Cf. 16 C.F.R. 8 1115.4(e) (1980), regulations under the substantial 
product hazard reporting provisions of Consumer Product Safety Act, 5 15(b), 15 U.S.C. 5 2064(b) 
(1976), which stress that firms should report promptly to the Commission product problems which 
may pose a substantial product hazard, even if there is some doubt as to whether a defect exists. 
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It is valuable at the outset to distinguish warnings from instructions. Warnings 
call attention to a danger, while instructions are intended to describe procedures 
for effective ancl reasonably safe product use. Thus, a product's warning may be 
adequate, while its instructions are deficient and actionable; or obversely, in- 
structions may not alert the consumer of the danger to be avoided, or a warning 
may highlight the danger but not state how the consumer may avoid it." This 
article will frequently describe warnings and instructions collectively as warnings, 
while treating the two separately when warranted by individual authority. 
The theory of liability for failure to warn that is grounded in negligence 
focuses, at least initially, upon the conduct of the supplier and asks: "Was it 
See Madden, Consumer Product Safety Act Section 15 and Substantial Product Hazards, 30 CATH. 
U.L. REV. 195, 203 n.29 (1981). 
l 3  See Boy1 v. California Chem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 669 (D. Or. 1963) (manufacturer liable both 
for failing to  warn of the long-lasting contamination potential of sodium arsenate used in garden 
weed killer, and for inadequate instructions for safe disposal of the rinse residue); see also 2 F. 
HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1549 (4th printing 1974) ("Directions for use may not 
discharge the maker's duty (to warn) if failure to follow directions will involve danger not apparent 
to  the user who has not been warned"). The court in McCully v. Fuller Brush Co., 68 Wash. 2d 
675, 678, 415 P.2d 7, 10 (1966) reiterates: "Directions and warnings are intended to  serve different 
purposes. The former are designed to  assure the effective use of a product; a warning, on the other 
hand, is intended to  assure a safe use." See Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use 
and the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. REV. 145 (1955), in which the authors state: "If warnings and 
directions serve different purposes, i.e., if warnings have to  do 'with avoiding danger while directions 
have to do  with pro~noting efficiency, the requirements of the former may not be discharged by giving 
the latter." Id. at  147. See also McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 69, 226 
N.Y.S.2d 407, 412, 181 N.E.2d 430, 434 (1962) ("the instructions, not particularly stressed, did not 
amount to  a warnirrg of the risk at all, and it is foreseeable that the small print instruction might 
never be read, and might be disregarded even if read"). 
Professors Schwartz and Driver suggest an alternative dichotomy that describes both warnings 
and instructions as warnings, characterizing the former as "admonitory" warnings and the latter as 
"instructional" warnings. They state: 
There are different kinds of warnings designed to communicate different kinds of infor- 
mation. Two categories generally recognized in the law are admonitory warnings and in- 
structional warnings. One also can distinguish between these two categories from a 
communication perspective. An admonitory warning is intended to point out to a user of 
a product a particular hazard associated with the product. Admonitory warnings are gen- 
erally appropriate where the number or source of hazards is small, the hazard and the 
means of avoidance are easily recognized and understood, and the user need not encounter 
the hazard to use the product properly. An instructional warning provides the information 
necessary for safe, efficient and effective use of the product. An instructional warning is 
generally necessary when there are several hazards or several sources of a hazard inherent 
in the use of the product, when the dangers may not be easily recognized, and when specific 
procedures that may involve several steps are required to avoid the hazard. An instructional 
warning, moreover, usually contemplates that the user will encounter the hazards during 
normal use of the product. 
Schwartz & Driver, Warnings in the Workplace: The Need for a Synthesis of Law & Commrrnication 
Theory, 52 U. CXN. L. REV. 38, 52 (1983)'(citations omitted). 
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reasonable for this supplier to release this product into the market with these 
warnings or lack of warnings?" Strict liability, which imposes liability without 
fault for the sale of an unreasonably dangerous product, and warranty, under 
which breach can be found without regard to the conduct of the seller, constitute 
analytically distinct theories. In the context of defining the supplier's duty to warn, 
however, the jurisprudence of negligence and strict liability can be seen to have 
converged. The analysis of the duty to warn under each principle proceeds quite 
similarly in evaluating the nature of the hazard and the type and efficacy of the 
supplier's warning.14 The conventional evaluation of an asserted duty to warn 
under these two torts principles has been ably synthesized by Professor Kidwell. 
Relative to the facts of a given situation, this evaluation embraces the nature of 
the product and the harm risked, the information available to the seller or sup- 
plier, the user's information, the position of the seller or supplier in the chain 
of distribution, the cost or other burden of adding efficacious warnings or in- 
structions, the probability that harm will result from the absence of warnings or 
instructions, and the causal relation between the absence or inadequacy of warn- 
ings or instructions and the harm suffered.15 
The comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A suggest that 
a product will be considered to be defective and unreasonably dangerous to the 
u'ser or consumer when it is "dangerous to the extent beyond that which would 
be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it."16 This gives rise 
to the so-called "consumer expectation" test of strict liability. Rather than confine 
evaluation of the ineaning of unreasonably dangerous to the monochromatic con- 
sideration of the consumer expectation test, growing authority suggests that even 
under principles of strict liability, a product should be considered unreasonably 
dangerous if the danger arises from mismanufacture, misdesign, or misinfor- 
mation'' by reference to the seller's actual or constructive knowledge. A seller 
would incur liability for failure to warn where he "would be negligent if he 
sold the product knowing of the risk in~olved."'~ The argument for the 
symbiosis between a consumer view standard for unreasonable danger and a man- 
ufacturer view standard is made by one court that urges that the consumer's 
viewpoint and that of the manufacturer are in reality "two sides of the same 
standard." lg 
I 4  Cf. Gracyalny, 723 F.2d at 1317 n.11. 
Iqee  Kidwell, The Duty to Warn: A Description of the Model of Decision, 53 TEX. L. REV. 
1375, 1390-1408 (1975); Schwartz. The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road 
to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 892 n.2 (1983). 
Is RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A comment i (1979). 
l1 See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability For Products, 44 MBS. L.J. 825, 830 (1973) 
(including failure to warn as a design defect). 
Phillips V. Kirnwood Mach, Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974). 
19 Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973), in which the court 
elaborates: 
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The opinion of the Oregon Supreme Court in Phillips v. Kimwood Machine 
C O . ~ ~  reiterates that application of the reasonable manufacturer standard should 
yield the same result as application of the reasonable consumer standard for un- 
reasonable danger. This is because "a manufacturer who would be negligent in 
marketing a given product, considering its risks, would necessarily be marketing 
a product which fell below the reasonable expectations of consumers who purchase 
it."21 Thus perceived, a duty to warn arises when the manufacturer should rea- 
sonably see that there is an imbalance between the germane, safety-related in- 
formation known to the manufacturer which is pertinent to the use or operation 
of the product and what information of a like safety-related nature is known to 
the average consumer. The most recent decisions reiterate that the gravamen of 
the informational obligation of the duty to warn in products liability is the cor- 
rection of buyer-seller imbalances in pertinent safety-related information.* For 
the single indicator of buyer versus seller safety-related information, this creates 
a virtual analytical primacy among the ten factors proposed by Professor Kidwell 
in 1975.= 
The obligation of parity in buyer and seller safety-related information is seen 
correctly as a corrollary to the Phillips court's mirror imaging of the reasonable 
We see no necessary inconsistency between a seller-oriented standard and user-oriented standard 
when, as here, each turns on foreseeable risks. They are two sides of the same standard. 
A product is defective and unreasonably dangerous when a reasonable seller would not sell 
the product if he knew of the risks involved or if the risks are greater than a reasonable 
buyer would expect. 
Id. 
Phillips, 266 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033. 
" Id. at 493, 525 P.2d at 1037. The court adds: "The foreseeable uses to which a product could 
be put would be the same in the minds of both the seller and the buyer unless one of the parties 
was not acting reasonably." Id. 
A harmonious proposition was expressed by the court in Ragsdale Bros., Inc., 693 S.W.2d 
530, in which the court observes correctly that "[a] manufacturer's duty to warn of risks inherent 
in its product is based on the sound policy that the user is entitled to information necessary to make 
an intelligent choice as to whether the product's utility or benefits justify exposing himself to a risk 
of harm." Id. at 536; see also Thursby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 466 So. 2d 245 @la. Dist. Ct. App. 
1984), appeal denied, 476 So. 2d 676 (1985). "[Tlhere is a duty to warn when the hazards associated 
with the use of the product are . . . not as well known to the user as to the manufacturer." Id. at 
251; Zehring v. Wick Argri-Buildings 590 F. Supp. 138 (D. Ohio 1984) (A supplier is under a duty 
to exercise ordinary care to give the user information which it has and which it should realize would 
be necessary to make the use of a product safe); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Armstrong World Indus., 
476 N.E.2d 397 (Ohio Comm. PI. 1985) (Each seller in the distribution chain is "imposed with the 
duty of communicating its superior knowledge to those who, because of their limited knowledge and 
information, would otherwise be unable to protect themselves while using the product." Id. at 405); 
Mills v. United States, 764 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 808 (1986) (the man- 
ufacturer has a duty to warn of any dangers that are inherent in a product's use and which would 
not be within the knowledge of the ordinary user). 
See Kidwell, supra note 15. 
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expectations of the consumer with the reasonable expectations of the seller.24 The 
concept of analyzing the seller's duties and expectations in pari materia with the 
reasonable expectations of the buyer has descended lineally from the earliest of 
the formulations of modern products liability law. Analysis of reasonable recip- 
rocal expectations was presaged in MacPherson v. Buick Motor e ~ . , ~ ~  in which 
the wheel on the vehicle sold by Buick was made of defective wood that crumbled 
into fragments while in use, injuring the buyer. A principal dereliction to which 
the MacPherson court adverts is that the seller knew or should have known that 
the vehicle, or more specifically its wheels, would be used by a secondary pur- 
chaser who would neither know of the existence of any defect nor be likely to 
inspect for any such hazard.26 
Thus, the focus of the MacPherson decision is upon the product which is 
capable of harm if defectively made, and is sold under conditions in which the 
eventual user will use the product without further inspection in "[r]eliance on the 
skill of the manufacturer."" The implicit holding of MacPherson is that the rea- 
sonableness of the buyer's conduct in purchasing such a product and putting it 
to use without further testing is the purchaser's rational supposition that the 
manufacturer would not "put the finished product on the market without sub- 
jecting the component parts to ordinary and simple  test^."^ Contemporary duty 
to warn analysis might be superimposed upon MacPherson. It would provide that 
if a purchaser is wholly without information as to the testing and quality control 
measures employed by a manufacturer and, perhaps as a consequence of this 
ignorance, reposes total confidence in the conduct of the seller, the seller's knowl- 
edge that it does not subject important components of its product to testing 
constitutes pertinent safety-related information known to the seller and not to the 
buyer. This would give rise to a duty to warn. 
In Baxter v. Ford Motor C O . , ~ ~  the plaintiff was injured by the shattering of 
an automobile front windshield which the manufacturer had advertised as elim- 
Phillips, 269 Or. at 495, 525 P.2d at 1036-37. 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916). 
26 The court stated: 
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril 
when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the con- 
sequences to be expected. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the 
thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, 
irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make 
it carefully. 
Id. at 389. 
Id. at 395, distinguishing an action brought by a servant against a master, and describing 
the master's reliance on the manufacturer, the master in that action being in an informational position 
comparable to that of Mr. MacPherson. 
Id. at 394 (citation omitted). 
Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932). 
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inating the danger of flying glass. This case is remembered primarily as a mis- 
information or nlisrepresentation case, insofar as it bolstered the then novel theory 
that an injured party could maintain a cause of action against a remote manu- 
facturer for false representations concerning the product. For present purposes, 
however, it is interesting to note that the holding also undertook to correct an 
imbalance between the product-related information available to the consumer and 
that available to the manufacturer. That endeavor is evidenced by the court's 
repeated reference to the consumer's inability to discover the windshield's defect 
by usual and customary examination of the product. This left the consumer in 
a shroud of ignorance comparable, in the words of the court, "to that of the 
consumer of a wrongly labeled drug, who has bought the same from a retailer, 
and who has relied upon the manufacturer's representation that the label correctly 
set forth the contents of the ~onta iner ."~~ Perceived in this light, the decision in 
Baxter can be r1:cognized for its secondary proposition that the consumer of a 
product with potential defects that cannot be readily identified by ordinary ex- 
amination is entitled to expect that the product-related information imparted by 
the manufacturer, be it qualitative, hazard-related or a combination of the two, 
will reveal the illformation a reasonable consumer would expect as essential for 
the safe and efficacious use of the product. 
The court's rebalancing of a then prevalent condition in the market for the 
purchase of new automobiles served to correct contract of adhesion practices 
employed until only recently by the major automobile manufacturers. These prac- 
tices foreshortened buyers' satisfaction of reasonable expectations as to product 
information and remedies and, were, among other considerations, at the heart of 
the landmark decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Henningsen v. Bloom- 
field Motors, I~c.~' Regarding the effect of the commercial environment for such 
sales, described by the court as evidencing a "gross inequality of bargaining po- 
s i t i ~ n , " ~ ~  the facts in Henningsen involved a standardized contract employed at 
that time by many manufacturers. This contract called for the buyer to relinquish 
any personal injury claim that might in the future be available against the man- 
ufacturer for a defect in the automobile in return for a limited parts replacement 
warranty.33 Such a practice, during its time, operated as a blanket disincentive 
for manufacturers to be searching and forthcoming in making product-related 
information available to consumers. The defeat of such practices in 1960, forty- 
four years after MacPherson was decided, stands by itself as a benchmark of the 
dynamic immobility of early products liability law. 
Justice Traynor, the most prominent early champion of strict products lia- 
bility, invoked a similar theme in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. He argued 
JO Id. at 461-62, 12 P.2d at 412. 
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). 
32 Id. at 391, 161 A.2d at 87. 
33 Id. at 385, 161 A.2d at 84. 
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that the monopoly on product-related information, including safety information, 
held by the manufacturer, required imposition of liability without fault for placing 
on the market a defective product that causes human injury.34 Traynor identified 
modem means of mass production, marketing and promotion as responsible in 
part for the dulling of the ordinary consumer's awareness of qualitative and safety- 
related information that should be made available as a matter of commercial 
right.35 One, though by no means the only, pernicious effect of this was the 
depressing impact of the modern commercial milieu, with its cacophony of prod- 
uct-related claims, on the consumer's competence to ask for or appreciate com- 
plete and pertinent quality and safety-related product information. The commercial 
environment described by Justice Traynor, it is seen, attacked the buyer's ability 
ab initio to identify reasonable expectations as to the product safety informational 
predicate. 
The analysis of warnings in products liability has profited from significant 
critical review. One offering of Professor K e e t ~ n ' s ~ ~  proposed an alternative and 
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J., con- 
curring). 
As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its great markets and trans- 
portation facilities, the close relationship between the producer and consumer of a product 
has been altered. Manufacturing processes, frequently valuable secrets, are ordinarily either 
inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general public. The consumer no longer has means 
or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product, even when it is not 
contained in a sealed package, and his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady 
efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and marketing devices such 
as trade-marks. Consumers no longer approach products warily but accept them on faith, 
relying on the reputation of the manufacturer or the trade-mark. Manufacturers have sought 
to justify that faith by increasingly high standards of inspection and a readiness to make 
good on defective products by way of replacement and refunds. (See Bogert and Fink, 
Business Practices Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods, 25 Ill. L. Rev. 400.) The 
manufacturer's obligation to the consumer must keep pace with the changing relationship 
between them; it cannot be escaped because the marketing of a product has become so 
complicated as to require one or more intermediaries. Certainly there is greater reason to 
impose liability on the manufacturer than on the retailer who is but a conduit of a product 
that he is not himself able to test. 
Id. at 467-68, 150 P.2d at 443-44 (citations omitted). 
Indeed it is possible to perceive that the individual consumer's position in the commercial en- 
vironment has come full circle with respect to the quantum, if not the quality, of product-related 
information available. The progression has its beginning in the era of relative powerlessness in which 
the predominant rule of law was caveat emptor; maturing to the more simple, and for that reason 
perhaps more fair, era of the "traditional contract . . . the result of free bargaining of parties . . . 
brought together by the play of the market, and who meet each other on a footing of approximate 
economic equality." Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 387, 161 A.2d at 86; and now again in an environment 
where the consumer may, with respect to available product information, enjoy an embarrassment of 
riches, but in reality live in almost abject ignorance as to the safety of the formulae of pharmaceuticals, 
the safety of home insulation or wiring, or the roadworthiness of vehicles. 
Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEX. L. REV. 398 (1970). 
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explicit definition of an unreasonably dangerous condition that would include 
products that "at the time of sale . . . the ordinary man, knowing the risks and 
dangers actually involved in its use, would not have marketed . . . without sup- 
plying more information about the risks and dangers involved in its use and ways 
to avoid harm therefr~m."~' Professor Keeton therein also suggested a recovery- 
based analysis of both warning adequacy and certain defenses based upon user 
conduct. Concerning warning adequacy alone, he proposed the justification of 
recovery by any consumer-victim "if he was not actually put on notice of a risk 
or danger involved in the use of a product that would be material to some users 
in making the choice whether to accept the risk."38 Emphasis on the choice-making 
mechanism of the consumer is, one may argue, as fully grounded in the juris- 
prudence of informed consent as it is in the products liability duty to warn.3g 
Professor Keeton further proposes a reduction in stature of the knowledge of the 
user as an affirmative seller defense in warnings l i t i g a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Naturally the proponents of standards of products liability that can be in- 
terpreted as recovery-based have drawn criticism. One of the most prominent 
forms of criticism has been the perennial endeavor to pass a federal law of product 
liability. The criticism directed specifically at the growing role of the duty to warn 
in products liability would have it that promiscuous resort to this means of re- 
covery has created a condition wherein corporate counsel entertaining a doubt as 
to whether or not to add a warning or enhance an existing one will today almost 
invariably resolve to provide more information to the consumer. A counterbalance 
to this trend is the recognition that in many situations the addition of warnings 
on many products is not pra~tical.~' A distinct but related doctrine that similarly 
Id. at 404 (citations omitted). 
Id. at 411. Such analysis might be described by others as involving "a single value axis (i.e., 
maximum information to the user or consumer)," typified by the questions "How much warning is 
enough?" or "How much v~arning is too much?" as distinct from analysis pursuant to the question 
"How much product safety is enough?" involving arguably greater attention to a greater range of 
internally competing societal values. See Henderson, Design Defect Litigation Revisited, 61 CORNELL 
L. REV. 541, 546 (1976). 
19 See generally Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in 
Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL . REV. 495, 519 (1976). 
a Keeton supra note 36, at 401. Keaton continues: 
Even if ezonomic efficiency can best be obtained by leaving the consumer and the 
producer free to bargain about legal liability for accident costs, fairness in the allocation 
of the costs of accidents when they do occur should be the primary concern of tort law. 
Every effort should be made to minimize the effect on wealth distribution of accident costs. 
Id. 
Hethcoat v. Chevron Oil Co. 364 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), rev'd and remanded, 
380 So. 2d 1035 (1980). in which the court stated: 
To hold that every part subject to repair at grave risk must have a posted warning 
would result in an impossible and even undesirable situation. One wonders, for instance, 
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recognizes the logical and common sense limitations on the warning duty holds 
that the manufacturer will not be required to provide the user with superfluous 
information or safety-related information already known to the mere4* Also to 
be considered is the "cry wolf" phenomenon, described by one influential com- 
mentator in these words: "If every possible danger in life were accompanied by 
warning, product users would quickly become inured to all warnings, and even- 
tually would ignore them."43 
As will be examined in detail below, the negligence standard for a manu- 
facturer's duty to warn derives in the main from Restatement (Second) of Torts 
section 388. This section focuses upon what the manufacturer knows or should 
know of the familiarity of the user or the user's employer with any hazardous 
propensities of a product. The comments to the strict liability provision of Res- 
tatement (Second) of Torts section 402A, on the other hand, state a test for 
determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, for informational dr 
for any other reason, that turns upon whether the product is in a condition that 
presents a hazard in excess of that which would be contemplated by the ordinary 
consumer.44 Analysis of the supplier's duty to warn conducted under merged neg- 
ligence and strict liability principles has created a Janus-like standard that has 
contributed to problems for the courts in some actions. The problems are most 
obvious in those decisions interpreting the duty to warn where the purchaser or 
the purchaser's employees are professional users of like products. Dissonant au- 
thority has emerged as well in those decisions called upon to interpret the extent 
to which the manufacturer may reasonably rely upon the purchaser's supervisory 
personnel to adequately advise and instruct employees of the danger of certain 
where the warning should be posted on a bicycle chain subject to severing the fingers of 
a repairman; the gas tank of an automobile subject to exploding while in the process of 
repair; the electric motor of all sorts of household devices (blenders, dishwashers, washing 
machines, air conditioners, etc.) subject to electrocuting a repairman if the current is not 
cut off. 
Id. at 1244-45. 
42 McCaleb v. Mackey Paint Mfg. Co., 343 So. 2d 511 (Ala. 1977) holding that the manufacturer 
of paint thinner should not necessarily have included the product's flash point on the label where 
the purchasers' employees knew the substance would catch fire if hit by sparks of grinding wheel, 
and the requested cautionary information would not have supplied the information that users did not 
already have. See discussion of known or obvious risks, and assumption of risk, infra nn.119-53, 
nn.429-45. 
Schwartz & Driver, supra note 13, at 60. To the discussion Dean Prosser adds: "Those who 
argue for warning as the judicial solution to latent design defects labor under a naive belief that one 
can warn against all significant risks. Too much detail can be counterproductive. A warning to be 
effective must be read and understood." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS 686 (5th ed. 1984). As Professor Twerski recognizes, "[mlaking the consumer account mentally 
for trivia or guard against risks that are not likely to occur imposes a very real societal cost." Twerski, 
Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, supra note 39, at 514. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 4(nA comment i. 
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AS v~ill be seen from the discussion to follow, it is in the professional 
user and the employer-purchaser jurisprudence that one still finds a high incidence 
of retrogressive opinions defeating the recovery of injured parties whose superiors 
may have been informed of a product's risk, but who were, themselves, never 
made aware of the danger. 
In recent years there have arisen many conflicting observations and proposals 
as to the metes and bounds of the seller's informational obligation. Professor 
Keeton has proposed the elimination of the negligence standard, and with it, the 
task of assessing what scientific or engineering information was known or know- 
able at the time of initial manufacture and sale.46 The discussion to follow shows, 
nonetheless, that the examination of the seller's duty to warn, even when brought 
under a theory of strict liability in tort, has become wed inextricably to a quasi- 
negligence basecl evaluation of the seller's conduct. This evaluation includes con- 
sideration of the seller's knowledge which would therefore be at issue even if the 
seller were stripped of the advantages of the negligence standard. Thus, concern 
about the burden of trying the issue of the supplier's actual or constructive knowl- 
edge is misplaced since such issues have become the conventional inquiry not only 
of negligence, but also in the strict liability causes of- action for breach of the 
implied warranty of merchantability and of strict liability in tort.47 
Other authority suggests a type of parasitism between the products liability 
cause of action alleging a design defect and that claiming a failure to warn ad- 
equately. The suggestion made there is that the courts have quailed at the task 
of evaluating manufacturers' conscious design choices, the review of which, be- 
4s See generally Schwartz & Driver, supra note 13, at  41. 
a If the conduct is unreasonably dangerous, then there should be strict liability without 
reference to  what excuse defendant might give for being unaware of the danger. I t  should 
be a cost of doing business that in the course of doing that business an unreasonable risk 
was created. The task of identifying, for strict liability purposes, the risks of which a 
reasonable man could justifiably be unaware but that were scientifically knowable is an 
almost impossible one . . . . 
My principal thesis is and has been that theories of negligence should be avoided 
altogether in the products liability area in order to  simplify the law, and that if the sale 
of a product is made under circumstances that would subject someone to an unreasonable 
risk in fact, liability for harm resulting from those risks should follow. 
Keeton, supra note 36, at  408-09. 
p ]he  better view treats the failure to  warn as establishing negligence, or breach of an 
implied warranty, or  violation of one's duty under strict liability in tort. The critical con- 
clusion of this section will be that no relevant differences appear to  distinguish the three 
theories in the duty-to-warn context because recovery, under any theory requires the proof 
of identical facts, proof of injury, and proof that defendant knew or should have known 
of the risk of injury and did not warn plaintiff about it. 
Kidwell, supra note 15, at  1377-78. 
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cause of its polycentrism, is both intricate and time c o n s ~ m i n g , ~ ~  and incline 
instead to find any peril associated with a manufacturer's design either obvious 
or already adequately warned against.49 Such an analysis, if correct, serves to 
intensify the need for a plaintiff to allege a failure to warn,50 for in the absence 
of a failure-to-warn-count in the complaint the plaintiff alleging product-related 
injury would be playing against a stacked deck." Other analysis, grounded in 
economics, proposes the comprehensive assignment of liability for tort loss to the 
best cost av~ider ,~*  which will almost invariably be the supplier, and usually the 
manufacturer. 
In the main, the courts have declined the invitation of authors who exhort 
the departure from the practiced and familiar negligence analysis that dominates 
duty to warn jurispr~dence.~~ From the multifaceted inquiry of the negligence 
standard, modern decisions have gravitated towards a more particularized ap- 
proach, the fairly constant concern of which is the imbalance or asymmetry, if 
any, in the safety-related information held by the buyer and the seller respectively. 
While phrasing varies, the predominant authority almost always inquires: (1) What 
did the seller know regarding safety-related information that would be pertinent 
to the buyer, and what did the seller do about it? Herein are the issues of the 
seller's knowledge and conduct, congruent with accepted negligence evaluation, 
and the question of warning adequacy; and (2) what safety-related information, 
if any, was known to the buyer, and did he act in conformity therewith? Herein 
" Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Concious Design Choice: The Limits of Ad- 
judication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1539-42 (1973). 
49 Id. at 1561-62, 1565. 
" Id. at 1562. 
The sardonic observation of another contributor to pr6ducts liability scholarship is "The 
popular solution to every alleged design defect problem seems to be: 'Warn against it.' Like mother's 
chicken soup it is the panacea for all ills." Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, supra note 39, 
at 500. 
See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974): 
Recently a number of scholars have suggested that liability for losses occasioned by torts 
should be apportioned in a manner that will best contribute to the achievement of an 
optimum allocation of resources. See, e.g., Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents, 69-73 (1970); 
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960). This optimum, in theory, 
would be that which would be achieved by a perfect market system. In determining whether 
the cost of an accident should be borne by the injured party or be shifted, in whole or in 
part, this approach requires the court to fix the identity of the party who can avoid the 
costs more cheaply. Once fixed, this determination then controls liability. 
Id. at 569. - 
j3 Compare Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1985) (in a failure to warn case 
including a strict liability claim, to prove that a product was unreasonably dangerous the plaintiff 
must prove that the magnitude of danger it presents outweighs its utility) with Dambacher v. Mallis, 
485 A.2d 408 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), appeal dismissed, 508 Pa. 643, 500 A.2d 428 (1985) (the risk- 
utility analysis is not well suited to the failure to warn case, for the utility of a product will remain 
a constant irrespective of whether a warning is added.) 
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are the issues of causation, including, without limitation, defenses based upon 
obviousness, knowledge, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk. 
Thus, even from the variegated principles and diverse policies of negligence, 
warranty, and strict liability in tort, an overall doctrine can be identified. Its 
distillate is this: a seller will have a duty to provide warnings as to the risks of 
use or consumption of a product where the risk is material and the seller knows 
or should know that the user is less informed concerning that risk than the seller. 
The warning itself must be communicated by means of positioning, lettering, 
coloring, and language that will convey to the typical user of average intelligence 
the information necessary to permit him to avoid the risk, and as appropriate, 
to use the product safely. 
This article will essay the principal interpretations that have been placed upon 
the continously enlarging scope of the seller's duty to warn. In identifying the 
doctrinal and policy underpinnings of the leading theories, it will also, where 
applicable, review decisions that are arguably wrongly decided. This will permit 
observations as to whether different conclusions would have been reached through 
evaluation of the buyer's and the seller's reasonable reciprocal expectations as to 
product information. This review will demonstrate also that identification of a 
material disparity in germane safety-related information known to the seller as 
opposed to that known to the injured claimant will, with only limited exceptions, 
predict seller liability for inadequate warnings or instructions. 
11. WHEN A DUTY TO WARN ARISES UNDER NEGLIGENCE PRINCIPLES 
At common law, a seller or supplier has a duty to give adequate warnings 
of any risk involved in the use of a product when the seller "knows of or has 
reason to know" that in the absence of such warnings the product is likely to 
be dangerous for the use supplied.54 This duty to warn under negligence principles 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 388 provides: 
CHATTEL KNOWN TO BE DANGEROUS FOR INTENDED USE: 
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another use is subject 
to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent 
of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use 
of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if 
the supplier 
a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for 
the use for which it is supplied, and 
b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize 
its dangerous condition, and 
C) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or the 
facts which make it likely to be dangerous. 
See McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); 
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is triggered where the potential for harm from the use of the product without 
warnings or instructions is "signifi~ant."~~ 
Resolution of the question of whether the risk is significant or unreasonable 
requires a balancing of the seriousness of harm, and the probability that the harm 
will occur if appropriate steps are not taken, against the cost or burden of taking 
 precaution^.^^ The manufacturer's duty to warn under negligence principles at- 
taches when it knows or should know of a product's hazards.57 significant!^, of 
all of the members in the chain of distribution, only the manufacturer is charged 
with the "should know" standard, thereby creating the burden "of discovering 
the product's dangers to the foreseeable user and providing the warning concerning 
those dangers."58 In contrast, the seller or the distributor of a product manu- 
factured by another must, under negligence principles, give a warning only when 
it knows or has reason to know of product-related hazards. This lesser obligation 
has been construed to mean that the nonmanufacturing seller should warn when 
it has actual knowledge of a hazard or when it has been given "information from 
see also \V. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 8 96 (4th ed. 1971); Burch v. Amsterdam 
Corp., 366 A.2d 1079 @.C. App. 1976) (mastic adhesive with inadequate warnings as to flashpoint 
and flammability). Courts have given diverse expressions to the standard of actual or constructive 
knowledge contemplated by the negligent breach of the manufacturer's duty to warn, but they are 
all materially indistinguishable. E.g., Brocklesby v. United States, 753 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1985) (duty 
to warn of defects of which the manufacturer "is or should be aware"); Wood v. Ford Motor Co., 
71 Or. App. 87, 691 P.2d 495 (1984), cert. denied, 298 Or. 773, 697 P.2d 556 (1985) (duty to warn 
of a product's dangerous propensities of which the manufacturer or seller "knows or reasonably 
should know"); Thomas v. Amway Corp., 488 A.2d 716 (R.I. 1985) (the defendant seller's duty to 
warn under negligence theory limited to those dangerous properties of the product the seller "had 
reason to know about"); Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 171 Ga. App. 331, 319 S.E.2d 470 (1984) 
(manufacturer of product must give warning of danger to users of which it has "actual or constructive 
knowledge"). 
" See Suchomajcz v. Hummel Chem. Co., 524 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1975) (two minors killed and 
four injured from experimentation with firecracker "kits" ordered by mail from advertisement in 
Popular Mechanics). 
s6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $5 291-293, 298; Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 
332 A.2d 11 (1975). 
Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 325, 364 N.E.2d 267, 272-73 (1977); Carter 
v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946). 
Foremost-McKesson Co. v. Allied Chem. Co., [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. 
(CCH) 19884 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983), in which the court explains: 
While other parties in the chain of distribution may be liable for negligently failing to warn 
of a product's hazards, it is only the manufacturer that bears the heavy burden of discovering 
the product's dangers to the foreseeable user and providing the warnings regarding those 
dangers. That burden is reflected in the "should know" standard placed on the manufac- 
turer. The duty placed on the retailer and distributors . . . is not as exacting as that borne 
by the manufacturer. 
Id. at 25,110. 
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which a person of reasonable intelligence . . . would infer that the (risk) exists 
. . . .  
' ' 59  
The rationale for applying the "knows or should know" standard to the 
manufacturer is grounded in the manufacturer's presumed "superior knowledge" 
of the product, its components, its attributes and its hazards. This justifies the 
manufacturer's informational obligation to the user or consumer that is triggered 
when it may reasonably foresee danger of injury or damage ta one less knowl- 
edgeable, unless an adequate warning is given.60 
9 The negligence standard for the duty t o  warn of the nonmanufacturing seller is set forth at 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 401, which provides: 
Cmm~ LMEI.Y TO BE DANGEROUS: 
A seller of 8 chattel manufactured by a third person who knows or has reason to  know 
that the chattel is, or is likely to  be, dangerous when used by a person to whom it is 
delivered or  for whose use it is supplied, or  to others whom the seller should expect to 
share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for bodily harm caused thereby 
to them if he fails to exercise reasonable care to  inform them of the danger or otherwise 
to  protect them against it. 
Comment a to  this section elaborates upon the distinction between the "reason to  know" and 
the "should knovr" standards of 388 and 401 respectively. The comment states: 
a. The words 'reason to  know', . . . are used to  denote the fact that the actor has infor- 
mation from which a person of reasonable intelligence or  of the superior intelligence of 
the actor would infer that the fact in question exists or  that such person would govern his 
conduct upon the assumption that such fact exists. The words 'reason to  know' do not 
impose any duty to  ascertain unknown facts, and are to be distinguished from the words 
should know . . . . 
Id. a t  comment a. 
The justification of the greater informational duty for the manufacturer, based upon superior 
knowledge of the propensities of the product, is highlighted in the discussion of RESTATEMENT (SGCOND) 
OF TORTS § 388 (a) comment g'which states: 
There are many chattels which, even though perfect, a re  unsafe for any use or for the 
particular use for which they are supplied unless their properties and capabilities are known 
to those who use them. If such a chattel is supplied to  another whom the supplier should 
realize to  be unlikely to knaw its properties and capabilities, the supplier is required to 
. exercise reasonable care to give to the other such information thereof as he himself possesses. 
In evaluating a failure to warn claim, "the manufacturer is held to  that degree of skill and of knowl- 
edge of developments in the art of the industry then existing when the product was manufactured." 
Smith v. FMC Corp., 754 F.2d 873, 877 (10th Cir, 1985). "[A]nyone who enters a special field of 
manufacturing will be held to possess the knowledge and skill of an expert in that field and must 
'keep reasonably abreast . . . of techniques and devices used by practical men in his trade."' Noel, 
Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Producl, 71 YALB L. J. 816, 847 
(1962). Professor Noel suggests that inquiry into certain subjects is pertinent to determination of 
whether or  not the manufacturer has employed the skill and judgment of an  expert, to  wit; whether 
or  not other manufacturers are using the same design, or a safer design: whether or not a safer design 
is known to be feasible; and whether or  not there has been adequate testing. Id. at 848. 
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Thus, under negligence principles, the manufacturer is required to warn of 
those dangers of which he is aware or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should 
have been It is not necessary that the manufacturer appreciate the specific 
nature of the hazard posed by the product to create the duty to warn. Rather 
to trigger the duty to warn it is sufficient that the manufacturer have only some 
general awareness of the risk." 
The duty to warn under conventional negligence principles turns upon the 
reasonable foreseeabilitP3 of harm by use of or exposure to the product in the 
absence of warnings. The additional question of what use of a product is rea- 
sonably foreseeable, the determination of which fixes the manufacturer's duty to 
anticipate potentially unconventional product uses, is inextricably tied to the ques- 
tion of foreseeable harm. The presence or absence of this reasonable foreseeability 
and the question of what is foreseeable as applied to product use and inadequate 
warnings or instructions has been litigated e~tensively.~~ In the end, probably no 
standard provides any better guidance than that of one court that observed: "If 
61 Moran, 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11. See Bottazzi v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. 664 F.2d 49 
(5th Cir. 1981) (evidence was sufficient to support a finding of negligence on the part of a helicopter 
engine manufacturer; the helicopter crashed as a result of an oil leak, and the manufacturer failed 
to warn customers of this known potential danger and failed to specify in its manual the test required 
to detect such a leak). See also German v. Illinois Power Co., 115 Ill. App. 3d 977, 451 N.E.2d 903 
(1983); Johnson v. Murphy Metals Inc., 562 F. Supp. 246 (N.D. Tex. 1983); Duke v. Gulf & W. 
Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). 
a Consciousness of a vague danger, without appreciation of the seriousness of the consequences, 
may nonetheless require the manufacturer to provide warnings. Graham v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons, 
96 Mich. App. 480, 292 N.W.2d 704 (1980). 
6J Petty v. United States, 11984-85 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 710,161 at 26,459 
(8th Cir. 1984) (under Iowa law, in an action brought for injuries attributed to administration of the 
swine flu vaccine, the duty to warn is triggered by the "reasonable foreseeability" of the particular 
injury sustained); see, e.g., Lakatosh v. Diamond Alkali Co., 208 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Iowa 1973). The 
profile of supplier conduct encouraged by the Restatement provision is that of the reasonably prudent 
person, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 388 comment g, and contemplates the giving of warnings 
only as to those uses of the product that are reasonably foreseeable. See id. at comment e, which 
provides: 
In order that the supplier of a chattel may be subject to liability under the rule stated in 
this Section, not only must the person who uses the chattel be one whom the supplier should 
expect to use it with the consent of him to whom it is supplied, but the chattel must also 
be put to a use to which the supplier has reason to expect it to be put. 
a The results have not always been reconcilable. Compare Blissenbach v. Yanko, 90 Ohio App. 
557, 107 N.E.2d 409 (1951) (involving an allegation of failure to warn following the scalding of a 
child when the top to a vaporizer dislodged, and with respect to the design of the vaporizer the court 
states: "It was not intended that the top should remain intact at a l l  times.", Id. at 562, 107 N.E.2d 
at 411) with McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967) (another vaporizer 
scalding case, this time finding manufacturer liability on facts differentiable only in that by the time 
of the litigation of the latter suit there existed a feasible alternative design for the container of heated 
water). The court in the latter action affirmed the jury verdict that the manufacturer failed to exercise 
reasonable care to warn of the hazards of scalding water. 
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there is some probability of harm sufficiently serious that ordinary men would 
take precautions to avoid it, then failure to do so is negligen~e."~' The limitations 
of any definition of foreseeability necessarily conceded, there are certain prop- 
ositions as to which there is general agreement. The most significant of these is 
that it is the harm that must be foreseeable, rather than the precise means by 
which that harm may eventually occur.66 Under this principle, there should be no 
liability where the injury falls beyond the compass of the general type of harm 
that the seller could reasonably anticipate given the product's use in a particular 
environment with inadequate warnings.67 However, even when the type of harm 
that actually takes place is not the type a knowledgeable person would have sup- 
posed to be possible, liability may be found. Such a finding will result when the 
injury falls within the "general danger area" caused by the manufacturer's neg- 
ligent acts or omissions to act.68 As will be developed more fully below, while 
a Bean, 344 S.W.2d at 25, cited with approval in Moran, 273 Md. App. 538, 332 A.2d 11. 
a E.g., Spruill v. Boyle-Midway Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962) (insufficient warning given 
to mother in household where fourteen month old infant perished from chemjcal pneumonia following 
ingestion of furniture polish). The court advised that in addition to the injuries arising from the 
intended uses for which a product is manufactured, the manufacturer 
[Mlust also be expected to anticipate the environment which is normal for the use of his 
product and where, as here, that environment is the home, he must anticipate the reasonably 
foreseeable risks of the use of his product in such an environment . . . to anticipate (such) 
risks, and to warn of them, though such risks may be incidental to the actual use for which 
the product was intended. 
Id. at 83-84. 
E.g., Lawson v. Benjamin Ansehl Co., 180 S.W.2d 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944), in which a 
five year old child was fatally burned after splashing himself with flammable fingernail polish remover. 
Dean Prosser suggests that an alternative ground for finding no liability might have been futility, for 
cautionary information as to such a rare use "would probably have served no purpose in most instances 
since those who read or could read would already know of the existence of the likely flammability 
of the product." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 43, at 687. Unintended and unforeseeable 
use is discussed in detail below. One means by which the defendant may attempt to prove that the 
occurrence of which plaintiff complains was not foreseeable is by showing no earlier instances of 
similar occurrences that would have put defendant on actual or constructive notice of the hazard. 
See, e.g., Koloda v. General Motors Parts Div., 716 F.2d 373 (6th Cir. 1983) (where manufacturer 
of valve lubricant vapors which were alleged to cause mechanic's heart attack was erroneously pre- 
vented at trial from introducing into evidence lack of prior claims or incidents). 
" In Pease v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 104 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1939), an action for damages arising 
from the defendant's alleged negligence in placing a kerosene label on a bottle filled with water, the 
court identified its task as that of looking for the possibility of hazard to some person, rather than 
for an expectation of the particular mishap that took place. See F. HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS 14-15 (1933). "The sequence of events, of course, need not be foreseeable. The manner in 
which the risk culminates in harm may be unusual, improbable and highly unexpectable, from the 
point of view of the actor at the time of his conduct. And yet, if the harm suffered falls within the 
general danger area, there may be liability, provided other requisites of legal causation are present." 
Id., See also Hall v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353, 362 @.D.N.Y. 1972); 
Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk. 25 VIWD. 
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the seller is permitted to expect the consumer to protect himself against certain 
obvious and avoidable hazards,69 a user's ignorance or carelessness may never- 
theless be anticipated, and thus may be fore~eeable.'~ 
L. REY. 93 (1972); Comment, Foreseeability in Product Design and Duty to Warn Cases-Distinctions 
and Misconceptions, 1968 \VJSC. L. REV. 228 (1968). 
The distinction between the foreseeabiity of use and the foreseeability of harm is set forth by 
the court in Newman v. Utility Trailer and Equip. Co., Inc., 278 Or. 395, 564 P.2d 674 (1977). While 
discussed with reference to strict liability, the analysis is applicable equally to the negligence cause 
of action for failure to warn, and states: 
It is obvious that trial courts are experiencing difficulty in distinguishing foreseeability 
of use from foreseeability of the risk of harm. Before a manufacturer or other seller is 
strictly liable for injury inflicted by a product, the product must have been put to a fore- 
seeable use. As an example: if a shovel is used to prop open a heavy door, but, because 
of the way the shovel was designed, it is inadequate to the task and the door swings shut 
and crushes the user's hand, no responsibility for the injury results by reason of the shovel's 
not being designed to prop open doors since it was not reasonably foreseeable by the man- 
ufacturer or seller that it would be so used. Whether or not the article was put to a fore- 
seeable use is a jury question unless, as in the above hypothetical case of the shovel, reasonable 
minds could not differ, in which instance the case would be at an end. On the other hand, 
if it is decided as a matter of law by the court or as a matter of fact by the jury that the 
article was being put to a foreseeable use at the time of the injury, it is assumed that the 
manufacturer or seller was aware of the risk involved which caused harm to plaintiff, 
whether or not the manufacturer or seller actually had such knowledge or reasonably could 
have been expected to have it. As a further illustration: if the shovel is being used to dig 
a ditch, and, while it is being so used, the blade strikes a rock in the soil and a piece of 
steel from the blade flies up and injures plaintiff's eye, the manufacturer or seller is assumed 
to have had knowledge of the risk of injury to plaintiff occasioned by the use of the shovel. 
The shovel was being used for a purpose for which it was manufactured. Whether the article 
is defective is then determined by whether a reasonably prudent manufacturer or seller, 
knowing of the risk which the shovel presented, would have put the article into the stream 
of commerce. 
Id. at 675-77. 
69 See Iacurci v. Lurnmus Co., 340 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1965), vacated, 387 U.S. 86 (1967). "It 
required no knowledge of electrical or mechanical engineering to perceive the danger in wedging one's 
body between flied steel plates and a moveable 450 pound bucket or to realize that safety lay in 
insuring that the bucket would not be put in motion." Id. at 871-72. In Jamieson v. Woodward & 
Lothrop, 101 U.S. App. D.C. 32, 247 F.2d 23 0 .C .  Ci. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957), 
where the plaintiff was unable to recover damages for injuries received while using an exercise device 
that was, in essence, a simple rubber rope, the court described its reasoning for holding that the 
device was not unreasonably dangerous: 
If a man drops an iron dumbbell on his foot the manufacturer is not liable. 
* * * 
The only 'dangerous condition' was that a rubber rope is elastic and when stretched will, 
when released, return to its original length with some degree of force. Small boys know 
that fact and fashion slingshots upon the principle. Surely every adult knows that, if an 
elastic band, whether it be an office rubber band or a rubber rope exerciser, is stretched 
and one's hold on it slips, the elastic snaps back. There was no duty on the manufacturer 
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Coequal with foreseeability as part of the evaluation of the manufacturer's 
duty to warn under negligence principles is the familiar weighing of costs against 
benefits. Relevant to the seller's duty to provide warnings and instructions, there 
are two questions for resolution. First, what is the likelihood of harm if warnings 
are not used, and what will be the seriousness of that harm? Second, what is the 
cost or burden of taking appropriate  precaution^?^^ 
to  warn of that simple fact. 
Id. at  37, 247 F.2d a t  28. 
70 See Noel, supra note 60; 5 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 114 (1966). 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 provides the general risk-utility standard that may 
be applied to the supplier's duty to warn under negligence principles. That section states: 
UNREASONABLENESS; HOW DETERMINED; WNITUDE OF RISK AND U ~ I T Y  OF CONDUCT: 
Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as involving a risk of harm 
to  another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of such magnitude 
as to  outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or the particular manner in 
which it is done. 
An articulation of this cost-benefit analysis is of particular relevance to  circumstances in which the 
product is not to  be handled by the manufacturer's immediate vendee, but is instead to be used by 
a third party, such as the vendee's employee. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $ 388 Comment n 
states: 
Here, as in every case which involves the determination of the precautions which must be 
taken to satisfy the requirements of reasonable care, the magnitude of the risk involved 
must be compared with the burden which would be imposed by requiring them . . . , and 
the magnitude of the risk is determined not only by the chance that some harm may result 
but also the serious or trivial character of the harm which is likely to  result. 
See Boyl, 221 F. Supp. 669 (liquid weed killer "TrioxJ', targeted to home gardener, found to have 
warnings that were inadequate to convey extreme toxicity of dermal contact, and consequential need 
for cautious disposal of waste). "Whether any such unreasonable risk exists in a given situation 
depends on balancing the probability and seriousness of harm, if care is not exercised, against the 
costs of taking appropriate precautions." Moran, 273 Md. a t  543, 332 A.2d at  15 (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) TORTS $5 291-93, 298). The weight of the authority in duty to  warn actions based in neg- 
ligence states that the seller's duty of care may be ascertained by taking the likelihood of harm, and 
the gravity of the harm, should it  happen, as weighed against the burden of precautions that could 
effectively 'avoid the harm. E.g., Holladay v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co., 255 F. Supp. 
879, 884 (S.D. Iowa 1966) (issue of failure to warn against skin irritations from herbicide). 
See also Wright v. Carter Prods. Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957) (an action involving failure 
to  warn of risk of skin disorder from use of deodorant), in which the court suggests: "[Iln addition 
to  the incidence of sensitivity to  aluminum sulfate, the trial court should also consider the gravity 
of the possible injuly from the use of Arrid and the difficulty, if any, of embodying an effective 
precaution in the labels or  literature attached to the product." Id. at  59 and Dougherfy, 540 F.2d 
174, (a wrongful death action brought by the widow of an employee of an aircraft manufacturer 
who purchased the chemical solvent trichloroethylene). The court therein cast the seller's duty of care 
concerning warnings in this way: 
The care to  be exercised in discharging the duty to  warn is . . . measured by the dangerous 
potentialities of the commodity as well as the foreseeable use to  which it might be put . , . . 
The determination of whether the method or means utilized to  warn is sufficient will depend 
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It is here that the real footing of the negligence analysis in the asymmetry 
of buyer-seller information can be seen. Evaluation of the likelihood of harm if 
warnings are not used is nothing more and nothing less than a measurement of 
the germane safety-related information held by the seller and that, if any, held 
by the buyer. If the nature of the harm from the ignorant use or consumption 
of the product is more than trivial, and the buyer knows as much as the seller 
about the safety characteristics, there will be buyer-seller informational parity and 
its concommitant, no duty to warn. Any action brought by the buyer for injuries 
occasioned by the use of the product should be successfully deflected by the 
defense of assumption of risk, based upon the user's full awareness of the risk 
and knowing and voluntary encounter with it. On the other hand, again assuming 
a nontrivial harm and also a modest burden in effecting any warnings, if the 
seller holds more germane safety-related information than would be known to 
the ordinary user or consumer, the duty to warn and to impart that information 
should invariably attach. 
While the cost-benefit analysis employed by the courts in duty to warn actions 
can be harmonized easily with the requirements of due care in a universe of man's 
other affairs,72 a crucial distinction exists between defective warning actions on 
the one hand, and defective design cases on the other. The distinction pertains 
to the burden of precaution element of the equation, or the cost to the manu- 
facturer to act to avoid or at least lessen the risk. In design defect cases, the cost 
of implementation of a new design may be quite substantial, or even nonfeasible 
when a design alteration would impair the product's utility, or the cost of such 
changes would eliminate the product's economic viability. On the other hand, 
putting aside certain situations such as products sold in bulk, it is almost always 
upon a balancing of considerations involving among other factors, the dangerous nature 
of the product, the form in which the product is used, the intensity and form of the warnings 
given, the burdens to be imposed by requiring warnings, and the likelihood that the par- 
ticular warning will be adequately communicated to those who will foreseeably use the 
product. 
Id. at  179. 
72 The revered equation of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 
F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), reh'g denied, 160 F.2d 482 (1947) states that the duty owed to protect 
others from injury was a function of three variables: (1) the probability of the injurious event; (2) 
the gravity of the injury should the event take place; and (3) the burden of adequate precautions. 
Rendered algebraicly, with Probability P ,  Injury L, and Burden B, liability will attach where B is 
less than PL. The formulation of the warning standard in many of the modern warning decisions 
bears a resemblance to the Hand formulation. E.g., Frederick v, Niagara Mach. and Tool Works, 
107 A.D.2d 1063, 1064, 486 N.Y.S.2d 564, 565 (1985): 
The nature of the warning and to  whom it should be given depends upon a number of 
factors including the harm that may result from use of the product without the warnings, 
the reliability and adverse interest of the person to  whom notice is given, the kind of product 
involved and the burden in disseminating the warning. 
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practicable to create warnings or instructions for a product or to improve upon 
existing ones. Relative to the cost of a design change, it is usually a modest 
financial endeavor to add or improve warnings. Thus, in applying the risk benefit 
analysis, to a duty to warn action where there has been adduced some evidence 
that more adequate warnings would improve the safety of the product, the finder 
of fact will more often than not conclude that the manufacturer failed in its duty 
to 
111. WHEN A DUTY TO WARN ARISES UNDER STRICT LIABILITY PRINCIPLES 
The most widely-referenced distinction between liability based in negligence 
and that based in strict liability in tort is that the strict liability inquiry pertains 
to the condition, or dangerousness, of the product, while the negligence evaluation 
focuses on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the seller in marketing the 
product in its final condition.74 The distinction between a product-based and a 
conduct-based analysis is not, for its familiarity, as instructive as one might hope. 
More helpful than the particularization of the technical and semantic differences 
between the theories of negligent failure to warn and failure to warn based on 
strict liability is the recognition that identical to analysis under both theories is 
the concern with products posing an unreasonable risk of injury to users or con- 
sumers, and the adequacy of warnings. 
As is equally true under negligence principles, the vital issue in strict liability 
is what is the type of harm, measured in terms of the degree of risk, the severity 
of injury, and the number of persons likely to be affected, that represents an 
unreasonable danger. A generally accepted standard is that a dangerously defective 
article is one "which a reasonable man would not put into the stream of commerce 
73 This is the gist of the court's observation in Moran, 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 in which it 
states: 
[Wle observe that in cases such as this the cost of giving an adequate warning is usually 
so minimal, amounting only to the expense of adding some more printing to a label, that 
this balancing process will almost always weigh in favor of an obligation to warn of latent 
dangers, if the m'anufacturer is otherwise required to do so. 
Id. at 543, 332 A.2d at 15. 
To similar effect is the observation of the court in Jonescue v. Jewel Home Shopping ~ e h . ,  16 Ill. 
App. 3d 339, 306 N.13.2d 312 (1973). An action involving a child's ingestion of an all-purpose cleaner, 
in which the court stated: "[Tlhe addition of appropriate words of warning on the Jetco label would 
have constituted only a slight burden of precaution for defendant to have undertaken." Id. at 347, 
306 N.E.2d at 318. 
74 See Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 465, 525 P.2d 125, 129 (1974); In re Air Crash Disaster 
at Washington, D.C., 559 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1983) (in strict liability, the merchant selling an 
unreasonably dangerous product is liable for injuries proximately caused therefore, regardless of fault); 
Bridges v. Chemrez Specialty Coatings, Inc., 704 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1983) (in Louisiana, the strict 
liability concepts and those of negligence are similar, save for the pertinence in negligence evaluation 
of the defendant's knowledge of the risk involved). 
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if he had knowledge of its harmful chara~ter."~~ Put another way, the question 
is whether the seller would be negligent if he sold the article knowing of the risk 
involved.76 From the above it becomes clear that in the context of failure to warn 
jurisprudence, the functional characteristics of strict liability and negligence the- 
ories are almost indisting~ishable.~~ 
Thus, the duty to warn under strict liability principles differs from the prev- 
alent interpretation of the duty to warn in negligence in that, under strict liability, 
one may impute to the manufacturer constructive knowledge of the hazardous 
condition of the At the same time, the theory of strict liability in tort 
for warnings cases adds little, either d~ctrinally~~ or literallys0 to the tort of neg- 
ligent failure to warn. 
75 Phillips, 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033; Borel, 493 F.2d 1076, 1088; Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 
v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 850 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968); Dorsey v. Yoder, 331 
F. Supp. 753, 759-60 (ED. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Keeton, supra note 36, 
at 403-04. 
76 Cf., Welch, 481 F.2d at 254; see Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About AI- 
location of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1335 (1966). 
Gracyalny, 723 F.2d at 1317 n.11. The negligence concepts of foreseeability and actual or 
constructive knowledge have been interpreted as common to both strict liability and negligence, with 
particular regard to the manufacturer's knowledge of the risk to be warned against. See, e.g., Holmes 
v. Sahara Coal Co., 131 Ill. App. 3d 666, 475 N.E.2d 1383 (1985) (plaintiff in a strict liability action 
alleging failure to warn must establish the manufacturer's knowledge of the danger). 
78 Phillips, 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033. In this connection, of course, the imputation of con- 
structive knowledge to the manufacturer is virtually identical to the "should know" aspect of the 
negligence standard for the manufacturer's duty to warn as described in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS 5 388. 
79 See, e.g., Opera v. Hyva, Inc., 86 A.D.2d 373, 450 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1982). "Where the theory 
of liability is failure to warn or adequately instruct, negligence and strict products liability are equiv- 
alent causes of action." Id. at 377, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 618 (citations omitted). In Werner v. Upjohn 
Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981), an action involving 
allegations of a failure to provide adequate warnings concerning administration of the prescription 
opthalmic pharmaceutical Cleocin, the court, after noting the "close similarity" between negligence 
and strict liability when applied to warnings cases, stated: 
The elements of both are the same with the exception that in negligence plaintiff must show 
a breach of a duty of due care by defendant while in strict liability plaintiff must show 
the product was unreasonably dangerous. The distinction between the two lessens consid- 
erably in failure to warn cases since it is clear that strict liability adds little in warning 
cases. Under a negligence theory the issue is whether the defendant exercised due care in 
formulating and updating the warning, while under a strict liability theory the issue is 
whether the lack of a proper warning made the product unreasonably dangerous. Though 
phrased differently the issue under either theory is essentially the same: was the warning 
adequate? 
Id. at 858 (citation omitted). See also Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969) 
(applying Connecticut law), which held that for unavoidable unsafe products comment k of RES- 
TATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 402A "simply adopts the ordinary negligence concept of duty to 
warn" and, thus, the two theories are virtually identical. Id. at 426-27. There have been, nevertheless, 
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The comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A provide guid- 
ance both as to the distinctions and similarities between negligence and strict 
liability. Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A comment a states that in 
general "[tlhe rule of strict liability subjects the seller to liability to the user or 
consumer even though he has exercised all possible care in the preparation of the 
product." Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A comment j, in turn, states 
the seller's obligation to inform the consumer or user of hazards of which the 
seller either knew or should have known at the time of initial sale. Even in strict 
liability, therefore, "a seller is under a duty to warn of only those dangers that 
are reasonably foreseeable," a standard which by its grounding in foreseeability 
"coincides with the standard of due care in negligence ~ases."~' 
influential expressions of the distinction between the breach of duty to warn analysis in strict liability 
and that in negligence. The court in Phillips, 269 Or, 485, 525 P.2d 1033, for example, states: 
The article car1 have a degree of dangerousness because of a lack of warning which the 
law of strict liability will not tolerate even though the actions of the seller were entirely 
reasonable in selling the article without a warning considering what he knew or should have 
known at the rime he sold it. 
Id. at 498, 525 P.Zj 1039. 
80 RESTATEMEPIT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A does not mention warnings or directions for use. 
As pertinent to the issue of when the duty to warn arises, the prefatory language of comment j 
thereto, entitled "Directions or Warning," states: "In order to ptevent the product from being un- 
reasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container, as 
to its use." Id. comment j. 
Borel, 493 F.2d at 1088. In the helpful expression of one court, this requirement that the risk 
be reasonably foreseeable impels the inquiry into "whether it was reasonably foreseeable to the man- 
ufacturer that the product would be unreasonably dangerous if distributed v~ithout a warning on the 
label and, if so, whether the manufacturer supplied the warning that a reasonably prudent manu- 
facturer would have supplied." Anderson v. Kli Chem. Co., 256 Or. 199, 203, 472 P.2d 806, 808 
(1970). While Borel represents the majority view that the manufacturer's duty is to be evaluated with 
reference to what it knew or should have known, i.e., what was scientifically or technically knowl- 
edgeable about the dangerous potentialities of the product at the time of marketing, a strong minority 
is represented in such opinions as that of Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 (9th 
Cir. 1974), where the court states: "In strict liability it is of no moment what defendant had reason 
to believe.'" Id. at 812. See also the comments of the court in Little v. PPG Indus., Inc., 19 Wash. 
App. 812, 579 P.2d 940 (1978), modified, 92 Wash. 2d 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979): 
It is true as plaintiff contends that RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS !j 402A, comment j 
suggests that strict liability for failure to warn is based upon the manufacturer's knowledge 
or imputation of knowledge of the danger. But his suggestion is incongruous, since it shifts 
the emphasis away from the condition of the product (strict liability) and back to the 
reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct (negligence). Aside from situations in which 
a danger is obvious or known to the user, strict liability (as distinct from negligence) for 
a manufacturer's failure to provide adequate warnings does not depend on the manufac- 
turer's knowleclge of the danger. Such knowledge is assumed, Phillips v. Kimwood Machine 
Co., [269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974)], and it is the failure to given the adequate warning 
that renders the product unreasonably dangerous. (citations.) Plaintiff's proposed instruction 
couched in terms of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A comment j should not be 
given in this type of case. In summary, if the product has dangerous propensities even 
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The now conventional inquiry in duty to warn claims brought in strict liability 
is "(1) whether the manufacturer knew or should have known of the danger, and 
(2) whether the manufacturer was negligent in failing to communicate this superior 
knowledge to the user or consumer of its For its simplicity and con- 
sistency with the leading decisional law, a representative expression of when the 
duty to warn arises under principles of strict liability in tort is stated by the courts 
as "whenever a reasonable man would want to be informed of the risk in order 
to decide whether to expose himself to it."83 The former protocol, specifically its 
second part, can be seen as similar to the inquiry into whether the seller held 
pertinent safety-related information not imparted to the buyer. It is arguable, 
however, that the subsequent proposition of an inquiry into whether the man- 
ufacturer was negligent in failing to share its superior safety-related knowledge 
is flummery. The decisional law by now establishes that where there is a hazard 
and a feasible means of its abatement by dissemination of warnings or instruc- 
tions, the seller will be liable for failing to do so. Such a standard will apply 
even where the risk or causal relation between the product and the resulting harm 
has not been established to a scientific ~ e r t a i n t y . ~ ~  The standard will also apply 
when information available to the manufacturer concerning some risk is distin- 
guishable from the risk the injured plaintiff now seeks to prove.85 
For there to be strict liability for failure to warn, the absence or inadequacy 
of warnings or instructions must be of such a nature as to render the product 
though they are unknown to the manufacturer and reasonable care has been taken to make 
and market the product-unless the dangers are obvious or known to the user, the manu- 
facturer will be held strictly liable if it has not adequately warned the user of the dangers 
inherent in the use of the product by, for example, affixing a proper label. 
Id. at 821-22, 579 P.2d at 946-47. 
Borel, 493 F.2d at 1089. 
Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 814 (6th Cir. 1982) (quoting with ap- 
proval Borel, 493 F.2d at 1089). 
Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 192, 198, 423 N.E.2d 831, 836-37 (1981). 
Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Corp., 736 F.2d 1529, 1536-37 @.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 1062 (1984), an action by an agricultural worker alleging contraction of pulmonary fibrosis due 
to long-term exposure to paraquat, in which the manufacturer at trial discounted reports it had of 
at least three critical injuries, two resulting in death, on the grounds that the chronic illness suffered 
by the plaintiff was altogether different. The court responded: 
Chevron seeks to distinguish these incidents and to establish compliance with its duty to 
warn by arguing that these incidents all involved immediate internal complications resulting 
from dermal paraquat exposure, whereas Ferebee suffered from delayed and prolonged 
pulmonary fibrosis. Chevron argues that it had no information that prolonged exposure to 
parquat could cause a chronic illness like Ferebee's or that such illness could continue long 
after exposure to paraquat had ceased. But the fact that the injuries of which Chevron 
knew occurred much more quickly than the prolonged illness through which Ferebee suffered 
is no answer to Chevron's complete failure to warn that any such injuries, whether immediate 
or latent, could result from dermal exposure to paraquat. 
Id. at 1537. 
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unreasonably dangerous.86 Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A comment 
i emphasizes that the evaluation of what is unreasonably dangerous is the focal 
point of the strict liability inquiry, be the product hazard attributable to mis- 
manufacture, a design or formulation defect, or a failure to provide adequate 
 warning^.^' A prevalent means for evaluation of when an alleged warning in- 
adequacy renders a product unreasonably dangerous within the meaning of Res- 
tatement (Second) of Torts section 402A requires reference to the "ordinary 
consumer," posited in comment i, and the consumer expectation test. Under the 
consumer expectation test, a product will be considered to have been sold in a 
defective condition and to be unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer 
where, by its manufacture, design, or informational inadequacies, it is "dangerous 
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer" 
purchasing it.88 
One helpful analysis places the claims of unreasonable danger and inadequate 
warning in strict liability in the context of two tests as to whether a product is 
safe: (1) whether the product's utility outweighs the risk to its user, and (2) if 
the utility outweighs the risk, whether the risk has been reduced insofar as possible 
without a material diminution of the product's utility. When a product succeeds 
in passing the first standard, it must pass the second test, for a product will not 
be considered reasonably safe if the same product could have been either made 
86 The unreasonably dangerous standard is that of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 402A 
with its imposition of liability upon "[olne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer . . ." Id. comment j, discussed supra note 80, simply reiterates 
the requirement that liability will be imposed only where the informational absence or inadequacy 
renders the product unreasonably dangerous. 
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 402A comment i states in pertinent part: "The rule stated 
in this section applies only where the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dan- 
gerous to the user or consumer." Id. 
a Id.; See Teagle v. Fischer & Porter Co., 89 Wash. 2d 149, 570 P.2d 438 (1977), applying 
the consumer expectation test to the issue of whether an unguarded flowrator "was not reasonably 
safe without (defendant) first giving a warning of the dangers of measuring liquids above 50 p.s.i. 
and of using Viton 0-Rings when measuring ammonia." Id. at 155, 570 P.2d at 442. There was 
evidence in that action that the manufacturer knew that it was hazardous to operate the flowrator 
in question applying in excess of 50 p.s.i., although the machine was rated as capable of operation 
with pressures of up to 440 p.s.i. The explosion causing the injury occurred when the machine was 
running at 175 p.s.i. Finding in favor of the respondent on the basis of reasonable consumer ex- 
pectations, the court states: 
In terms of the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer, given the fact that 
this flowrater was rated at 440 p.s.i, we believe reasonable persons could only conclude 
that this unguarded flowrator was not reasonably safe when it was sold without a warning. 
In addition, appellant knew that Viton O-rings were incompatible with ammonia, yet it did 
nothing more than recommend the use of Buna O-rings. It did not warn of the dangers 
which could result from using Viton 0-Rings with ammonia. The lack of this warning, by 
itself, would render the flowrator unsafe. 
Id. at 155-6, 570 P.2d at 442. 
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or marketed more safely, with no substantial lessening of utility. Warnings cases 
in strict liability reflect most clearly the second standard, for they advance the 
proposition that "regardless of the overall cost benefit calculation the product is 
unsafe because a warning could have made it safer at virtually no added cost 
and without limiting its utility."89 
While in strict liability the manufacturer will be presumed to have a knowledge 
of any hazardous propensities of the product sold, the leading authority concludes 
that this constructive knowledge will properly be considered to extend only to 
worldly and not to supernal matters. This conclusion is reached with both explicit 
and implicit reference to the language of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 
402A comment k, and the suggestion therein that limitations imposed by "the 
present state of human kno~ledge,"~~ may be properly considered in determining 
what degree of safety was or is possible to achieve in a particular product. Ac- 
cordingly, the decisions conclude that in evaluating whether a manufacturer failed 
in its duty to warn, the manufacturer's constructive knowledge of the risk (mean- 
ing what the manufacturer knew or should have known, or what knowledge can 
fairly be imputed to the manufacturer), is limited by the "present state of human 
knowledge," as that phrase is used in comment k. In most instances, the limits 
of such scientific or technical knowledge are readily ascertainable by reference to 
the knowledge existing in the relevant industry as to the characteristics of the 
prod~ct.~' Therefore, the manufacturer of pharmaceuticals will be considered to 
have constructive knowledge of information related in accepted scholarly jour- 
nals.% The manufacturer of ethical drugs alleged to have caused an injury about 
which it did not warn may defend on the grounds that knowledge as to the alleged, 
and subsequently litigated, adverse consequences of the drug were beyond the 
reach of medical and scientific knowledge. Therefore, such adverse consequences 
were beyond foreseeability at the time of initial manufacture and sale.93 
89 Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 201, 447 A.2d 539, 545 (1982). 
90 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $ 402A comment k. 
91 See \Voodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 37 Ill. Dec. 304, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980), 
involving a chid severely injured at birth by administration of the pharmaceutical Pitocin, in which 
the court found further that to impose manufacturer liability for failure to warn the plaintiff must 
prove that the manufacturer knew or should have known of the risks of fetal injury, and that such 
analysis contemplates analysis of what knowledge existed in the industry of the dangerous propensity 
of a manufacturer's product. 
92 Allen v. Upjohn, [1982-83 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 19173 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1982). 
9, Woodill, 402 N.E.2d at 199. To the objection that evaluation of the manufacturer's knowledge 
at the time of original distribution of the product was inappropriate to the inquiry in strict liability 
as to failure to warn, the court responded: 
\Ve think that the imposition of a knowledge requirement is a proper limitation to place 
on a manufacturer's strict liabiity in tort predicated upon a failure to warn of a danger 
inherent in a product. We do not agree with the plaintiffs that to require knowledge to  be 
alleged and proved is to infuse negligence principles into strict liability. Indeed, liabiity 
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This symbiosis of the constructive knowledge that will be imputed to the 
manufacturer for the purposes of a claim of strict liability for failure to warn, 
as influenced by the level of scientific and technical knowledge available to the 
industry at the time of manufacture and marketing, is readily harmonized with 
the reference in section 402A, comment j to the seller's obligation to warn "if 
he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill 
and foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of . . . the danger."94 For 
the purpose of any evaluation of seller safety-related knowledge vis-a-vis com- 
parable knowledge held by the buyer, the delimitation of the information that 
will be imputed to the seller to that appreciated in the relevant industry also has 
the salutary effect of requiring the plaintiff to confine proof of the seller's actual 
or imputed safety familiarity to that information known to the seller or at least 
known to others in the seller's industry. It also prevents the otherwise harsh result 
of permitting a plaintiff's proof of theoretical bases for the seller's knowledge 
of the risk, while confining the defendant's buyer-conduct defenses to a showing, 
if possible, of the buyer's hands-on familiarity with the hazard. 
In the context of products liability claims involving injuries occasioned by 
long latency disease-inducing substances, the augury of recent authority may be 
that a more chilly reception awaits manufacturers who defend the duty to warn 
count in a plaintiff's complaint by arguing that the risks posed by the product 
were unknown and unknowable at the time of initial manufacture and distribution. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products 
C ~ r p . , ~ ~  concluded that a manufacturer might still be strictly liable for failure to 
warn even where the risk was undiscoverable at the time of manufacture. Such 
a conclusion, according to the court, is consistent with the strict liability goals 
and policies of risk spreading, accident avoidance, and maintenance of a man- 
ageable judicial fact-finding process. The court provocatively adds that the holding 
based upon a failure to warn adequately of dangers . . . is itself a doctrine borrowed from 
negligence . . . . Yet the failure-to-warn theory in strict liability has been upheld as a dis- 
tinguishable doctrine from its counterpart in negligence, based on the fact that it is the 
inadequacy of the warning that is looked to, rather than the conduct of the particular 
manufacturer, to establish strict liability. 
Id. at 198. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 402A comment j. A contrary interpretation would make 
the manufacturer the insurer of its product: 
[A] logical limit must be placed on the scope of a manufacturer's liability under a strict 
liability theory. To hold a manufacturer liable for failure to warn of a danger of which it 
would be impossible to know based on the present state of human knowledge would make 
the manufacturer the virtual insurer of the product, a position rejected by this court in 
Suvada. Woodill, 402 N.E.2d at 199. 
9J Beshada, SO N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539. 
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could fairly be viewed as creating "an incentive for [manufacturers] to invest 
more actively in safety re~earch."~~ 
After Beshada, some other decisions alleging strict liability in tort and alleging 
the seller's failure to warn have spurned the attempts of defendants to show that 
the hazard was not foreseeable given the state of general scientific knowledge at 
the time of introduction into commerce. The aspects of that principle pertinent 
to the seller's knowledge of the risk, without regard to whether such knowledge 
reposed in the frontiers of science or was commonplace, were followed in later 
New Jersey authorityg7 and applied to rebuilders of machines and manufacturers 
of component parts.98 Additional authority has weighed in to support the position 
that the seller must warn the buyer of risks associated with the consumption or 
use of the product "regardless of whether the seller knew or had reason to know 
of the risks and  limitation^."^^ 
Those decisions declining to follow the actual or constructive knowledge 
standard of section 402A comment j ' O O  take the approach that, under strict li- 
ability, courts should disregard evaluation of the reasonableness of the manu- 
facturer's conduct, including questions of what it or the industry knew of the 
hazard. Courts should focus instead upon the condition of the product at the 
time of sale, the axial coordinate of strict liability.101 Illustrative of such authority 
is-one action arising from the death of an industrial worker who asphyxiated 
ivhile using defendkt's cleaning product containing methyl chloroform. The court 
found that the issue of the adequacy of the defendant's somewhat bland warning 
should be submitted to the jury, reasoning that, in strict liability, a finding of 
% Id. at 201, 447 A.2d at 539. The court's comment in full states "The 'state-of-the-art' at a 
given time is partly determined by how much industry invests in safety research. By imposing on 
manufacturers the costs of failure to discover hazards, we create for them an incentive to invest more 
actively in safety research." Id., 447 A.2d at 539. 
I" Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386,451 A.2d 179 (1982). But see Feldman 
v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429,479 A.2d 374 (1984) (an action concerning the discoloring effects 
on the teeth of children administered the drug during certain periods of tooth growth, and confining 
the precedential effect of the decision in Beshnda to its facts). 
Michalko, 91 N.J. at 395, 451 A.2d at 183. In the words of New Jersey Supreme Court: 
PVJhen it is feasible for the rebuilder of machinery or the manufacturer of component parts 
to incorporate safety device and it fails to do so, the rebuilt machine or component part 
will be deemed to be a defective product when delivered by the manufacturer to its owner. 
Further, the fact that the product was built according to the plans and specifications of 
the owner does not constitute a defense to a claim based on strict liability for the man- 
ufacturer of a defective product when the injuries are suffered by the innocent foreseeable 
user of the product. 
Id., 451 A.2d at 183. 
99 Pegg v. General Motors Corp., 258 Pa. Super. 59, 62, 391 A.2d 1074, 1075 (1978). 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 402A comment j. 
Little, 19 Wash. App. at 821, 579 P.2d at 946. 
Heinonline - -  89 W. Va. L. Rev. 249 1986-1987 
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW 
manufacturer liability does not depend upon what the manufacturer knew for 
"[sluch knowledge is a~sumed."'~ An additional logic offered by this court for 
declining to consider the state of scientific knowledge at the time of manufacture 
is the recognition that even where a product has been manufactured with all 
reasonable care, many such products "can have a degree of dangerousness which 
the law of strict liability will not tolerate . . . . ,9103 
IV. FATLURE TO WARN AS A BREACH OF WARRANTY 
The absence of adequate warnings or instructions on a product may in some 
circumstances support a finding that the product marketed in this condition is 
not merchantable, and is in breach of section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC), as codified in most juridictions. The court so concluded in the 
celebrated decision of Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,lo4 in which the 
plaintiff, an industrial insulation worker who contracted the diseases of mesoth- 
elioma and asbestosis as a result of thirty-three years of exposure to respirable 
asbestos, brought an action against certain manufacturers of insulation products 
containing asbestos. The warranty count of the complaint alleged that the defend- 
ant's products were unreasonably dangerous and unmerchantable, because of 
defendant's "failure to provide adequate warnings of the foreseeable danger as- 
sociated with them.'y105 That court's affirmance that the manufacturer's failure 
to warn adequately rendered the insulation products unreasonably dangerous suf- 
ficed to support both the allegation of breach of implied warranty of merchant- 
ability and that of strict liability in tort.lo6 
In another action illustrative of how a seller's failure to provide adequate 
warnings may be found to render the product unmerchantable, plaintiff brought 
suit alleging breach of an implied warranty of merchantability against the seller 
The warning read as follows: "Caution: Vapor may be harmful. Use with adequate ventilation. 
Avoid prolonged or repeated breathing of vapor." Id. at 822, 579 P.2d at 946 (citing with approval 
Phil[ips, 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033). 
lm Phillips, 525 P.2d 1033, at 1037 (citing Roach, 269 Or. 452, 525 P.2d 125). See also Haugen 
v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 15 Wash. App. 379, 550 P.2d 71 (1976); Anderson v. Heron 
Eng'g Co., 198 Colo. 391, 604 P.2d 674 (1979) cautioning that permitting strict liability to be affected 
by the manufacturer's "knov~ledge or reasonable imputation of knowledge" would divert attention 
"away from the condition of the product (strict liability) and back to the reasonableness of the 
manufacturer's conduct (negligence)." Id. at 679 (citing with approval Little, 19 Wash. App. at 821, 
579 P.2d a t  946). 
Iw Borel, 493 F.2d 1076. 
IM Id. at 1086. 
Id. at 1091. Describing the common nature of the proof sufficient for warranty or strict tort 
liability, be it a failure to warn case or otherwise, the court added: "Breach of warranty cases in- 
variably speak in terms of fitness for the particular purpose for which the goods are sold. This 
formulation parallels the 'unreasonably dangerous' rule applied in the strict liability in tort cases." 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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of aerosol deodorant that, after application, ignited on his skin as he lit a cigarette. 
The court agreed with plaintiff's contention that an implied warranty of mer- 
chantability applied to the contents of the deodorant can as well as to the can 
itself. The court further agreed that a failure to warn of dangerous propensities 
of either could render the product unmerchantable and that plaintiff's contention 
that the warnings on the can were inadequate therefore posed factual questions 
for the jury.lo7 It has been urged accordingly that in the context of a failure to 
warn allegation, no material differences exist between the negligence, warranty 
and strict liability counts inasmuch as "recovery under any theory requires the 
proof of identical facts: proof of injury, and proof that defendant knew or should 
have known of the risk of injury and did not warn plaintiff about it."Ios 
Other authority equates the negligence-based duty to warn obligations of Res- 
tatement (Second) of Torts section 388 with the requirements of UCC section 2- 
314, obligating the seller to sell only such goods as are "fit for the ordinary 
purpose for which such goods are used." Instructive in this regard is one action 
in which an apartment house owner brought suit against the manufacturer and 
seller of hair rollers after one apartment resident inadvertently started a fire by 
permitting the water to boil away in the pot used to heat the rollers. The cau- 
tionary comments accompanying the rollers at the time of sale stated that they 
"may" be inflammable should they be left over a "flame" in a container without 
water, but adding that otherwise, the rollers were "perfectly safe." The court, 
applying South Carolina law, granted a new trial, concluding that the evidence 
raised jury questions as to the adequacy of the manufacturer's warnings, sounding 
equivalently in negligence and in warranty.lo9 
Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476, 253 S.E.2d 344, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 612, 
257 S.E.2d 219 (1979) (summary judgment reserved). 
lW Kidwell, supra note 15, at 1377-78. Cf. Fisher v. Gate City Steel Corp., 190 Neb. 699, 703, 
211 N.W.2d 914, 917 (1973) (failure to instruct on implied warranty not prejudicial when covered 
by instruction on strict liability) (dictum). 
109 Gardner v. Q.H.S. Inc., 448 F.2d 238, 242 (4th Cu. 1971). The court went on to state: 
For the law has now reached the stage of development that a supplier and a manufacturer 
of a chattel are liable to all whom they should expect will use the chattel or be endangered 
by its use if (a) they know or have reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be 
dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, (b) they lack reason to believe that the user 
will realize the potential danger, and (c) they fail to exercise reasonable care to inform of 
its dangerous condition of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OP TORTS $5 388 and 395 (1965 Ed.). The same is true with respect to a cause 
of action for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability under the Uniform Com- 
mercial Code, as that warranty is breached when goods are not 'fit for the ordinary purposes 
for which such goods are used.' 
Id. (citation omitted). See also Basko, 416 F.2d at 427; Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 
N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965), equating "defective" for purposes of Restatement section 402A with 
"not reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which such articles are sold and used." Id. at 67, 
207 A.2d at 313; Goldberg v. Kollsman Inst. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 
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The similarity between the failure to warn case based on negligence and that 
based on warranty extends, naturally, to the requirement that plaintiff prove that 
the hazard posed by the seller's product, or conduct, was a cause of the injuries 
suffered by the plaintiff.110 It has been held that even when a product is, strictly 
speaking, fit to p~zrform its intended function, the manufacturer's failure to warn 
the buyer of adverse side effects may constitute a breach of the implied warranty 
of merchantability. In one representative action, a purchaser of potato sprout 
suppressant alleged a failure to warn in both tort and warranty against the seller 
of that product, used for dusting seed potatoes before storage to retard sprouting. 
The bags in which the product was contained cautioned only that there might, 
after planting 'the following season, be "a slight delay in emergence."111 While 
the product apparently succeeded in retarding emergence, it also, evidence showed, 
caused erratic emergence, multiple sprouting, and small potatoes.I1* The court 
affirmed that goods are not fit for their ordinary purpose within the meaning of 
UCC section 2-314 if the manufacturer fails to warn of adverse "side-effects which 
[result] from its use."Il3 
Distinctions do exist between the warranty cause of action and the tort cause 
of action. Unlike the defenses available on a claim of tortious failure to warn, 
the defendant may defend the warranty claim with the defenses of lack of privity, 
lack of notice of breach, contractual assumption of the risk, express disclaimer 
or express limitation of remedy.lI4 The failure to warn claim sounding in warranty 
is also distinguishable from the allegation of negligent failure to warn in that in 
negligence, the seller will be liable if the inadequacy of its waming constitutes 
conduct that is unreasonable under Restatement (Second) of Torts section 388. 
Resolution of the issue of whether the seller has breached a duty to warn under 
81 (1963); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965) (strict liability under 5 
402A "is hardly more than what exists under implied warranty when stripped of the contract doctrines 
of privity, disclaimer, requirements of notice of defect, and limitations through inconsistencies with 
express warranties." Id. at 429); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 126 (9th Cir. 1968) 
(the difference between implied warranty and strict liability in tort is largely one of terminology); 
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Sen.,  45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965). 
"O Spencer v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Mich. App. 356, 367 N.W.2d 393 (1985). In this action 
both the manufacturer of the truck and the manufacturer of a multi-piece rim were sued for injuries 
sustained by a repainnan when the rim explosively disengaged. Plaintiff alleged breach of warranty 
and negligence for failure to warn of dangers inherent in the three-piece rim. First acknowledging 
that "[nlegligence and breach of implied warranty claims based on a failure to warn involve proof 
of the same elements." Id. at 361, 367 N.lV.2d at 396. The appellate court affirmed the finding 
below that the plaintiff's awareness of the risk and acknowledgment that this conduct would have 
been the same had a warning been issued "refuted a causal connection between the lack of warning 
of the danger of three-piece wheel rims and plaintiff's injury." Id. at 362, 367 N.W.2d at 396. 
Streich, 692 IB.2d at 442-43. 
Il2 Id. at 442. 
n3 Id. at 448, and continuing: "Surely goods are not merchantable, if in their ordinary use, the 
goods cause damage to property to which they are applied or harm to the person using them." Id. 
"* See Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 969 (4th Cir. 1971). 
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an implied warranty of merchantability, on the other hand, "focuses upon whether 
the Iack of warning renders the product unreasonably dangerous and thereby 
breaches an implied warranty. "I1' 
One of the most important distinctions between warranty and tort as applied 
to allegations of failure to warn is that the manufacturer's duty to warn under 
a tort theory is "continuous,~y in that it is not interrupted by the manufacture 
or the sale of the product.l16 Under warranty theory, on the other hand, the 
seller's obligation is that the product be merchantable, or not unreasonably dan- 
gerous, at the time of initial sale.l17 Therefore, where plaintiff alleges a failure 
to warn sounding in breach of implied warranty of merchantability, if the product 
is not unreasonably dangerous for want of adequate warnings at the time it leaves 
the control of the manufacturer, "it cannot at some later date 'become' unrea- 
sonably dangerous due to the lack of warnings."11s 
V. THE EFFECT OF OBVIOUSNESS OF THE l%mm~ ON USER'S KNOWLEDGE OF 
THEHAZARD 
In many situations the risk associated with the use of or the exposure to a 
product is of such a nature that it is known to the buyer or consumer, or is 
readily apparent to the casual observer. Where there is such knowledge or ob- 
viousness of the risk, there exists in most instances an equilibrium between the 
safety-related information held by the seller and that known by the buyer or user, 
and there should be no duty to warn. Where the hazard is apparent, but not the 
means by which the hazard can be avoided or the product used without an un- 
necessary risk, the seller should still have a duty to warn or offer instructions to 
the user or consumer. 
The majority rule is that there exists no duty to warn of certain obviously 
hazardous conditions.llg Authority consistent with the conclusion that a manu- 
facturer need not warn of hazards that are of common knowledge has involved 
Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552, 556 0V.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 769 F.2d 213 
(4th Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original) (no breach of implied warranty of merchantability for failure 
to warn under Virginia law where a skilled purchaser, a foundry, knew, or should have known of 
the hazardous propensities of silica). 
Bly V. Otis Elevator, 713 F.2d 1040, 1046 (4th Cir. 1983); W. Prosser, supra note 54, at 647. 
Bly, 713 F.2d at 1046; Barber v. General Elec. Co., 648 F.2d 1272 (10th Cir. 1981); Logan 
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 216 Va. 425, 219 S.E.2d 685 (1975); 1 R. Hursh & H. Bailey, 
American Law of Products Liability 674 (26 ed. 1974). 
la8 Bly, 713 F.2d at 1046. 
See, e.g., Fanning v. Lemay, 38 Ill. 2d 209, 230 N.E.2d 182 (1967) (slipperyness of shoes 
when wet); Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.26 1176 (5th Ci. 1971) (placing hand in operating meat 
grinder). 
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slingshots,lZ0 BB guns,I2l darts,lZ2 chairs on casters for invalids,'= kerosene used 
by industrial workers,124 and the activity of diving from a roof into a four-foot- 
deep swimming po01.'~ 
The law has been often, but inadequately, summarized that there should be 
no recovery for failure to warn where the hazard posed by the product was obvious 
to the ordinary user or consumer. The position taken in the decisions comprising 
this body of law is stated by one court in this language: "A manufacturer cannot 
manufacture a knife that will not cut or a hammer that will not mash a thumb 
or a stove that will not burn a finger. The law does not require him to warn of 
such common dangers."lZ6 Whatever may be the limitations of this articulation 
of the law, it nevertheless finds substantial support. A consistent position is sug- 
gested by the comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts section 388 which pro- 
vide that the supplier's duty to warn others of hazardous propensities of a product 
applies "if, and only if, he has no reason to expect that those for whose use the 
chattel is supplied will discover its condition and realize the danger involved."127 
a m  Bojorquez v. House of Toys, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 930, 133 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1976). 
l2I Menard v. Newhall, 135 Vt. 53, 373 A.2d 505 (1977); Bookout v. Victor Comptometer Corp., 
40 Colo. App. 417, 576 P.2d 197 (1978). 
I n  Atkins v. Aslans Dept. Store of Norman, Inc., 522 P.2d 1020 (Okla. 1974). 
I z 3  McIntyre v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 575 F.2d 155 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 864 
(1978). 
Burton v. L.O. Smith Foundry Prods. Co., 529 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1976). 
Hensley, 65 Mich. App. 662, 238 N.W.2d 362. 
Jamieson, 101 U.S. App. D.C. at 36, 247 F.2d at 26. Jamieson involved the plaintiff's pur- 
chase of an elastic exerciser that was essentially "an ordinary rubber rope, about the thickness of a 
large lead pencil, about forty inches long, with loops on the ends." Id. at 35, 247 F.2d at 25. Plaintiff 
was injured when the extended exerciser slipped and struck her in the eye. 
I n  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $ 388, comment k. Importantly, however, the comment 
goes on to state that the supplier will have a duty to warn where the condition, however "readily 
observable," represents "one which only persons of special experience would realize to be dangerous." 
Id. Professor James summarizes the consistent conclusion in this way: 
p h e  obviousness of a danger, including the likelihood that it will be appreciated] is a factor 
which diminishes the likelihood of danger and militates against the need for precautions. 
The sharpness of knives and axes, or the tendency of unpacked fresh meat to spoil are so 
notorious that a warning could be expected to add nothing useful to the perception gained 
from one's senses and the knowledge common to all men. Nor does any alternative feasible 
precaution suggest itself. People generally can and do protect themselves against the dangers, 
thus they are not unreasonable ones. 
2 F. HARPER & F. .IAMES, supra note 13, at 1542. 
"Under this analysis the obviousness of a condition will still preclude liability if the obvio~~sness 
justifies the conclusion that the condition is not unreasonably dangerous; otherwise it would simply 
be a factor to consider on the issue of negligence." Id. at 1543. Perhaps the sharpest articulation of 
the patent danger rule to date has been offered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Bartkewich 
v. Bilinger, 432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968): "[Wle hardly believe it is anymore necessary to tell 
an experienced factory worker that he should not put his hand into a machine that is at that moment 
breaking glass than it would be necessary to tell a zookeeper to keep his head out of a hippopotamus' 
mouth.'' Id. at 356, 247 A.2d at 606. 
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Similar results include a denial of recovery to the plaintiff upon a finding of the 
obviousness of the hazard of using a power saw without the guard in place,lZ8 
flammability of kerosene,Iz9 and putting one's hand in a meat grinder during 
operation.130 
Reflections of the doctrine precluding liability in a failure to warn case where 
the product hazard was obvious also include findings of no manufacturer liability 
for the failure to warn the operator of a forklift truck of the danger of falling 
cartons in the absence of an overhead guard;I3l that the top of a trash dumpster 
could close on a or that objects might be hurled outward from the blades 
of a bushhog rotary mower, injuring a co-worker.133 There exists a livtly dispute 
as to whether the capacity of a champagne cork to fly from the bottle upon 
opening, with the consequent risk of injury to celebrants, represents an obvious 
risk as to which no warning is required.134 
The almost invariable issue in the discussion of the effect of hazard obvious- 
ness on the duty to warn is the subject of the injured party's actual knowledge 
of the danger as to which it is later alleged defendant should have warned. In 
the workplace setting, the majority rule is that there can be no liability for failure 
to warn of a hazard known specifically and individually to the user, or even 
sometimes the user's employer. Thus, recovery has been denied to a plaintiff 
punch-press operator who was injured while changing a broken punch when the 
defendant was successful in showing that the injured party was an experienced 
operator of the machine and was aware of the dangers involved in the residual 
motion of the ram after the power is shut off.I3' Similarly, when the retail seller 
of a winch truck was made a defendant in an action after one of the employees 
of the purchaser was injured while driving the truck with a heavy load attached 
Haines v. Powermatic Houdaille, Inc., 661 F.2d 94 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying Missouri law). 
Iz9 Burton, 529 F.2d 108. 
Ward, 450 F.2d 1176. 
Posey v. Clark Equip. Co., 409 F.2d 560 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969) (applying 
Indiana law). 
n2 Greenway v. Peabody Int'l Corp., 163 Ga. App. 698, 294 S.E.2d 541 (1982). 
lS3 Colson v. Allied Prods. Corp., 640 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1981). 
1" For a finding that the obviousness and common knowledge that such corks disengage under 
power does not convey obviousness that they may eject spontaneously. See Burke v. Almaden Vine- 
yards Inc., 86 Cal. App. 3d 768, 150 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1978) (also admitting evidence of warning added 
to label after incident for purpose of showing feasibility of cautionary effort). But see Shuput v. 
Heublein Inc., 511 F.2d 1104 (10th Cir. 1975) in which the court states: "The duty to warn . . . does 
not extend to a perfectly obvious hazard but we do not consider this to be such a case. The propensities 
of bubbly wine may be well known to many but are not a matter of such common knowledge as to 
be established as a matter of law and imposed as a matter of judicial knowledge." Id. at 1106. 
"5 Bullock v. Gulf & W. Mfg., 11983-84 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 19865 (Mich. 
App. 1983). 
Heinonline - -  89 W. Va. L. Rev. 255 1986-1987 
256 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
to the winch, no liability for failure to warn was found upon the seller's showing 
that the buyer was fully cognizant of the risks inv01ved.I~~ 
Another dimension of the doctrine denying recovery where a product's perils 
are obvious is represented by those holdings on facts not involving injuries in 
the workplace, and reaching the companion conclusion that there should be no 
recovery for inadequate or absent warning when the party to whom the warning 
would be properly directed is already aware of the danger.'" Consistent with the 
authority concerning hazards in the workplace, these decisions focus upon the 
knowledge of the person to whom the warning would be ostensibly due, and not 
upon the apparent or unapparent nature of the risk. It has been held, therefore, 
that the seller's defense that a hazard was readily observable or known will be 
applicable even when the product's hazards might not be considered obvious to 
the uninformed.'" There is authority extending the applicability of. the known 
hazard doctrine to claims brought in strict liability in tort as well as in negli- 
gence. 139 
Importantly, under the known danger doctrine, the user's generalized aware- 
ness of some peril will not defeat recovery unless the user knows of the specific 
risk involved and of its magnitude.I4" Accordingly, a manufacturer may be found 
to have breached its duty to warn where the evidence shows that the injured party 
perceived some, but not all, of the danger. Illustrative is one action in which the 
court found that the plaintiff, severely injured by diving into a shallow pool, 
raised sufficient issue of material fact to avoid summary judgment since the evi- 
dence suggested that the plaintiff had some knowledge of some risk, but no ap- 
preciation of the entirety of such risk or its severity.l4I 
Cruz V. Texaco, Inc., 11984-85 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 710307 (S.D. Ill. 
1984). The defendant here relied upon the knowledgeable purchaser doctrine, by which is posited that 
in certain circumstances a seller may be entitled to rely upon the buyer to impact to the ultimate 
users any pertinent warnings or instructions. See Hopkins v. E.  I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 212 
F.2d 623 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 872 (1954) (no duty to warn found for dynamite manu- 
facturer where blasting operations supervised by foreman knowledgeable of the dangers). 
13' See, e.g., Martinez v. D i e  Carriers Inc., 529 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1976). 
See, e.g., MIntyre, 575 F.2d 155, which involved the instability of a commode when the 
use would be by a handicapped person. 
U9 Garrett v. blissen Corp., 84 N.M. 16, 21, 498 P.2d 1359, 1364 (1972), involving the hazard 
of falling from a trampoline, and finding that there is no duty under either RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS 8 388 or 402A to warn of a risk known to the user or consumer. 
See, e.g., Hopkins v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 199 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1952). 
Corbin v. Coleco Indus. Inc., [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) f 10342 
(7th Ci. 1984). Specifically, the injured plaintiff therein knew generally of the dangers associated 
with diving into a shallow pool, but at the time of the incident itself he had intended only a shallow, 
or "belly flop," dive. The court seems to have agreed with the proposition that the risk, of which 
the plaintiff was not aware, was that of injury caused by a diver inadvertently taking a regular deep 
dive, rather than the shallow belly flop intended. But cf. Colosimo v. May Dept. Store, Inc., 466 
F.2d 1234 (3d Cir. 1972). where a fifteen year old boy was injured in a comparable way, but where 
recovery was denied on a showing of the plaintiff's extensive aquatics familiarity, including Red Cross 
courses in diving. 
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The doctrine denying recovery for injuries caused by product hazards that 
are obvious or known to the user or consumer has been applied even where the 
injured parties are children, embracing a logic that prompted one court in an 
action caused by slingshot to state: "Ever since David slew Goliath young and 
old alike have known that slingshots can be dangerous and deadly."142 Com- 
parable results have been reached in actions involving minors' use of BB guns,143 
pointed darts,'" and denatured alcohol.145 
Although the doctrine is sometimes stated that recovery may not be had for 
failure to warn where the hazard posed by the product is both known and obvious, 
the more supportable expression of the law is that if the danger is known or 
obvious, a warning will not be required. Thus, for the application of this defense, 
the manufacturer need only show that the risk was either known or 
While the patent danger rule has achieved substantial currency, the better 
reasoned argument is that automatic preclusion of liability based only upon alleged 
obviousness of the danger ill serves the risk spreading concepts underlying strict 
liability in tort.14' The authors of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A 
Borjorquez, 62 Cal. App. 3d at 931, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 484. 
la Bookout, 40 Colo. App. 417, 576 P.2d 197. 
lU Atkins, 522 P.2d 1020. 
"5 ~ a t r i i k  v. Perfect Parts Co., 515 S.\V.Zd 554 (Mo. 1974). 
la Mather v. Caterpillar Tractor Corp., 23 Ariz. App. 409, 533 P.2d 717 (1975) (alleged design 
defect and failure to warn concerning absense of tractor roll-over bars). ' 
14' See generally Marshall. An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a Right: Manufacturers' Liability 
for Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1065 (1973), arguing, among other things, that 
the patent defect rule ought not to apply to actions in strict liability in tort. See also Thompson v. 
Package Mach. Co., 22 Cal. App. 36 188, 99 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1971); 2 L. FRWJER & M. FREDMAN, 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY 5 16A(5)(F) (1985). Related hereto is fairly sharp criticism of the patent peril 
doctrine as it has been interpreted in design defect litigation. One such criticism was leveled in Palmer 
v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970) (an action against a hay baler 
manufacturer for injuries arising from the adjustment of a draw-bar). To the defendant's interposition 
of the obviousness defense, the court responded: "The manufacturer of the obviously defective product 
ought not to escape because the product was obviously a bad one. The law, we think, ought to 
discourage misdesign rather than encouraging it in its obvious form." Id. at 517, 476 P.2d at 719. 
See Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976) (citing with 
approval Palmer, 3 Wash. App. at 517, 476 P.2d at 719) involving a printing press operator who 
injured his hand "chasing a hickie," or removing a foreign object, from the surface of the plate of 
the unit. A new trial was ordered notwithstanding the plaintiff's admitted knowledge of the danger, 
and, for that matter, the common knowledge through the industry of the hazard. The court stated: 
As now enunciated, the patent-danger doctrine should not, in and of itself, prevent a plain- 
tiff from establishing his case. That does not mean, however, that the obviousness of the 
danger as a factor in the ultimate injury is thereby eliminated, for it must be remembered 
that in actions for negligent design, the ordinary rules of negligence apply. Rather, the 
openness and obviousness of the danger should be available to the defendant on the issue 
of whether plaintiff exercised that degree of reasonable care as was required under the 
circumstances . . . . 
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stated plainly that the "purpose of such liability is to ensure that the costs of 
injuries resulting from products are borne by the manufacturers that put such 
product. on the market, rather than by the injured persons who are powerless 
to protect theni~elves."~~~ More appropriate than immunizing from liability sellers 
who ignore patent dangers in their it has been suggested that the 
obviousness of the danger should not be an absolute defense, but rather should 
constitute but one of the factors in determining whether a product poses an un- 
reasonable danger.Is0 Pertinent to the question of the quantum of safety-related 
information held by the seller and the buyer respectively, it is further Qrged that, 
in measuring the likelihood of harm, "one may consider the obviousness of the 
defect since it is reasonable to assume that the user of an obviously defective 
product will exercise special care in its operation, and consequently the likelihood 
of harm dim in is he^."'^' 
Upon its review of like authority, the Supreme Court of North Dakota so 
concluded in Olson v. A. W. Chesterton, Co.,Is2 an action brought by the injured 
Id. at 387, 348 N.E.2d at 578, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 122 (citations omitted). See also 2 F .  HARPBR & F. 
JAMES, supra note 13 at $ 28.5. 
ITJhe bottom does not logically drop out of a negligence case against the maker when it 
is shown that the purchaser knew of the dangerous condition. Thus if the product is a 
carrot-topping machine with exposed moving parts, or an electric clothes wringer dangerous 
to the limbs of the operator, and if it would be feasible for the maker of the product to 
install a guard or safety release, it should be a question for the jury whether reasonable 
care demanded such a precaution, though its absence is obvious. Surely reasonable men 
might find here a great danger, even to one who knew the condition; and since it was so 
readily avoidable they might find the maker negligent. 
Id. at 1543 (citations omitted), quoted in Micallef, 39 N.Y.2d at 384, 348 N.E.2d at 576, 384 N.Y.S.2d 
at 120. 
la Lugue v. ~McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 144, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449 (1972) 
(quoting Greenrnan v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 
697, 701 (1962)). 
Id., 501 P.2d at 1169, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 449 (pointing out that it is anomalous to allow a 
plaintiff to prove that a manufacturer was negligent in marketing an obviously defective product, 
while precluding him from establishing the manufacturer's strict liability for doing the same thing). 
Dorsey, 331 F .  Supp. at 759. 
Is1 Id. at 760 (emphasis in original). As an aid in evaluation of "likelihood of harm" the court 
employed protocol of Dean Wade, which suggests the weighing of: 
(1) the usefulness and desirability of the product, (2) the availability of other and safer 
products to meet the same need, (3) the likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness, 
(4) the obviousness of the danger, (5) common knowledge and normal public expectation 
of the danger (particularly for established products), (6) the avoidability of injury by care 
in use of the product (including the effect of instructions or warnings), and (7) the ability 
to eliminate the danger without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product or making 
it unduly expensive. 
Id. (quoting Wade, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965)). 
IS2 Olson v. A. W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530, 537-38 (N.D. 1977). 
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operator of a conveyor belt against the manufacturer of a dressing applied to 
the belt before the accident. Affirming the verdict for the plaintiff below, the 
court turned to its view of the relationship between the patent danger rule and 
the allegation of duty to warn, stating: 
There is no valid reason for automatic preclusion of liability based solely upon 
obviousness of danger in an action founded upon the risk-spreading concept of 
strict liability in tort which is intended to burden the manufacturers of defectively 
dangerous products with special responsibilities and potential financial liabilities 
for accidental injuries. . . . We do not agree with [the manufacturer's] contention 
that since the dangers inherent in the conveyor belt system are obvious to every- 
one, no warning of potential danger need be placed on a product designed to be 
used in conjunction with that system.lS3 
The latter authority suggests that when the hazard is known, but the user or 
consumer remains at risk for want of information as to the means for avoiding 
the danger or using the product in a reasonably safe manner, an informational 
duty is preserved in the seller. Such a conclusion is consistent with the model 
that would require the seller to warn or offer instructions to the user or consumer 
when there exists an asymmetry between the germane, safety-related information 
held by the seller and that held by the buyer, when, as in Olson, the informational 
deficit suffered by the user or consumer is the lack of information known to the 
seller that will permit the use or consumption of the product free from an un- 
reasonable risk of harm. 
VI. WARNINGS AS TO UNINTENDED OR UNFORESEEABLE USE OF THE PRODUCT 
Generally stated, a manufacturer is required only to produce a product that 
is reasonably safe for its intended use. Where misuse of the product may create 
an unreasonable risk of injury or damage, the manufacturer must provide warn- 
ings adequate to permit the user to avert the hazard. This duty to warn extends 
to all risk-creating misuse that is reasonably foreseeable and is not limited by 
whether the foreseeable misuse is likely or unlikely; it need only be reasonably 
fore~eeable.~~~ 
Not very long ago, as measured in years, products liability jurisprudence 
permitted the manufacturer to presume that its product would be devoted to its 
normal use, and if it was safe when so used, it would "not [be] liable in damages 
for injury resulting from an abnormal or unusual use not reasonably antici- 
Id. at 537 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c). 
1% The proposition has been variously expressed: "[Tlhe manufacturer is not liable for injuries 
resulting from abnormal or unintended use of his product, if such use was reasonably foreseeable. 
The issue is one of foreseeability, and misuse may be foreseeable." 1A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 147, at 405-06. See Noel, supra note 68, at 97. 
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pated."lsS Under this view of a seller's duty, when the injury caused by the product 
arose from a use that could not be foreseen, the manufacturer would not be 
liable.'" In light of such policy it was held that it was not a foreseeable use of 
an automobile that it might be involved in collisions,1s7 that a hood designed for 
use as harness equipment might be used to support a man pruning trees,lS8 or 
that a consumer might splash cleaning fluid into her eye.Is9 
As is true of the decisional law concerning what represents foreseeable injury, 
the characterization of a product's foreseeable use, or if preferred, foreseeable 
misuse, has changed dramatically. This change has effectively rewritten the com- 
mon law and created a products liability remedy for injuries occasioned by product 
misuse where no remedy existed before. A galvanizing influence in this devel- 
opment has been comment k to Restatement (Second) of Torts section 395 which 
states that "[tlhe manufacturer may . . . reasonably anticipate other uses than 
the one for which the chattel is primarily intended."lm 
The thread connecting the decisions evaluating the conduct of the consumer 
in determining whether the particular and often creative use to which the product 
has been put is one that the seller ought reasonably to have foreseen, and as to 
which he should be liable for any injury caused, is "whether the plaintiff was 
acting within a commonly known area of c~nduct."'~' By such a common conduct 
standard, therefore, a kitchen chair used by a consumer to reach a high shelf 
was found to be in foreseeable use when the backrest failed to support her weight, 
causing injury.16* Similarly, a fifteen-year-old boy's dive into a thirty-inch deep 
backyard pool would be common conduct and foreseeable use of the pool for 
which the manufacturer could be held liable for consequent damages.1G3 The com- 
mon conduct standard would likewise support the conclusion that the common, 
Is5 McCready v. United Iron & Steel Co., 272 F.2d 700, 703 (10th Cir. 1959). 
Is The first Restatement took this approach, establishing that manufacturer liability for negli- 
gence is confined to situations where the product is used "for a purpose for which it is manufactured." 
RE~~ATEMENT OF ORTS $ 395 (1934). A learned observation of the same sensibility stated it this way: 
"A roller skate or even a book may become an instrument of serious injury if placed strategically 
at the top of a flight of stairs in the dark." 2 F. HARPER & F. JMS, supra note 13, at 1546. 
In Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 825 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 
(1966), overruled, Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977). 
Is$ O'Donnell v. Asplundh Tree Exp. Co., 13 N.J. 319, 99 A.2d 577 (1953). 
Sawyer v. Pine Oil Sales Co., 155 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1946). 
lm RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, 5 395 comment k continues by stating in part: "The maker 
of a chair, for example, may reasonably expect that someone will stand on it; and the maker of an 
inflammable cocktail robe may expect that it will be worn in the kitchen in close proximity to a fire." 
Note, Foreseeability in Product Dtsign and Duty lo Warn Cases-Distinctions and Miscon- 
ceptions, 1968 W~sc. L. REV. 228, 233. 
la Phiiips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235 P.2d 857 (1951). 
Colosimo v. May Dept. Store Co., 325 F. Supp. 609 (W.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd, 466 F.2d 1234 
(3d Cir. 1972). 
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while unfortunate, use of an automobile is its involvement in c01lisions.l~~ It also 
provides justification for imposing manufacturer liability where the vehicle's de- 
sign, instructions or warnings heightened the risk of accident or worsened the 
effects of one.165 
Application of a "commonly known area of conduct" standard, or a com- 
parable standard, to our measurement of the seller's safety-related information 
and any informational responsibilities with respect to that information, has the 
felicitous result of providing a reasonable limitation on what information the seller 
will be expected to impart to the buyer in connection with any particular product. 
The manufacturer, presumptively expert in an often expansive field of endeavor, 
should only be expected to make available to the buyer safety-related information 
related to the use or the foreseeable misuse of that product. The informational 
obligation should not extend to such activities as are at the furthest reaches of 
the pessimistic imagination of human conduct, but should extend instead to such 
use or misuse as can be described as being within a commonly known area of 
conduct. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A comment h provides limited guid- 
ance as to a manufacturer's duties to warn concerning potential misuse of a 
product and support for the above propositions. Reiterating that a product will 
generally not be considered in a defective condition within the meaning of strict 
liability when it is safe for normal handling and consumption, the comment sets 
forth examples of abnormal use which, if injury follows, should not result in 
manufacturer liability. The examples are those of a bottled beverage struck against 
a radiator to remove the cap (abnormal handling); the addition of too much salt 
to food (abnormal preparation for use); and a child eating too much candy and 
thereby becoming ill (abnormal consumption). From these somewhat benign risks, 
the comment distinguishes the situation where the manufacturer "has reason to 
anticipate that danger may result from a particular use" of the product, such as 
in the case of a pharmaceutical that is safe for use only in limited dosages. For 
such a product and for such a risk that can be reasonably anticipated or foreseen, 
and when the injury or illness risked, should it occur, is serious, the manufacturer 
"may be required to give adequate warning of the danger . . . and a product 
sold without such warning is in a defective condition."166 
IM Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737, 745 (1974). 
16* Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968). 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 4 402A comment h. Comment j, of the RES~ATE~ENT (SEC- 
OND) OF TORTS 5 395 states: 
Unforeseeable Use or Manner of Use. The liability stated in this Section is limited to 
persons who are endangered and the risks which are created in the course of uses of the 
chattel which the manufacturer should reasonable anticipate. In the absence of special reason 
to expect othenvise, the manufacturer is entitled to assume that h i~ .~roduct  will be put to 
normal use, for which the product is intended or appropriate; and he is not subject to 
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One excellent example of the liberal interpretation of the concept of fore- 
seeable misuseIfl is offered by Lebouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber CO. , '~~  an
action stemming from an accident in which the tread separated from the body 
of one of the vehicle's tires while the vehicle was being driven at over one hundred 
miles per hour. Interpreting state law holding that a warning could be considered 
inadequate where it rendered a product "unreasonably dangerous to normal use"169 
and providing further that the manufacturer's duty and consequent liability for 
failure to warn encompasses "all reasonably foreseeable uses of a 
the court concluded that the automobile's high horsepower and marketing to 
youthful drivers attracted to the product's power and potential speed made it 
"not simply foreseeable, but . . . readily expected, that the [vehicle] would, on 
occasion, be driven in excess of the . . . proven maximum safe operating speed 
of its . . . tires. "171 
The case of Moran v. Faberge, Inc., a decision approaching the outer doc- 
trinal reaches of liability for failure to warn as to hazards of unconventional use, 
involved an injury from ignition of women's cologne and corroborated the court's 
observation that "[t]he idle mind knows not what it is it wants."172 In Moran, 
two teen-aged girls were passing casual time in one family's recreation room when 
one concluded it would be diverting to see if she could scent a lighted candle by 
liability when it is safe for all such uses, and harm results only because it is mishandled 
in a way which he has no reason to expect, or is used in some unusual or unforeseeable 
manner. Thus ;I shoemaker is not liable to an obstinate lady who suffers harm because she 
insists on wearing a size too small for her, and the manufacturer of a bottle of cleaning 
fluid is not liable when the purchaser splashes it into his eye. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 395 comment j. 
See the excellent discussion of the distinction between the forseeability of use and the for- 
seeability of risk of harm in Newman, 278 Or. at 564, 564 P.2d at 675-77, and set forth in part 
supra note 68. 
Lebouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980). 
169 Id. at 988 (citing Chappuis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 358 So. 2d 926, 929 (La. 1978)). 
Id. at 989; see, e.g., Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So. 2d 840, 844 n.2, 847 (La. 1974) (duty to warn 
of "possible hazard" known to manufacturer); Amco Underwriters of the AMCO Underwriters of 
Audubon Ins. Co. v. American Radiator & Standard Corp., 329 So. 2d 501, 504 (La. Ct. App. 1976) 
(duty to warn of dangers even from improper use of otherwise nondefective product). See also, e.g., 
Jones v. Menard, 559 F.2d 1282, 1285 n.4 (5th Cir. 1977) (dictum, constming Louisiana law to the 
effect that "[iln inadequate warning cases misuse means that the seller had no duty to warn against 
unforeseeable uses of its products, while in design cases misuse means that the manufacturer had no 
duty to design a product so as to prevent injuries arising from unforeseeable uses of that product." 
Id.). 
Lebouef, 623 F.2d at 989. To the manufacturer's argument that the injured party's illegally 
excessive speed should not be considered a "normal" use, the court answered: "It would be blinking 
reality in this case to hold that Ford could not reasonably have expected purchasers of any automobile, 
much less one equipped and marketed as was the Cougar, to transgress our nation's speeding laws 
periodically." Id. n.4. 
In Moran v. Fi~berge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 540, 332 A.2d 11, 13 (1975). 
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pouring some of the contents of a bottle of the defendant's cologne on the bottom 
of the taper. The immediate ignition severely burned one of the two girls. The 
cologne carried no warning as to its alcohol content; about it's low flash point, 
described by one expert witness as approximately room temperature; or about the 
hazards associated with its use around open flame. The manufacturer naturally 
claimed no duty to warn existed for a hazard that was so obvious and was, 
moreover, occasioned by the injured girl's unusual, even bizarre use of the col- 
ogne. In finding for the plaintiff, the Maryland Court of Appeals first described 
the duty to warn most broadly, stating that "a duty to warn is imposed on a 
manufacture if the item it produces has an inherent and hidden danger about 
which the producer knows, or should know, could be a substantial factor in 
bringing injury to an individual or his property."173 To the Maryland court, the 
issue was not that the manufacturer should have foreseen the injured girl's irn- 
provident behavior. Instead, the issue was whether a cologne with a substantial 
alcohol content and a low flash point might reasonably be used near an open 
flame. This, the court concluded, was reasonably foreseeable, giving rise to the 
manufacturer's duty to warn.174' 
By requiring that a manufacturer anticipate the environment in which a prod- 
uct will be used, and the risks of misuse, however unorthodox, that may inhere 
in such an environment, the court in Moran did no more than follow a line of 
authority that antedates strict liability in tort and which found a most succinct 
expression in Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, 11nc.l~~ The court in Spruill held that, in 
addition to foreseeing the literal intended uses of the product, the seller "must 
also be expected to anticipate the environment which is normal for the use of 
his product, and where . . . that environment is the home, he must anticipate 
the reasonable foreseeable risks of the use of his product in such an environment 
. . . [even] though such risks may be incidental to the use for which the product 
was intended."176 Consistent with the doctrine expressed in Moran and Spruill, 
In Id. at 552, 332 A.2d at 20. 
The court summarized its analysis: 
Thus, in the context of this case, it was not necessary for a cologne manufacturer to foresee 
that someone would be hurt when a friend poured its product near the flame of a lit candle; 
it was only necessary that it be foreseeable to the producer that its product, while in its 
normal environment, may be brought near a catalyst, likely to be found in that environment, 
which can untie the chattel's inherent danger. For example while seated at a dressing table, 
a woman might strike a match to light a cigarette close enough to the top of the open 
cologne bottle so as to cause an explosion, or that while seated in a similar manner she 
might turn suddenly and accidentally bump the bottle of cologne with her elbow, splashing 
some cologne on a burning candle placed on the vanity. 
Id. at 553, 332 A.2d at 20. 
Spruill, 308 F.2d 79. 
Id. at 83-84. In that action the plaintiff's infant decedent died after drinking some of the 
defendant's cherry red furniture polish left only momentarily on a bureau near the child's crib. The 
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it is today well settled that the manufacturer must design for and impart warnings 
for involvement of its product in mishaps that are in no way related to the prod- 
uct's intended use. Thus, to use one widely appreciated example, the manufacturer 
of clothes must foresee that the wearer may, unwittingly, bring the garment into 
contact with cigarettes, stove burners, or other sources of ignition. The manu- 
facturer will be liable for any injury occasioned by the garment's unreasonable 
flammability in such a setting, notwithstanding the fact that bringing the fabric 
into contact with an ignition source is surely not an intended use of the product. 
It is, nevertheless, a foreseeable misuse.ln 
In a duty to warn action, including one in which misuse of the product is 
at issue, a third party's negligence is not a defense unless that negligence is the 
sole proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries.'78 The most common test for de- 
termination of whether an intervening negligent act represents a superseding cause 
is one of the "foreseeability of the third person's conduct."179 In the intervening 
conduct cases, the informational asymmetry analysis may be applied not to the 
safety-related information known to the injured claimant, but instead to what 
defendant argued that the container's label "harmful if swallowed, especially by children" was ad- 
equate, particularly where the product was not intended to be consumed. Affirming judgment for 
the plaintiff, the court observed that the concept of "intended use" is actually an articulation of 
"reasonable foreseaibility." Id. at 83. 
The earlier cases undulate inconsistently regarding consumer misuse of the manufacturer's duty 
to warn. One such holding that is harmonious with Spruilf involved a manufacturer's sale, without 
warnings, of "spit devils" (fireworks) wrapped in red paper and with the appearance, to children, 
of candy. A small child ate a "spit devil" and died from the poisonous explosive compound. The 
unconventional use of the fireworks withal, the manufacturer was found liable for failure to warn. 
Victory Sparkler & Specialty Co. v. Latimer, 53 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1931). A conflicting result was' 
reached in Lawson, 180 S.W.2d 751 (five-year-old unable to read sprinkles self with flammable nail 
polish that ignites when c u d  proceeds to play with matches, held: no duty to warn of this particular 
misuse). 
In See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 395 comment k, which provides: 
Foreseeable U s a  and Risks. The manufacturer may, however, reasonably anticipate other 
uses than the one for which the chattel is primarily intended. The maker of a chair, for 
example, may reasonably expect that someone will stand on it; and the maker of an in- 
flammable cocktail robe may expect that it will be worn in the kitchen in close proximity 
to a fire. For an early and illustrative case, see Noone v. Fred Perlberg, Inc., 268 A.D. 
149, 49 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1944), where a woman wearing a glazed double-netted skirt man- 
ufactured by the defendant was seriously injured when the netting of the dress, which 
contained some form of nitro-cellulose sizing, ignited, enveloping her in flames. Directing 
reinstitution of the judgement below for the plaintiff, the court stated: "The manufacturer 
knew or should have known that such an evening gown would be worn to dinners and 
cocktail parties where large numbers of persons gather and many indulge in smoking." Id. 
at 153, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 463. 
1" Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 66 Haw. 237, 248-49, 659 P.2d 734, 743 (1983) (citing 
with approval Brown v. Clark Equip. Co., 62 Haw. 530, 618 P.2d 267 (1980)). 
179 Id. at 249, 659 P.2d at 743. 
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was known by the third party. Often an absent or inadequate warning or jn- 
struction given to one who is to handle an instrumentality in which the claimant 
has placed confidence will predict the conclusion that the subsequent mishap was 
foreseeable. 
Instructive is the holding in one action brought by a patient who, while being 
x-rayed on a tilted table, was dropped to the floor when the foot rest on the 
mechanical examination platform disengaged. The evidence showed that the foot 
rest could disengage by the same method used to determine positive engagement, 
posing, in the view of the court, an "unreasonable and foreseeable" hazard. That 
a hospital technician might have misused the product by failure to appreciate that 
subtle distinction should not, resolved the court, prevent a jury from concluding 
that the manufacturer's conduct was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's in- 
juries.lW 
Similar to the effect that the negligent installation or maintenance of a man- 
ufacturer's product will not defeat liability if that misuse is foreseeable is one 
action brought by a ski instructor against the manufacturer of a chair lift. It was 
alleged that the mishap causing an adjoining chair to spring loose and knock him 
to the ground was caused by a cable clamp unit which secured the chair to the 
cable.lS1 The manufacturer defended on the ground, among others, that the actual 
cause of the accident was that the lift area's maintenance employees had not 
applied the recommended level of torque to a connecting screw. The court rejected 
that argument as a defense, however, stating that irreipective of the possible 
contribution of the maintenance employees to the peril, their actions would "not 
diminish any duty to warn, since a manufacturer is obligated to warn of dangers 
that may arise from improper use and handling"82 Normal misuse of an au- 
tomobile has likewise been found not to preclude the jury from finding as a matter 
of law that a small automobile's susceptibility to overturning could render it 
unreasonably dangerous in the absence of adequate warnings concerning that risk.Is3 
IW Id. at 248-49, 659 P.2d at 743. 
Anderson, 198 Colo. 391, 397-98, 604 P.2d 674, 678. 
I t 2  Id. at 397, 604 P.2d at 678. See Higel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 
983 (1975); Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963). 
Greiner v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselleschaft, 540 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1976), where evidence 
at trial showed the plaintiff's inebriated condition and incautious driving, including speeding on an 
unknown road and driving on the wrong side of the road at the time of the accident. The appellate 
court concluded that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury that they could find normal use 
"even if [the appellant] was mishandling the V.W. In the Judge's words, 'normal misuse' would be 
sufficient to support a finding of defect." Id. at 96. See also Benoit v. Ryan Chevrolet, 428 So. 2d 
489 (La. Ct. App. 1982), an action brought by an automobile owner who claimed that while proceeding 
down the road at a moderate speed one of the rear tires exploded with such force that a large fragment 
of the tire was propelled through the wheel well, causing damage that included, among other things, 
bending the rear door frame so as to prevent it from being closed. The defendant, by expert witness 
produced proof that the explosion occurred by overspinning, which results when the automobile is 
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A complementary result was reached in an action brought against the seller of 
a cuprock grinding wheel that flew apart during use, injuring the plaintiff.'* The 
appellate court overturned a jury verdict that included answers to special issues, 
responding affirmatively that plaintiff's improper storage, transportation, and 
handling of the grinder had been the producing cause of the accident. Conceding 
that the putative misuse might increase the risk of the accident that occurred, 
the court found ,the evidence showed that a guard probably would have contained 
any disintegration of the wheel and that a warning concerning use of the guard 
would have likely prevented such a mishap, irrespective of any mishandling.1s5 
Whether the application to which the plaintiff has put the defendant's product 
is a foreseeable one is a question involving the multiple factors of the foresee- 
ability of the use in question, the type of danger involved, and the relative degree 
of the user's knowledge of that danger.Is6 In the ordinary course, these evaluations 
will not be decided by summary disposition and should instead be considered by 
the trier of fact.lg7 There exists, of course, an undeniable synergy between the 
degree of the user's knowledge of the risk, as that factor may be deemed to be 
pertinent to the evaluation of foreseeable use, and like knowledge held by the 
seller. Where the seller is the user or consumer's sole source of knowledge as to 
the nature of the risk and has offered no warnings or instructions to the buyer 
as to the identity or the avoidance of that risk, one should pause before coun- 
tenancing a seller defense based upon nonforeseeable use. Where the seller has 
denied the buyer any information whatever as to the risks of misuse and means 
for avoidance of such hazards, in a Iater action arising from injury caused from 
such use, a user conduct defense should not prevail except in the most extreme 
instances of consumer foolhardiness. 
On the other hand, when the misuse of the product is of such a nature as 
to have been not reasonably foreseeable, the paramount logic of the rule of law 
in such a position one drive wheel rests on the ground or road surface and the other drive wheel 
does not touch the ground, while the engine is accelerated. Id. at 491. Finding liability proper, the 
court stated: "While the overspinning of tires is not part of their intended use, it is easily foreseeable 
and part of their normal use." Id. at 493. 
Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1974). 
I m  Id. at 875. The court stated the proposition in these words: "If the injury resulting from the 
foreseeable misuse of the product is one of which an adequate warning would likely prevent, then 
such misuse is no defense to an action based on the failure to given such a warning." Id. 
lM See generally Greenway, 163 Ga. App. 698, 294 S.E.2d 541. 
Beam v. Omark Indus., Inc., 143 Ga. App. 142, 237 S.E.2d 607 (1977). See Giordano v. 
Ford Motor Co., 165 Ga. App. 644, 646, 299 S.E.2d 897, 899 (1983), in which the court reversed 
summary judgement below for the manufacturer, and remanded for trial the question, inter alia, of 
foreseeable use. The action arose from injuries sustained by the plaintiff who, upon believing that 
his automobile had run out of gas, purchased two gallons of gasoline from a service station, and 
poured a small amount of gasoline on the carburetor while a service station attendant turned the 
ignition, resulting in a ball of fue causing severe bums to the plaintiff's torso. 
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precluding a plaintiff's recovery for an injury that occurred by nonforeseeable 
misuse of the product, is that the manufacturer is not required to produce a 
product that is wholly incapable of injuring the user. Instead, as is stated at the 
outset, it is only required to produce and sell a product that is reasonably safe.Is8 
By this definition of obligation or duty, the seller of a product does not become 
"an insurer against any and all injuries" caused by the product.Is9 The reductio 
ad absurdurn result of the contrary approach is suggested by one court hypoth- 
esizing an accident in which an automobile leaves the road coming to rest in a 
= river. "It could scarcely be argued," the court states, "that the manufacturer 
should have produced an automobile which would float."Ig0 
When the seller issues no warnings or other information whatever, the man- 
ufacturer should not be liable for failure to provide adequate warnings if the 
hazard ultimately causing injury is markedly different from the hazard to which 
the duty to warn logically arises. Authority so holding includes, for example, a 
decision finding that the manufacturer of a substance sprayed on fresh cement 
to hasten curing would not be liable for failure to warn for injuries sustained by 
a worker as a result of children playing with firecrackers near an empty and 
unresealed drum of the product which caught fire and exploded.lgl Similarly, the 
manufacturer of insulation employing a paper backing to block vapor and which, 
due to treatment for water repellency, was flammable, but which was to be used 
between studs of the building, would not be liable for failure to warn adequately 
for injuries sustained by a user who wrapped the insulation around water pipes 
and then used a propane torch to thaw adjoining frozen pipe section.'* It follows 
therefrom that where the manufacturer sets forth instructions for the use of the 
product, and the instructions are understandable and emphatic regarding the haz- 
See Serpiello v. Yoder Co., 418 F. Supp. 70, 71-72, (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd, 556 F.2d 568 
(3d Cir. 1977) (industrial accident involving chopping machine). 
Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co., 402 F. Supp. 1268, 1276 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 318 
(3d Cir. 1976) (per curiarn). 
190 Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (E.D. Pa. 1969), the court con- 
tinuing, "Similarly, it could not reasonably be argued that a car manufacturer should be held liable 
because its vehicle collapsed when involved in a head-on collision with a large truck, at high speed." 
Id. 
191 Bridges, 704 F.2d 175 (applying Louisiana law). 
192 Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Fyr-Fyter Sales & Sen., 67 Ohio App. 2d 11, 21 Ohio Ops. 3d 332, 
425 N.E.2d 910 (1979). Cf. May v. Giette Safety Razor Co., 464 N.E.2d 401, 402 (Mass. 1984), a 
personal injury claim brought after the plaintiff swallowed one of defendant's razor blades. Affirming 
a judgment adverse to plaintiffs warranty claims, the court expressed its view that a user's ingestion 
of its razor blades was not "a risk which the defendant is required to anticipate." Id. at 402. See 
also Marker v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1957), an action arising from the 
death by asphyxiation of an oil company employee in the process of recharging by hot catalyst, which 
in contact with air creates carbon monoxide, rather than cold catalyst, which had previously been used. 
The court therein states that the duty to warn does not "extend [ ] to the potential danger involved 
in the totally unanticipated misuse of an item." Id. at  606 (citation omitted). 
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ards of misuse, the consumer's disregard of them can be considered misuse pre- 
cluding liability for the seller. Such a result has been reached in actions involving 
a plaintiff that used tires of improper size and improper inflation,Ig3 and a plaintiff 
that mixed together the defendant's hair bleaching preparation with the prepa- 
ration of another manufacturer.'" 
Another action in which the injured party's disregard of the manufacturer's 
instructions, taken in conjunction with a creative, if unfortunate, misuse of the 
product, led to a denial of recovery is Brown v. General Motors Co.Ig5 The plain- 
tiff and a companion, undertaking to lubricate the driveshaft of a bulldozer man- 
' 
ufactured by the defendant, touched the starter button momentarily to rotate the 
shaft to facilitate the job. The engine started, and the machine crushed the plain- 
tiff. The court, impressed by the evidence of the manufacturer's express prohi- 
bition of the m'meuver executed by the plaintiff,Ig6 and the agility required for 
its a~complishment,~" determined that there was insufficient evidence of plaintiff's 
normal use to permit submission of the issue to the j ~ r y . ~ 9 ~  Even where the type 
19) McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co., 391 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1968) "We do not believe that the 
strict liability doctrine means that . . . a consumer may knowingly violate the plain, unambiguous 
instructions and ignore the warnings, then hold the makers, distributors and sellers of a product liable 
in the face of the obvious misuse of the product." Id. at 370 (quoting Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. 
v. Langley, 422 S.W.2d 773, 780 flex. Civ. App. 1967)). 
Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 385 F.2d 841, where beauty shop's unauthorized resale to plaintiff 
of preparation clearly marked "FOR PROFESSIONAL USE", court on review holds that subsequent 
nonprofessional application leading to scalp injuries constituted intervening cause precluding manu- 
facturer liability for alleged inadequate warnings. 
Brown v. General Motors Co., 355 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1966). 
Id. Several of the instructions, read in pari materia, served to bolster the simple warning 
therein: "Make sure no one is working on the unit before starting engine . . . . " Id. at 817-18. 
In the words of the court, "[Ilf the engine was in gear, [the plaintiff] could touch the starter 
only by squeezing his thumb or finger between the shield and the button." Id. at 820. 
Id. In the view of the court: "Certainly, the manufacturer did not warrant the safety of the 
machine against a blind operation of it; nor was it reasonably foreseeable that the machine would 
be activated by one fumbling in the dark." Id. See also Zollman v. Syrnington Wayne Corp., 438 
F.2d 28 (7th Ci.), czrt denied, 404 U.S. 827 (1977), an action brought by plaintiffs who were injured 
when a vehicle fell from an automobile hoist manufactured by the defendant. Where evidence from 
numerous tests on the same or on identical hoists showed that automobiles fell only when the front 
crossbar was placed under the front edge of the bumper, allowing the crossbar to slide out under 
minimal pressure, and which procedure the plaintiff admitted was dangerous: 
(while denying that it was the procedure employed prior to the accident). The verdict for 
plaintiffs was reversed and the action remanded with instructions. The appellate court con- 
cluded that one plaintiff "must have lifted the automobile in what he acknowledged would 
be a dangerous manner." A manufacturer has no duty to warn against obvious misuses of 
a product under Indiana law. 
Id. at 32 (citations omitted). 
Cf. Littlehale v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967). a negligence 
action against the manufacturer of detonators (blasting caps), manufactured during wartime for war- 
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of mishap that ultimately occurs is similar in nature to that which could be created 
by the risk inherent in a particular product, the means by which the accident 
occurred may be of such a nature as to prompt a finding of unforeseeable misuse. 
One illustrative action, mentioned above, was that brought against the manu- 
facturer of a chemical used to aid in the proper curing of concrete.lg9 Aware of 
the flammable nature of the product, the manufacturer undertook to identify on 
the container the flammability of the product and other detailed cautions.2w The 
plaintiff, a foreman of a crew using the product on a construction product, was 
injured when he neared an open, discarded drum he thought to be on fire, which 
then exploded. The evidence showed the possibility that the fire in the drum had 
been started by children observed earlier that day playing with firecrackers near 
the site. On the issue of whether the sequence of events was unforeseeable, the 
court was impressed by the recognition that three different circumstances, each 
of which were cautioned against by the manufacturer, had to take place before 
the explosion occurred.201 Taking the evidence in the aggregate, the court con- 
cluded that a jury could reasonably find that the defendant was not negligent in 
failing to foresee the hazard of explosion and warn against itszm However, another 
case which purported to apply a comparable standard found no liability of the 
manufacturer even where the chain of causation was not attenuated. In that case, 
time use by trained ordinance personnel, but then put into use over a decade later by civilian personnel 
of one of the armed forces branches who, in the words of the court, "apparently considered (any) 
warnings by the manufacturer to be superfluous." Id. at 275. The court held that there should be 
no liability for a defendant where the manufacturer "could not have foreseen that its detonators 
would be used by a person untrained in the handling of such explosives and in a manner that was 
never intended." Id. at 276 (citations omitted). 
Bridges, 704 F.2d 175. 
Id. at 177. The warnings included: "Keep Away From Heat and Open Flame," "Close Con- 
tainer After Each Use and Use Only With Adequate Ventilation," and "Keep Out of the Reach of 
Children". 
Id. at 179. In the words of the court: 
In this case, the combination of occurrences was unusual, making anticipation of  the events 
by the manufacturer difficult. The drums were discarded without resealing, contrary to the 
manufacturer's instructions. If the drums had been sealed, an open fire could not have 
entered. Contrary to warnings, children were playing nearby. The contractors had known 
of prior trouble with neighborhood children, yet had taken insufficient action to prevent 
accidents. Finally, the evidence supports a conclusion that open flame in the form of a 
firecracker was introduced to the drum, contrary to warnings. Bridges knew the contents 
of the drum were burning when he approached it. Where three different circumstances, 
each the result of a practice against which the manufacturer cautioned, needed to occur in 
combination before an explosion took place, a jury could reasonably conclude that the 
manufacturer was not negligent in failing to foresee the hazard and to warn against the 
risk of explosion. Similarly, a jury could find the product not unreasonably dangerous or 
defective in the absence of such a warning. Even under strict liability, a manufacturer need 
not insure against all defects, but only against unreasonable dangers. 
Id. 
= Id. 
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the court held in favor of the defendant manufacturer of a toy combination of 
a balloon and doll that simulated blowing a bubble, which was responsible for 
the death of a chid who ingested the b a l l o ~ n . ~  
From the standpoint of the symmetry of safety-related information held by 
the buyer and the seller respectively, in the "firecracker-in-drum" case, one could 
claim reasonably that the warnings as to flammability, closure, and keeping the 
product away from children represented all that the manufacturer could reason- 
ably be said to know about the risks of it's product. Put another way, the in- 
formational duty should not require one to warn about what cannot be imagined. 
In the balloon and doll action, on the other hand, it is one thing to say that 
balloons are not unreasonably dangerous, but it is quite another to market for 
infants a toy that simulates the use of a balloon as though it were an edible 
foodstuff, i.e., bubble gum. When such a risk cannot be warned against, the 
product should be removed from the market. 
VII. CAUSATION AND DISREGARD OF WARNINGS BY THE PLAINTIFF OR OTHERS 
In the failure to warn claim, as in other products liability causes of action, 
the plaintiff's proof must establish causation. In its most elementary form, such 
proof will show that, had the seller supplied an adequate warning, the injured 
claimant would have altered his or her behavior so as to avoid injury.2m 
Thus, pivotal to the successful maintenance of plaintiff's claim of actionable 
failure to warn is the demonstration that the seller's failure to warn adequately 
of the hazard was the cause-in-fact and the proximate cause of the injury. As 
expressed by one court, "the evidence must be such as to support a reasonable 
m3 Landrine v. Mego Corp., 95 A.D.2d 759, 464 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1983), in which the court, finding 
the infant's actions, and, inferentially, the guardian's omission to act in permitting the infant's actions, 
an unforeseeable misuse of the product, states: 
Balloons in and of themselves are not dangerous. Their characteristics, features and pro- 
pensities are well-known, to children and adults alike. No duty to warn exists where the 
intended or foreseeable use of the product is not hazardous . . . . Digestion of a balloon 
is not an intended use, and to the extent it is a foreseeable one, it is a misuse of the product 
for which the ~wardian of children must be wary. 
Id. at 759-60, 464 M.Y.S.2d at 518. 
Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985), in which the court 
states: 
Where . . . the initial hurdles of duty and failure to warn have been passed, plaintiff must 
establish causation by showing that had defendants issued a proper warning, plaintiffs would 
have altered their behavior to avoid the injury. Defendants can defeat causation in a failure 
to warn case by discrediting plaintiffs' claims that they would have acted to avoid injury. 
or by pointing to a third party as the sole proximate cause. 
Id. at 492-93. 
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inference, rather than a guess, that the existence of an adequate warning may 
have prevented the accident before the issue of causation may be submitted to 
the In that action an automobile manufacturer avoided liability for an 
asserted breach of duty to warn of the risk that its automobile with a standard 
transmission may lurch fonvard or backward if started without engaging the clutch. 
The court concluded that plaintiff's argument that a warning would have pre- 
vented the injury was "mere   peculation."^^^ Congruent authority is found in an 
action arising from plaintiff's injuries following an effort to prime an automobile 
carburetor by application of gasoline poured from a quart jar. The trial court's 
judgment for the automobile manufacturer and retailer was affirmed. The ap- 
pellate court approved the introduction at trial of evidence tending to show that 
the plaintiff was careless and would have disregarded any warning in the vehicle's 
manual against such do-it-yourself initiatives, including evidence of the plaintiff's 
drinking and smoking during the events in question and his disregard of other 
admonitions contained in the 
Two presumptions, both bearing on causation, have gained widespread ap- 
proval in duty to warn litigation. The first, applicable where some warning is, 
Conti, 743 F.2d at 198. An illustrative jury instruction on the requirement of plaintiff's proof 
of proximate cause in a duty to warn claim as expressed by one court states: 
[Tlhe words proximate cause . . . mean first, that there must have been a connection between 
the conduct of the defendants, . . . which the plaintiff claims was negligent and the injury 
complained of by the plaintiff, and second, that the occurrence which is claimed to have 
produced that injury was a natural and probable result of such conduct of the defendant 
. . . . [Tlhe words proximately contributed . . . mean first, that there must have been a 
connection between the conduct of the plaintiff which defendant claims was negligent and 
the injury of which plaintiff complains, and second, that the occurrence which is claimed 
to have produced that injury was a natural and probable result of such conduct of the 
plaintiff . . . . 
Warner v. General Motors Corp., 137 Mich. App. 340, 344, n.1, 357 N.W.2d 689, 692-93 n.1 (1984). 
'M Conti, 743 F.2d at 198. The plaintiff therein sustained injuries when her husband started the 
automobile without disengaging the clutch, and the car jumped backwards, injuring her. To plaintiff's 
argument that an effective warning could have averted the accident, the appellate court responded 
that the plaintiff had not proved that any additional warning would have prevented the husband's 
"momentary inadvertence" in failing to disengage the clutch before starting the automobile. Id. at 
197-98. Also illustrative is the decision of the same court, PoweU v. 3. T. Posey Co., 766 F.2d 131 
(3d Cir. 1985), in which the court was asked to consider the claim of a nurse who injured her back 
as she assisted a patient who had released himself from a restraining vest. The court reversed the 
judgment below, finding the manufacturer of the "Houdini Security Suit" liable for failure to warn, 
as it concluded that no warning would have altered the plaintiff's decision to employ this vest, rather 
than a more restrictive one, due to the patient's history of passivity, and that her action to assist 
the partially disengaged patient when he appeared to be falling was an "instinctive one" that no 
warning would have prevented. In the words of the court, "The manufacturer could have placed a 
warning in its literature, on the vest itself, or even on the door of Adam's room, and yet this accident 
still would have occurred." Id. at 134-35. 
Warner, 137 Mich. App. at 344-46, 357 N.W.2d at 693-95. 
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in fact, given, is stated in comment j to Restatement (Second) of Torts section 
402A. It provides that "[tvlhere a warning is given, the seller may reasonably 
assume that it will be read and heeded ...." The reciprocal presumption adopted 
by many courts is that when no warning has been given, a plaintiff may benefit 
from the presumption that had a warning been given, it would have been read 
and heeded.208 Such a presumption, which can be viewed as supportive of the 
purposes behind the doctrine of strict liability, has the meritorious effect of ob- 
viating the need for speculative testimony concerning whether plaintiff would have 
heeded a warning.209 
The defendant may overcome plaintiff's claim that the inadequate or absent 
warning was one proximate cause of injury by showing either that (1) even with 
an adequate warning the plaintiff would have acted in an identical way, and thus 
would have suffered the injury; or (2) that the independent acts, negligent or 
otherwise, of a third party were the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. The 
required causal connection between the inadequacy of the warning and the plain- 
tiff's injury is weak if the proof shows that the claimant would have pursued the 
same course of conduct irrespective of any cautionary inf~rmat ion.~ '~  An illus- 
trative example of decisional law so holding is that reached in an action in which 
a truck manufacturer and the manufacturer of a multipiece rim were sued for 
injuries when the rim components explosively disengaged. The injured party therein 
employed a safety cage for the task of repairing the tire and reassembly of the 
rim parts, but attempted to replace the repaired tire and rim on the truck without 
the benefit of the cage. Reversing the trial court's denial of summary disposition 
for the tire manufacturer, an appellate court found that the plaintiff's claim was 
precluded by his own testimony "that if had he read a warning with respect to 
m8 Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat'l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820, 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1975), rev'd on other grounds, 265 Ind. 457, 358 N.E.2d 974 (1976). Either presumption can be 
rebutted by evidence, one court suggests with asperity, "that the user was blind, illiterate, intoxicated 
at the time of use, irresponsible or lax in judgment or by some other circumstances tending to show 
that the improper use was or would have been made regardless of the warning." Technical Chem. 
Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. 1972) (reversing 472 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971)). 
M9 NiSSen Trampoline Co., 332 N.E.2d 820. 
210 The naked proposition that a warning might have induced the party to elect a different, and 
preferably more safe, course of conduct, has been held not to be a sufficient basis for imposition 
of liability for failure to warn. Powell, 766 F.2d at 134-35 (recovery denied for failure to show that 
any warning as to such a potential mishap would have caused the plaintiff to alter her conduct 
precluded recovery on the claim of the manufacturer's failure to warn). 
In Kohler v. hledline Indus., Inc., [I98485 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) q 10,249 
m a .  Dist. Ct. App. 1984), the court affirmed summary judgment for the manufacturer of a urine 
bag that, after use, was left unclosed by one nurse, causing another nurse, the plaintiff, to slip and 
fall when some of the bag's contents fell to the floor. In the opinion of the appellate court, the 
forgetfulness of the first nurse was the sole cause of the accident, and the mishap was one that even 
a "multilingual warning . . . printed on the bag" would not have prevented. On the facts before it, 
the court concluded that to grant a remedy in failure to warn for plaintiff "would be as futile as 
an attempt to reverse the seasons." Id. at 26,869. 
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the danger he would still have followed precisely the same repair procedures."211 
The manufacturer may also attempt to overcome the plaintiff's proof of caus- 
ation by showing that the act of a third party, often the employer, or in the case 
of pharmaceuticals, the physician, operated as the "efficient intervening cause" 
of the injury.212 Where the conduct of a third party is implicated in the defense 
of an allegation of failure to warn, the defendant is required to show that the 
act or omission to act of the third party was not foresee~able.~~~ Proof of suf- 
ficiently intrusive third party conduct sufficient to break causation is a formidable 
task and must show that the third party's conduct is itself the proximate cause 
of injury. One court, in the appeal of an asbestos-related claim, suggested that 
the manufacturer's showing that the conduct of the employee was the "sole prox- 
imate cause" of the plaintiff's pernicious exposure to respirable asbestos might 
only be achieved by the proffer of evidence that the employer had, for example, 
"removed the warning labels, or . . . forced its employees in some manner to 
work in direct contact with asbestos against their will."214 
Spencer v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Mich. App. 356, 367 N.W.2d 393 (1985), the court explaining 
in pertinent part: 
Plaintiff Robert Spencer was specifically questioned about his awareness of the nature and 
extent of danger. He stated that he was aware of the cause of the explosive disengagement 
and indicated that-if he had read a warning with respect to the danger he would still have 
followed precisely the same repair procedures. After the accident, he continued to change 
tires following the same procedure he had followed before the accident despite his awareness 
of the risk. Thus, by his own testimony, plaintiff refuted a causal connection between the 
lack of a warning of the danger of three-piece wheel rims and plaintiff's injury. 
Id. at 361-62. 367 N.W.2d at 396. 
212 Bennison v. Stillpass Transit Co., 5 Ohio St. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 213 (1966), where the 
employee of the purchaser was injured while cleaning out a tank which still smelled of gasoline and 
which was purchased from the defendant. The authorization by the employer to use these cleaning 
procedures when gasoline vapors were still present in the tank constituted a break in causation suf- 
ficient to relieve the seller of liability. 
213 Evridge v. American Honda Motor Co., 685 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tenn. 1985), was an action 
brought against a motorbike manufacturer for injuries sustained by a young child when a nine-year 
old neighbor, carrying a passenger on the bike in disregard of the manufacturer's warnings against 
doing so, lost control of the bike, resulting in bums to the plaintiff's foot caused by contact with 
the product's exhaust pipe. On the issue of whether the conduct of the nine-year-old neighbor, and 
his parents, in permitting "doubling" on the bike, was the efficient intervening cause of the harm, 
the court stated: "The characterization as an intervening cause of the failure to heed warning is a 
determination that is particularly for the jury because of the test of foreseeability which is attached 
to that characterization." Id. at 636 (citation omitted). 
"' Van Buskirk, 760 F.2d at 493. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 442 provides the most 
widely-enlisted aid to evaluation of when an intervening act breaks causation and becomes an efficient 
intervening cause. The section states: 
5 442. CONSIDERATIONS IMPORTANT IN D E T E R ~ ~ G  ~VHETBER AN INTERVENING FORCE IS A 
SUPERSEDING CAUSE 
The following considerations are of importance in determining whether an intervening force 
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Taken together, the issues to be resolved in the inquiry as to whether an 
employer's acts or omissions to act operate to relieve the manufacturer from 
liability for failure to warn are these: (1) Whether the manufacturer's failure to 
warn was a substantial cause of the plaintiff's injury; (2) whether the manufac- 
turer's negligent conduct was of a continuing nature; (3) whether the plaintiff's 
injury resulting from the employer's negligence was the same type of injury ex- 
pected to result from the manufacturer's negligence; and (4) whether the em- 
ployer's negligent failure to warn was reasonably foreseeable to the manufac t~ re r .~~~  
Under such a test, it is unlikely that a third party's conduct in simply failing to 
warn employees of the hazard would supersede the manufacturer's acts as the 
proximate cause of the consequent injury. A conclusion consistent with this was 
reached in an action in which the hand of the plaintiff employee was injured by 
the unexpected cycling of a punch press. The only warning provided by the man- 
ufacturer was that set forth in a service manual the court described as "unlikely 
is a superseding cause of harm to another: 
(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm different in kind from that which 
would otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligence; 
@) the fact that its operation or the consequences thereof appear after the event to 
be extraordinary rather than normal in view of the circumstances existing at the time of 
its operation; 
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating independently of any situation created 
by the actor's negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal result of such a 
situation; 
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening force is due to a third person's act 
or to his failure to act; 
(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an act of a third person which is 
wrongful toward the other and as such subjects the third person to liability to him; 
(f) the degree of culpability of wrongful act of a third person which sets the intervening 
force in motion. 
Some authority holds that where the inadequate warning is implicated in the injury of an employee, 
but where the employer, and buyer, failed, for example, to adequately train its employees in the use 
of the product, or failed to enforce its plant safety rules, that the buyer's misconduct should be 
admitted into evidence as bearing upon the adequacy of the warnings given, and upon whether the 
asserted deficiency in the warnings was a proximate cause of the accident or injury. In one such 
action involving the claims of numerous workers for injuries resulting from exposure to asbestos- 
based insulation products, the primary supplier of the asbestos defended on the grounds that irre- 
spective of the efficacy of the manufacturer's warnings, the fabricator's subsequent failure to warn 
its employees and to protect them from asbestos operated as the superseding cause of the injuries. 
The court found that such a defense should not be prevented, as a matter of law, from going to the 
jury. Menna v. Johns-Manville Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1178 (D.N.J. 1984). Superseding cause is defined 
as: "An act of a third person or other force which by its intervention prevents the actor from being 
liable for harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, 8 440 (1965). 
21s Gordon v. Niagara Mach. and Tool Works, 574 F.2d 1182, 1192 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing 
Solomon v. Continental Baking Co., 172 Miss. 388, 160 So. 732 (1935) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS 5 447), reh'g denied, 578 F.2d 871 (1978). 
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to reach operators of the press." The manufacturer countered that the employer's 
failure to warn the operators of the dangers of placing their hands in the die 
area of the press was the proximate cause of the injury. The court was persuaded 
by expert testimony, however, that appropriate and conspicuous warnings affixed 
to the press itself would have been, under any circumstances, the best means of 
fulfilling the informational obligation to the users of the press, and that the 
manufacturer's "substantial and continuing" omission to do so required a finding 
of liability.216 
It is generally agreed, therefore, that even when the product's original defect, 
by warning, design or otherwise, is not the sole cause of the accident, but is, 
rather, a substantial cause of the injury along with the subsequent conduct of 
the purchaser, the manufacturer will remain liable.217 Thus, convincing authority 
holds that, absent the manufacturer's showing of an intervening superseding cause 
or of the proximate cause, the simple showing that the purchaser "failed to take 
reasonable steps" to protect against the risk created by the manufacturer should 
not permit a jury finding that the purchaser's conduct was the proximate cause 
of the injury.21s 
When, on the other hand, the employer-purchaser of machinery to be used 
by others disregards the manufacturer's explicit advice that precautionary meas- 
ures be adopted with respect to the machine to ensure safe use, an employee's 
later claim against the manufacturer for failure to warn, alleged to be the prox- 
imate cause of the employee's injuries, may fail. Such was the holding in an 
action brought against the manufacturer of a chemical mixer, the documents ac- 
x6 Id. at 1194. The court states: 
The Court of Appeals asks the hypothetical question, 'If Poloron had given the re- 
quired warnings, what more could Niagara's inanimate warning plate have accomplished?' 
Plaintiff's expert on industrial accident prevention signs gave what, to us, is a most rea- 
sonable answer. He testified that a direct warning attached to the press and conspicuously 
displayed at eye level would surely be a more effective warning than oral words of caution 
taken from Niagara's manual. A prominent warning on the machine itself would be readily 
understood as necessary for one's safety, regardless of the level of the operator's skill or 
experience or whatever the task at hand. Thus, even if Poloron had advised its press op- 
erators of physical danger, the failure of Niagara to affix explicit warnings on the machine 
itself is an omission of such substantial and continuing effect as to have a definite causal 
connection with plaintiff's injuries. 
Id. 
21' See discussion in Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234 (1984). 
218 Butler, 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) at 28,252 to which discussion the court adds: 
The public interest in assuring that defective products are not placed into the channels of 
trade imposes a duty on the manufacturer to take feasible steps to render his product safe; 
the manufacturer may not rely on 'the haphazard conduct of the ultimate purchaser' to 
remedy or protect against defects for which he is responsible. 
Id. at 28,252 (citations omitted). 
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companying the sale of which required the purchaser, prior to use, to install an 
electric motor, starter, and switches. The instructions to the purchaser also advised 
that a "suitable fuse disconnect switch" be employed to permit power to be shut 
off during repairs. The buyer did not install such a disconnect switch, and plaintiff 
employee was injured thereafter while cleaning the interior of the mixer. The 
appellate court, affirming the trial court's judgment for the seller, found that the 
buyer's "failure to heed" the seller's suggested precautions, was "the intervening, 
sole proximate cause" of the 
SimilarIy, a third party's disregard of warnings for failure to communicate 
warnings to employees may be considered to break causation where the third 
party's acts are coupled with the third party's direction that the product be put 
to unsafe uses or reuses that are beyond the reasonably foreseeable contemplation 
of the m a n u f a c t ~ r e r . ~  In one action presenting such circumstances the plaintiff's 
employer was sold a cylinder of refrigerant upon which a label stated: "This is 
a no deposit, disposable container. Illegal to refill." At the employer's direction, 
the cylinder was refilled with compressed air for other purposes, and exploded 
when the plaintiff employee picked it up. The appellate court reversed judgment 
below for the plaintiff, concluding that the seller had "no duty to protect the 
plaintiff against such an intervening cause."u1 
Related but distinct policies are evidenced in the evaluation of whether the 
acts or omissions to act of a prescribing physician should exculpate a pharma- 
ceutical manufacturer's failure to provide adequate warnings for the administra- 
tion of pharmaceuticals. As a general proposition, the manufacturer of a 
Thomas v. Munson Mach. Co., 463 So. 2d 1044, 1046 (Miss. 1985) (quoting E. I. Du Pont 
de Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss. 378, 73 So. 2d 249 (1954), an action involving a claim 
against the manufacturer of a chemical compound, where the manufacturer stated expressly that the 
product was not to be used as cattle feed). 
A manufacturer is entitled to expect that a warning, once given, will be observed. See Fur- 
stenheim V. Congregation of the First Church of Kew Gardens, 21 N.Y.2d 893, 236 N.E.2d 638, 289 
N.Y.S.2d 410 (1963) (manufacturer relieved of liability in action brought by pedestrian injured by 
explosion caused by contractor's disregard of caution on cleaner can to extinguish pilot lights). 
Union Carbide Corp. v. Holton, 136 Ga. App. 726, 222 S.E.2d 105 (1975), in which the 
court offered this analysis: 
Even if appellant could have foreseen that its disposable cylinders might be reused, it had 
no control over how they might be refilled, what and how much substance would be used 
in them, how long they could be safely refilled, and what gauges or release valves should 
be used on them. No amount of labeling on the original container can instruct the consumer 
in all aspects of how to safely modify and reuse the cylinders, considering the myriad of 
conceivable reuses to which such cylinders might be put . . . . It was not the duty of ap- 
pellant to provide equipment on the cylinder that would make it safe for refilling because 
it did not sell it for that purpose. It was instead the duty of the person reusing it to make 
it safe for the purpose for which he intended to use it. In effect, appellant had no 'duty 
to protect the plaintiff against such an intervening cause.' 
Id. at 729-30, 222 S.E.2d at 109 (citations omitted). 
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prescription drug has the legal duty to warn the medical profession, and not the 
individual patient, of any risk associated with the use of its p r o d u ~ t s . ~  The 
physician is expected to assume the role of learned intermediary between the drug 
manufacturer and the patient and to convey to the patient the information, warn- 
ings and instructions provided by the manufacturer. The troubling issue often 
arises that the physician fails to do or is alleged to have failed to do so. Illustrative 
is an action in which an opthamologist prescribed for a patient ethambutol hy- 
drochloride, the use of which carried the risk of causing optic neuritis and at- 
tendant permanent loss of vision. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that the 
manufacturers of this opthalmic drug issued warnings that were "ambiguous, 
incomplete, inadequate, [and] watered down." The defendants countered that the 
injury was probably caused by the physician's admitted departure from the eye 
testing procedures and dosage recommendations of the manufacturers. The court 
concluded that the issue of whether the physician's actions were not foreseeable 
and were the independent intervening cause was proper for jury r e s o l u t i ~ n . ~  
To like effect, in an action to recover for neurological injuries resulting from 
excessive doses of the drug dilantin, an anticonvulsive, the defendant manufacturer 
defended successfully by proving that the plaintiff's physician prescribed the drug 
without checking the paclcage insert or the Physician's Desk Reference for in- 
formation on the drug and continued to prescribe administration of the drug, 
first in capsule, and then in liquid form.224 Similarly, in an action brought by 
the parents of a child born with birth defects alleged to have resulted from the 
mother's ingestion of the drug Biphetamine during pregnancy, the court deter- 
mined that the defendant manufacturer presented a jury issue as to intervening 
cause by offering proof that the prescribing physician failed to read the package 
E.g., Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 405 Mich. 79, 88, 273 N.W.2d 476, 479 (1979). 
The adequacy of a warning is ordinarily a question for the jury, e.g., Formella v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 
I00 Mich. App. 649, 300 N.W.2d 356 (1980), and contemplates an evaluation of whether the warning, 
"under all the circumstances . . . reasonably discloses to the medical profession all the risks inherent 
in the use of the drug which the manufacturer knew or should have known to exist." Seley, 67 Ohio 
St. 2d at 198, 423 N.E.2d at 836-37; see also McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 
528 P.2d 522 (1974). The standards relevant to the adequacy of warnings associated with the use of 
prescription drugs, require that (1) the warning indicate sufficiently the scope of the hazard; (2) the 
warning communicate effectively the extent and seriousness of the harm that may result from misuse; 
(3) the size, style, and location of the warning must be sufficient to alert a reasonably prudent person 
to the danger; and (4) the means employed to bring the warning to the attention of the physician 
must be adequate and effective. Ross v. Jacobs, 684 P.2d 1211, 1214 (Okla. App. 1984) (citing with 
approval Richards v. UpJohn Co., 94 N.M. 675, 615 P.2d 992, cert. denied, 96 N.M. 675, 625 P.2d 
1192 (1980)). 
" Ross, 684 P.2d 1211. 
Peterson v. Parke-Davis & Co. [I98485 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) q 10,558. 
(Colo. App. 1985). "Where, as here, an attending physician, in prescribing and in supervising the 
use of a drug, disregards the manufacturer's warnings and instruction, it is that conduct which renders 
the product unreasonably dangerous, and thus defective, and the adequacy of the warnings or in- 
structions are not relevant." Id. at 28,177 (citation omitted). 
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inserts and the Physician's Desk Reference before prescribing the drug.w Such 
authority suggests, in effect, that a physician's inadequate or negligent action or 
inaction in heeding or conveying a manufacturer's cautionary materials for phar- 
maceuticals may represent a "misuse" of the product that breaks causation be- 
tween the asserted imperfections of the manufacturer's warnings and instructions 
and the patient's injury or illness. Under such reasoning, it is the physician's 
conduct that renders the drug dangerously defective, and thus the issue of the 
seller's warnings and their adequacy are not relevant.u6 
It is, however, by no means automatic that a manufacturer's showing of 
the negligent failure to heed a warning will exonerate the manufacturer when the 
warning is proved to be inadequate. The manufacturer may avoid liability in a 
failure to warn action only if it can establish affirmatively that the prescribing 
physician would not have heeded and followed an adequate warning.u7 When, 
on the other hand, plaintiff's evidence provides some support for the contention 
that an adequate warning might have altered the physician's conduct or might 
have been heeded, it has been held that the action should be able to go to the 
jury on the question of c a u s a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Reeder v. Hammond, [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 19,721 (Mich. App. 
1983). 
U6 See Uptain v. Huntington Lab., Inc., 685 P.2d 218 (Colo. App. 1984). As perceived by courts 
adopting this view, where the physician's acts or omissions to act were reasonably foreseeable, the 
intervening negligence of the doctor, however lamentable, will not break the link of causation between 
the manufacturer's failure to provide adequate warnings, and the resulting injuries. On the other 
hand, where the physician's actions were not reasonably foreseeable, and constituted an independent 
intervening cause, the manufacturer should not be held liable. Ross, 684 P.2d 1211. Richards, 95 
N.M. 675, 625 P.2d 1192 (whether physician's negligence constitutes an independent intervening cause 
is a jury question). 
May, 142 hlich. App. at 418, 370 N.W.2d at 379; Stanback v. Parke-Davis & Co., 657 F.2d 
642, 645 (4th Cir. 1981). E.g., Fraley v. American Cyanamid Co., 589 F. Supp. 826, 827-28 (D. 
Colo. 1984), in which the plaintiff contracted polio from contact with her child who had been given 
a polio vaccine, and who alleged that the manufacturer failed to warn of such risks; (citing Douglas 
v. Bussabarger, 73 Wash. 2d 476, 438 P.2d 829, (1968) (physician statement that he did not read the 
warning)); Oppenheimer v. Sterling Drug Co., 7 Ohio App. 2d 103, 219 N.E.2d 54, 58 (1964) (phy- 
sicians statement that he relied not on manufacturer's warnings, but rather on his own expertise). 
" May, 142 hlich. App. 404, 370 N.W.2d 371, where on the issue of whether a physician who 
prescribed oral contraceptives would have altered his conduct had the manufacturer effectively warned 
physicians that persons with Type A blood had a three times greater risk of developing blood clots 
as those with Type 0, the physician testified that he would have "undoubtedly" warned the decedent. 
Id. at 379. In another action for inadequacy of the drug manufacturer's warning, the evidence showed 
that the physician had in any event forgotten such warning as there was. The court rejected the 
pharmaceutical company's claim that the physician's action constituted superseding negligence, and 
countered that if the physician had been adequately warned, and then had forgotten, there would be 
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VIII. THE DUTY OF THE NONMANUFACTURING SELLER 
Liability for failure to provide adequate warnings may be imposed upon all 
entities within the chain of distribution, including not only manufacturers, but 
suppliers, wholesalers, distributors and retailers as well.ug Therefore, it is not 
unusual for liability for failure to warn or to furnish a safe product to be placed 
upon a distributor, notwithstanding the fact that the party did not itself man- 
ufacture the risk-creating product.u0 
Notwithstanding the coexistence of informational duties between and among 
the different entities in the distribution chain, there are recognized distinctions 
in nature and degree between the duty to warn of the manufacturer and that of 
the distributor or the retailer. For example, the duty to warn of the manufacturer 
is understood generally to be greater than that of the retailerYu1 with such dis- 
tinctions being "grounded in the different information that the manufacturer and 
the vendor may posses as to the hazards of the product."u2 Thus, there exists 
authority that limits nonmanufacturing dealer liability for failure to warn to sit- 
uations in which the defect or hazard is one that is known ... or visible ...[ and] 
no manufacturer liability. However, where the manufacturer had put a "dangerous drug" on the 
market without adequate warning, the court concluded that the company should not be heard to say 
that the physician might have disregarded a proper one. McCue v. Nonvich Pharmaceutical Co., 453 
F.2d 1033, (1st Cir. 1972). 
219 Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97 Ill. 2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 210 (1983); Venus 
v. O'Hara, 127 Ill. App. 3d 19, 468 N.E.2d 405 (1984). 
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 830 G.D.N.Y. 1984); see, e.g., 
Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961); Henningsen v. Bloom- 
field Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A. 
In the leading case of Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. 
Rptr. 896 (1964), Justice Traynor develops the rationale for application of strict liability to retailers: 
Retailers like manufacturers are engaged in the business of distributing goods to the public. 
They are an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise that should 
bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products . . . . In some cases the retailer 
may be the only member of that enterprise reasonably available to the injured plaintiff. In 
other cases the retailer himself may play a substantial part in insuring that the product is 
safe or may be in a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end; the retailer's 
strict liability thus serves as an added incentive to safety. Strict liability on the manufacturer 
and retailer alike affords maximum protection to the injured plaintiff and works no injustice 
to the defendants, for they can adjust the costs of such protection between them in the 
course of their continuing business relationship. Accordingly, as a retailer engaged in the 
business of distributing goods to the public, [Defendant] is strictly liable in tort for personal 
injuries caused by defects in cars sold by it. 
Id. at 262, 391 P.2d at 171-72, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899 (citations omitted). 
E.g., Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 275, 461 N.E.2d 864, 871, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 864 
(1984) (The manufacturer and the vendor do not necessarily have the same obligation to warn con- 
cerning dangers learned of after delivery of the product). 
Martell v. Boardwalk Enter., Inc., 748 F.2d 740, 749 (2d Cir. 1984). 
Heinonline - -  89 W. Va. L. Rev. 279 1986-1987 
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 89 
readily ascertainable," under which doctrine the seller has no duty to warn of 
defects either hidden from or unknown to the selleraB3 
The distinction may be accounted for if the imbalance of safety-related in- 
formation held, respectively, by the distributor and the consumer is of a lesser 
order (if such imbalance exists at all) than the asymmetry of such information. 
For this reason the seller or other distributor of a product manufactured by a 
third party will for the most part be held to a somewhat lesser duty to warn, 
and the nonmariufacturing supplier will be liable for the negligent failure to warn 
of a product's hazards only when it knows or has reason to know of such dangers.B4 
The prevalent view, therefore, is that a distributor will not be found in breach 
of any duty to warn unless it is in receipt of information that would give it reason 
to know of a product's hazard and the warning already provided is either absent 
or inadequate. 
The factors pertinent to whether to impose such a duty on the nonmanu- 
facturing seller have been summarized as requiring weighing of the distributor's 
"integral [role in] the overall producing and marketing enterprise [which justifies 
its] bearling] the cost of injuries resulting from defective The court 
in Hall v. E. 1: Dupont DeNemours & Co., Inc. has followed this reasoning, 
suggesting that relevant factors include: 
(1) m h e  standard of care-itself a function of the foreseeability and gravity of 
risk and the capacity of avoiding it; (2) the participants' capabilities of promoting 
the requisite safety in the risk-creating process; (3) the need to protect the con- 
sumer, both in terms of ascertaining responsible parties and providing compen- 
sation; and (4) the participants' ability to adjust the costs of liability among 
themselves in a continuing business relationship."6 
.- Warner, 137 Mich. App. at 346, 357 N.W.2d at 693. In that action the husband and the 
wife brought suit against an automobile dealership arising from injuries sustained by the husband 
when the automobile backfued while he was repairing it, igniting his shirt. To douse the flame he 
dove into a lake breaking his neck. Concerning the nonmanufacturing seller's duty to warn, however, 
the appellate court here affirmed the trial court verdict for the distributor based upon, among others, 
the quoted portion of the trial court's instructions as to the seller's duty to warn, which relate to 
plaintiff's claim of breach of implied warranty of merchantability. 
ZU RESTATEMEI'IT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 401 comment a specifically distinguishes the duties con- 
veyed by the "reason to know" standard from those of the "should know'' standard. See Guglielmo 
v. Klausner Supply Co., 158 Conn. 308, 259 A.2d 608 (1969); Davis v. Siloo, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 
237, 267 S.E.2d 354, appeal denied, 301 N.C. 234, 283 S.E.2d 131 (1980). 
" Vandermark, 61 Cal. 2d at 262, 391 P.2d at 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899. 
236 Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. 345 F. Supp. 353, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (ana- 
lyzing Vandermark). 
See Evridge, 685 S.W.2d 632 reversing and remanding for trial action by six-year-old child and 
father for injuries sustained by child in falling from rear platform of motorbike on which she was 
a passenger. The owner's manual and other legends cautioned the vehicle was for "Operator Only", 
but the court found that the evidence created "substantial issues of material fact as to adequacy of 
warnings, particularly inasmuch as the defendants should have taken into account that the motorbike 
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There is authority holding the retailer to a continuing duty to warn the pur- 
chaser of a hazard discovered to exist in the foreseeable use of a product even 
where the hazard is not appreciated by the retailer until after the sale. Support 
for this proposition was offered by the court in Harris Y. International Harvesler 
Co.,"' which invoked a design flaw in the defendant's tractors that permitted 
fuel pressure buildup to cause heated fuel to geiser, spray, and ignite when the 
fuel cap was removed. With knowledge of this problem, the manufacturer made 
available an insulation package for the tractor's critical heat shield. The retailer 
learned of the fuel buildup hazard through literature from the manufacturer, but 
failed to inform the buyer of the problem and the availability of the heat shield 
insulation package. The court concluded that this was a breach of the retailer's 
duty to warn.as 
Dealers in used goods also have been found to have a duty to warn.u9 The 
general duty of the seller of used goods towards the purchaser has been described 
as a duty "to future and foreseeable users of the product to exercise the reasonable 
care required of a reasonably prudent seller under the existing cir~umstances."~~ 
This may include the duty to advise the buyer of any information that will permit 
the buyer to appreciate any risk associated with the use of the product."I As is 
true for the duty of sellers of new products, the used seller's duty includes a duty 
to "relate information as to the character and condition of the chattel which [the 
seller] should recognize as necessary to enable the prospective user to realize the 
danger of using it.""2 
Commercial lessors have also been found to be within the class of commercial 
entities that may be found to owe a duty to warn of dangerous conditions in the 
was designed for and intended for use by children." Id. at 637, In agreement that the distributor 
does not have an "absolute" duty to test for, discover, and warn of all product related dangers is 
Fish Breeders of Idaho, Inc. v. Rangen, Inc., 108 Idaho 379, 700 P.2d 1 (1985), an action arising 
from the application of malachite green for the treatment of disease in fish, which product was alleged 
instead to have killed them. The court refused appellant's proposed instructions on the grounds that 
they would have, in the view of the court, "impose[d] an absolute duty upon a distributor to test 
for, discover, and warn of all possible dangers with the product." Id. at 384, 700 P.2d at 6. 
21' Harris v. International Harvestor Co., 127 Misc. 2d 426, 486 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1984). 
Id. at 428-29, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 604. 
Galanos v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (an action involving personal 
injuries arising from use of surplus Postal Senice vehicles. Sold used by the government, as passenger 
vehicles, this created a duty of the Postal Service, cognizant of the danger of rollover and foreseeability 
of use by purchasers of the vehicle for passenger purposes, to warn purchasers in writing not to 
undertake such use. Id. at 375). 
Johnson v. Purex Corp., 128 Mich. App. 736, 341 N.W.2d 198 (1983). 
Id., 341 N.W.2d at 198. 
Elkins v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 700 0V.D. Va. 1969), afyd, 429 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 
1970). Even one-time sellers of used products may be found to have such a duty. Bevard v. Ajax 
Mfg. Co., 473 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Mich. 1979). 
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use of their Inclusion of commercial lessors among those upon whom 
informational responsibilities may be fairly placed is consistent with the recog- 
nition that commercial lessors, by reason of their regular dealing with the product, 
will ordinarily be in a better position to analyze potential hazards in the product 
than will the lessee.244 Illustrative of such policies, a commercial lessor of a motor 
home was, together with the motor home manufacturer, found strictly liable for 
failing to warn the lessee of the home about the inadequacy of the tires offered 
as original equipment for use on the home.245 Reversing and remanding, the ap- 
pellate court found that the plaintiff should have been allowed at trial to offer 
proof that the lessor "was aware that the tires supplied with the motor home 
were inadequate for its load as a basis for liability, and that [the lessor] failed 
to warn plaintiff of that defect . . . . ,246 
With respect to ethical pharmaceuticals, the seller in the ordinary course is 
the pharmacist. The prevailing authority holds that in the absence of any evidence 
that the pharmacist altered the product by compounding, adding to or taking 
from the pharmaceutical as prescribed by the physician, the pharmacist has no 
duty to warn. One court so holding relied substantially on its observation that, 
particularly with drugs, the manufacturer alone may have the practical opportunity 
to detect defects in a pharma~eutical.~~~ The court also stated the expectations of 
product information to which reference has been made. In the words of the court: 
Implied warranties are conditioned on the buyer's reliance upon the skill and 
judgment of the seller but when a consumer asks a druggist to fill a prescription, 
~ 4 '  There is ample authority in several jurisdictions that holds that commercial lessors may be 
held strictly liable for leasing defective products. E.g., Cintrone, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769; Stang 
v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730,497 P.2d 732 (1972); Nastasi v. Hochman, 58 A.D.2d 564,396 N.Y.S.2d 
216 (1977); Dewberry v. LaFollette, 598 P.2d 241 (Okl. 1979); Fulbright v. Klamath Gas Co., 271 
Or. 449, 533 P.2d 316 (1975); T iman  v. Vance Equip. Co., 286 Or. 747, 596 P.2d 1299 (1979); 
Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 472 Pa. 362, 372 A.2d 736 (1977); Nath v. National Equip. 
Leasing Corp., 497 Pa. 126, 439 A.2d 633 (1981); Rourke v. Garza, 511 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1974), aff'd, 530 S.W.2d 794 (1975); George v. Tonjes, 414 F. Supp. 1199 @. Wis. 1976); Bachner 
v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 12 Ariz. App. 32, 467 P.2d 
256 (1970); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970); McClaflin 
v. Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 446, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969); Martin v. Ryder 
Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581 @el. 1976); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Haw. 71, 
470 P.2d 240 (1970); Galiuccio v. Hertz Corp., 1 Ill. App. 3d 272, 274 N.E.2d 178 (1971); Crowe 
v. Public Bldg. Comm. of Chicago, 74 111. 2d 10, 383 N.E.2d 951 (1978); Perfection Paint & Color 
Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 1'06, 258 N.E.2d 681 (1970); Gabbard v. Stephenson's Orchard, Inc., 
565 S.W.2d 753 @lo. App. 1978). 
See Brimbau v. Ausdale Equip. Rental Corp., 440 A.2d 1292 (R.I. 1982). 
Miles v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 10 Ohio App. 3d 186, 187, 188-91, 460 N.E.2d 1377, 
1379, 1380-82 (1983). The action claimed both a defect in the motor home and a failure to warn 
concerning the tires, with respect to the latter claiming that the tires placed on the motor home were 
overloaded and not appropriate for that vehicle. 
Id. at 189, 460 N.E.2d at 1381. 
U7 Bichler v. Wilig, 58 A.D.2d 331, 397 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977). 
Heinonline - -  89 W. Va. L. Rev. 282 1986-1987 
19861 PRODUCTS LIABILITY 283 
thus enabling him to obtain a drug which is not otherwise available to the public, 
he does not rely on the druggist's judgment as to whether that particular drug 
is inherently fit for its intended purpose but rather he places that confidence and 
reliance in the physician who prescribed the re rned~ .~  
Later authority has endorsed the decisions extricating the pharmacist from 
those nonmanufacturing sellers who may be found to have a duty to warn, but 
cautions that the pharmacist will have the duty to convey warnings that the phy- 
sician includes in the prescription.249 Similarly, should the pharmacist violate the 
standard of ordinary care associated with reasonable conduct of such business, 
liability for failure to warn customers of potential perils in the ingestion or use 
of pharmaceuticals may be imposed. Thus, it has been held that a pharmacist 
may be found liable for failure to warn a customer, known to the pharmacist to 
be an alcoholic, of the side effects of taking certain psychotropic pharmaceuticals 
in combination with alcoh01."~ 
Where there is alleged a failure to warn by the manufacturer of a component 
part of the finished product, the question arises whether it is the component part 
manufacturer or the assembler of the completed product that has the duty to 
warn. There is ample authority that the component manufacturer-supplier of a 
nondefective part should not be liable for injuries occasioned by the final product 
when the claim of the injured party is failure to warn or to include a warning 
device1 and the component manufacturer simply supplied parts made to the spec- 
ification of the a s~emble r .~~  Consistent authority, in deciding to assign liability 
for failure to warn to the manufacture-assembler and not the component part 
manufacturer, emphasizes the difference in expertise between the two. One such 
decision found no liability for the manufacturer of the star component of a hel- 
icopter manufactured to specification for the manufacturer-assembler, when the 
US Id. at 333-34, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 59. 
249 Ingram v. Hook's Drugs Inc., 476 N.E.2d 881, 886-87 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). 
UO Hand v. Krakowski, 89 A.D.2d 650, 453 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1982) 
Here [the druggist] knew that the decedent was alcoholic and knew, or should have known, 
that the prescribed drugs vlere contraindicated and, therefore, extremely dangerous to the 
well-being of its customer. Clearly, under these circumstances, the dispensing druggist may 
have had a duty to warn decedent of the grave danger involved and to inquire of the 
prescribing doctors if such drugs should not be discontinued. 
Id. at 651, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 123. 
E.g., Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973). 
La See Verge v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1978), an action in which plaintiff had 
been injured by a garbage truck as it was backing up, and the complaint alleged that the truck should 
have had a warning device. Defendant Ford had produced the chassis for the truck, but the vehicle 
had undergone substantial work thereafter before it was completed. Where there were multiple par- 
ticipants in the manufacture of a product, the court reasoned that identifying which entity had the 
duty to supply the buzzer required reference to three factors: (1) trade custom, (2) expertise, and (3) 
practicality. Id. at 387. 
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star was found to be free of defect, the assembler had examined the part before 
acceptance, and the assembler was in the business of manufacturing helicopters 
while the component manufacturer was not.2s3 Nonetheless, still other authority 
proposes with equally apparent logic that the component manufacturer's duty to 
warn should be indefeasible, inasmuch as the component maker has the greatest 
access to information on its product, this logic obtains all the more when the 
component part is incorporated without change into the final 
2J3 Orion Ins. Co., Ltd., v. United Technologies Corp., 502 F. Supp, 173 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The 
court therein makes the additional observations as to why the duty to warn reposes best with the 
ultimate manufacturer and not with the manufacturer of component parts to specification, particularly 
where the component manufacturer's reliance upon the specifications is reasonable. In the words of 
the court: 
Finally, no public policy can be served by imposing a civil penalty on a manufacturer of 
specialized parts for a highly technical machine according to the specification supplied by 
one who is expert at assembling these technical machines, who does so without questioning 
the plans or warning of ultimate user. The effect of such a decision on component parts 
manufacturers would be enormous. They would be forced to retain private experts to review 
an assembler's plans and to evaluate the soundness of the proposed use of the manufacturer's 
parts. The added cost of such a procedure both financially and in terms of stifled innovation 
outweighs the public benefit of giving plaintiffs an additional pocket to look to for recovery 
. . . . m h e  better view is to leave the liability for design defects where it belongs and where 
it now is-with the originator and implementer of the design-the assembler of the finished 
product. 
Id. at 178. See also Mayberry v. Akron Rubber Mach. Corp., 483 F. Supp. 407 (N.D. Okla. 1979), 
holding that the supplier of nondefective used component parts for use by subsequent manufacturer 
in the construction of a large rubber mixing mill of the manufacturer's exclusive design had no duty 
to warn the manufacturer, or the employees of the manufacturer of the advisability of certain safety 
devices, including, among others a sufficient space between the floor level and the top of the rollers 
to lessen the operators opportunity to reach into the danger area. Id. at 411. 
ZU In Beuchamp v. Russel, 547 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Ga. 1982), involving the issue of the relation, 
if any, of an air valve component in a pneumatically-run palletizer to the injury of plaintiff's spouse, 
the court suggests that the duty to warn should properly be with the participant in manufacture with 
the greatest access to information, and the most easy means of its dissemination. In the words of 
the court: 
The responsibility for information collection and dissemination should rest on the party 
who has the greatest access to the information and who can make it available at the lowest 
cost. Where a component part is incorporated into another product, without material change, 
the manufacturer of the part is in the best position to bear this responsibility. 
Id. at 1197. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 402A comment q states concerning strict liability, but not 
specifically warnings, this language: "Component parts . . . It is no doubt to be expected that where 
there is no change in the component part itself, but it is merely incorporated into something larger, 
the strict liability will be found to carry through to the ultimate user or consumer." A well-reasoned 
suggestion that in apportioning liability between a component part manufacturer and an assembler, 
liability should be assigned to the cheapest cost avoider, is explained in Comment, Apportionment 
Between Partmakers and Assemblers in Strict Liability, 49 U .  Cm. L. REV. 544 (1982), the author 
writing: 
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The repairer or semicer of a product will not generally be found responsible 
for failure to warn of risks associated with the use of a product, particularly if 
the risk is not attributable to any act of the repairer, and the hazard is as apparent 
to the owner of the product as it is to the repairer.255 Thus, the repairer of a 
cotton compress who did not redesign the compress, but rather repaired certain 
specified parts and replaced or rematched others, would not be held liable for 
failure to warn by one court where the existence of "pinch points" on the ma- 
chine, the parts actually involved in the subsequent accidental injury, were as 
apparent to the machine's owner as they were to the repairer.256 One might wish 
that a humanitarian impulse would lead the repairer or installer to share with 
the owner or user any such discovery of a hazardous condition. In the above 
case, however, because the owner and user, and the repairer had equal and ready 
access to the observation of the hazardous condition, it can be claimed defensibly 
that the goal of informational parity has been met, albeit marginally. 
IX. PERSONS TO BE WARNED 
The general rule is that the selIer of a product that may pose a risk of injury 
if not accompanied by adequate warnings as to the risk and, as appropriate, 
instructions for safe use, has a duty to warn the purchaser of the  hazard^.^' 
Moreover, where the seller can reasonably foresee that the warning conveyed to 
the immediate vendee will not be adequate to reduce the risk of harm to the 
likely users of the product, the duty to warn has been interpreted to extend beyond 
the purchaser to persons who foreseeably will be endangered by use of or exposure 
Under this approach, the fact-finder should simply ask who can more easily detect and 
correct the defect . . . . m h e  party with the lowest detection costs would bear full liability, 
but could shift this liabity to the party with the lowest correction costs if it provided full 
warnings of the detected dangers. 
Id. at 547. 
255 The majority of jurisdictions considering the matter have declined to impose strict liability 
upon repairers or installers. E.g., McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965); Slayton 
v. Wright, 271 Cal. App. 2d 219, 76 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1969); Raritan Trucking Corp. v. Aero Com- 
mander Inc., 458 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir. 1972). 
256 Johnson v. William C. Ellis & Sons Iron Works, Inc., 604 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1979), reh'g 
granted in part, denied in part, 609 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1980), the court explained: 
Even if we were to conclude that Mississippi would impose liabity without fault upon 
those who provide services, we do not think that it would make the servicer liable to warn 
its customers of patent dangers neither created or aggravated by the services provided and 
not within the scope of the work contracted for. 
Id. at 956 (citations omitted). 
E.g., Galanos, 608 F. Supp. 360 (duty extends as well to sellers of used goods and to one 
time sellers of used products). 
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to the Included are members of the public who might be injured as 
a result of lack of adequate warning.z9 
The leading expression of the weighing process that should accompany a man- 
ufacturer's determination of whether additional warnings should be given beyond 
those available to the immediate purchaser is stated by the court in Dougherty 
v. Hooker Chemical Co.260 That court called for the balancing of the following 
considerations: "the dangerous nature of the product, the form in which the 
product is used, the intensity and form of the warnings given, the burdens to be 
imposed by requiring warnings, and the likelihood that the particular warning 
will be adequately communicated to those who will foreseeably use the prod- 
uct . . . . 7261 
The issue of to whom, beyond the immediate purchaser, the warning should 
be given is of paramount significance to the informational equilibrium model. 
Using the workplace as an example, if in the sale of an industrial solvent to a 
commercial buyer, the seller informs the buyer of the hazards of the product and 
the means for its safe use, and the buyer faithfully imparts that information to 
the workers likely to be exposed to the product in the work environment, there 
should be no liability. The workers have not been denied access to safety-related 
See Hopkins v. Chip-In-Saw, Inc., 630 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1980), in which the court states: 
When a manufacturer can reasonably foresee that the warnings it gives to a purchaser of 
its product will not be adequately conveyed to probable users of the product, then its duty 
to warn may extend beyond the purchaser to those persons foreseeably endangered by the 
products use. Warnings given to the purchaser do not necessarily insulate the manufacturer 
from liability to injured users of the product. 
Id. at 619. 
U9 Compare Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical Center, 136 111. App. 3d 945, 483 N.E.2d 
906 (1985) (allowing recovery for failure to warn an automobile passenger injured when the driver 
of a vehicle lost control and crashed, allegedly the result of side effects of administration of psy- 
choactive pharmaceuticals, the court stating a general principle that the manufacturer has a duty to 
warn of possible adverse effects of drugs even to members of the public who might be injured by 
others' use of the product) wifh Kinney v. Hutchison, 468 So. 2d 714 (La. Ct. App.), cerf. denied, 
472 So. 2d 35 (La. 1985) (finding no manufacturer liability to bystander who was shot by a stranger 
who had taken the drug Preludin, the court finding that the manufacturer had provided sufficient 
cautionary information to prescribing physicians that even in normal dosages the drug could produce 
psychotic episodes). 
260 Dougherfy, 540 F.2d 174. 
Id. at 179. In Dougherfy the appellate court found that the plaintiff had adduced sufficient 
evidence to warrant submission to the trier of fact as to the manufacturer's duty to convey warnings 
beyond the immediate purchaser and to the workers who could be expected to use the industrial 
solvent upon the showing that trichloroethylene posed a latent, and potentially lethal, hazard; that 
no warnings of this risk were communicated by the employer, or by the manufacturer, to the workers 
who were being exposed; and there was not reasonable basis on which the manufacturer could rely 
on the purchaser to give "appropriate information to its employees of all the hazards of working 
with [the product]." Id. at 181-82. 
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information essential to the safe discharge of their work. On the other hand, if 
the seller, innocently or negligently, informs the purchaser of the pertinent safety- 
related information, and the purchaser does not communicate that information 
to the employees, the failure of the intermediary to perform the desired instruc- 
tional function preserves the informational imbalance between the seller and the 
users of the product. Arguably, liability should attach. 
As is also true for the evaluation of the nature of a warning that should be 
given, the question concerning to whom it should be given requires evaluation of 
the harm likely to occur in the product's use without warnings, the reliability of 
any intermediary to whom the warning is given, the nature of the product involved 
and the burden on the manufacturer in disseminating the warning.262 In some 
E.g., Frederick, 107 A.D.2d 1063, 486 N.Y.S.2d 564, 565. These factors may be seen as 
congruent with the considerations recommended by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 388, comment 
n, which advises reference to the relative hazard posed by the product, the immediate purchaser's 
familiarity with the risk, the trust that may be properly reposed in the intermediary to convey in- 
formation of the risk to those who will use the product, and the feasibility of carrying the message 
directly to the ultimate user. The comment states in pertinent part: 
Thus, while it may be proper to permit a supplier to assume that one through whom he 
supplies a chattel which is only slightly dangerous will communicate the information given 
him to those who are to use it unless he knows that the other is careless, it may be improper 
to permit him to trust the conveyance of the necessary information of the actual character 
of a highly dangerous article to a third person of whose character he lcnows nothing. It 
may well be that he should take the risk that this information may not be communicated, 
unless he exercises reasonable care to ascertain the character of the third person, or unless 
from previous experience with him or from the excellence of his reputation the supplier 
has positive reason to believe that he is careful. In addition to this, if the danger involved 
in the ignorant use of a particular chattel is very great, it may be that the supplier does 
not exercise reasonable care in entrusting the communication of the necessary information 
even to a person whom he has good reason to believe to be careful. Many such articles 
can be made to carry their own message to the understanding of those who are likely to 
use them by the form in which they are put out, by the container in which they are supplied, 
or by a label or other device, indicating with a substantial sufficiency their dangerous char- 
acter. Where the danger involved in the ignorant use of their true quality is great and such 
means of disclosure are practicable and not unduly burdensome, it may well be that the 
supplier should be required to adopt them. 
A contemporary analysis provides that the manufacturer owes the foreseeable user of its product a 
duty to warn of risks involved in using the product, a proposition applicable equally under strict 
liability and under negligence. Powell, 166 Cal. App. 3d 357, 212 Cal. Rptr. 395. From this premise 
it is stated that the manufacturer's duty to wam "is restricted to warnings based on the characteristics 
of the manufacturer's own product," Id. at 363, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 397. E.g., Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d 121, 
104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153 (1972). Because insofar as the manufacturer's evaluation of the 
nature and quantum, if any, of warnings to accompany its product is "based upon and tailored to" 
the characteristics of the manufacturer's own product, for the purpose of a duty to warn in tort, 
"the most the manufacturer could reasonably foresee is that consumers might be subject to the risks 
of the manufacturer's own product, since those are the only risks he is required to know." Powell 
166 Cal. App. 3d at 364, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 398. Accordingly, in Powell, where the plaintiffs had 
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circumstances the class to which the duty is owed and that to which the warning 
should go are not coextensive. The professional user and the medical-pharma- 
cological learned intermediary doctrines represent two such types of situations. 
The bystander doctrine represents another. The court in Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, 
I ~ c . , ~ ~ ~  framed the bystander issue well in its disposition of an action brought 
against the manufacturer of a lawnrnower for an injury suffered by a bystander 
struck in the jaw by a bolt picked up and thrown by the lawnmower. Identifying 
the duty of a manufacturer of a product that creates a hazard to give effective 
warnings to those who may foreseeably be affected by it, the court recognized 
that such a warning need not necessarily go to the person injured.2a It also rec- 
ognized that, on the facts before it, "it would be admittedly difficult for a man- 
ufacturer to warn the general public" of the lawnmower projectile phenomenon.265 
The appropriate warning in such a setting, the court concluded, would be one 
"adequate and sufficient . . . [to] apprise the reasonable person of the dangers 
at hand." This would probably be one as to safety precautions "given to the 
user of the mower . . . . 9 ,266 
In other duty to warn actions not involving the workplace, well-reasoned 
authority expresses a resistance to permitting the seller to discharge its duty to 
warn to remote users or bystanders by simply conveying cautionary information 
to the immediate purchaser. One discussion of the arguably indefeasible nature 
of the manufacturer's duty to warn the ultimate user or bystander of a product's 
hazardous propensities is the decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Mont- 
gomery Elevator Co. v. M~Cul lough.~~~ This action was brought against the man- 
ufacturer of an escalator and the department store purchaser of that escalator. 
It arose from injuries sustained by a ten-year-old boy when his tennis shoe was 
caught up and crushed into the space between the escalator treads and side skirt. 
The manufacturer defended on the grounds that, upon its recognition of the 
product's design flaw, it sent to the purchaser letters advising of the hazard and 
including suggestions of remedial measures and an offer to sell to the department 
store a "kit" that would permit effectuation of those measures. The department 
labored for one day with the paint thinner manufactured by the defendant, and after depleting that 
product switched the following day to the product of another manufacturer, suffered an injurious 
explosion thereby, the court affirmed judgment for defendant Standard Brands as, in the view of the 
court, "it was not reasonably foreseeable . . . that Standard Brands' failure to vmn of risks of its 
product would cause plaintiffs to suffer injuries while using the product of another." Id. at 366, 212 
Cal. Rptr. at 400. 
263 Sills V. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969). 
Id. at 783; see, e.g., McCormack v. Hankschraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967) 
(child injured by scalding water from overturned bedroom vaporizer, where appropriate warnings as 
to hazard of scalding would go logically to purchaser of product, rather than to the infant for whose 
benefit the product is to be used). 
" Id. 
266 Id. at 783. 
267 Montgomery Elevator Co. v. McCullough, 676 S.W.2d 776 (1984). 
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store in which this plaintiff was injured took no such action, and the manufacturer 
claimed that this was a superseding cause sufficient to obviate liability.268 
The court acknowledged that there are circumstances in which the buyer's 
actions or omissions to act with the product "can be of such a nature as to 
prevent finding that the injury was caused by the unreasonably dangerous con- 
dition of the escalator."269 It concluded, ho.rvever, that here the intermediary's, 
action, or inaction, was not of such a nature or degree as to become the cause 
in fact of the accident. The court further stated, "[tlhe manufacturer has a non- 
delegable duty to provide a product reasonably safe for its foreseeable uses, a 
duty not abrogated by warning to the immediate purchaser."270 
Putting aside products for household use or cornsumption, the majority of 
the circumstances in which the seller's product will be used by those other than 
the immediate vendee, are sales to commercial or industrial buyers whose em- 
ployees will actually use or be exposed to the products. Interpretation of the 
l(S Id. at 778, 779. 
x9 E.g., the careless handling of dynamite (Hercules Powder Co. v. Hicks, 453 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 
1970)), or the failure to keep a product in safe working order (Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 
S.W.2d 197 (Ky. 1976)). 
no Id. at 781, 782, and stating also: 
In the final analysis, as a general rule the purchaser's failure to remedy a defect in the 
product is no defense for the manufacturer where the claim is based on the defective con- 
dition of the product at the time of manufacture and is made on behalf of an ultimate 
user or bystander who has not been adequately warned of the danger . . . . The purchaser 
who has notice of the dangerous condition may be concurrently liable to the ultimate user 
for failure to provide adequate warning, for failure to remedy the defect or on some other 
basis, but the purchaser's failure to act is not an intervening cause except in extraordinary 
circumstances. 
Id. at 782. 
See also Minert v. Harsco Corp., 26 Wash. App. 867, 875, 614 P.2d 686, 691 (1980): "We agree 
that the manufacturer has a duty to warn the ultimate user of any dangers in its product [other than 
those that are open or obvious.] This duty is non-delegable . . . . If the injury was the result of the 
manufacturer's breach, the liability for the injury will lie with the manufacturer." But see Borel, 493 
F.2d at 1091-92 in which that court states: 
In general, of course, a manufacturer is not liable for miscarriages in the communication 
process that are not attributable to his failure to warn or the adequacy of the warning. 
This may occur, for example, where some intermediate party is notified of the danger, or 
discovers it for himself, and proceeds deliberately to ignore it and to pass on the product 
without a warning. 
Cf., Jones v. Hittle Sen., Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 549 P.2d 1383 (1976); Alm v. Aluminum Co. of 
America, 687 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 55 U.S.L.W. 2080 (1986) 
(implied jury finding that on the basis of bottle cap' designer's instruction manual reference that 
"[]leakage or closure blow-off at lower pressures can occur when the closure application is improper" 
was sufficient to put the bottler on notice that a misapplied cap could result in personal injury, 
permitted conclusion of insufficient evidence of designer's breach of a duty to warn. Id. at 382). 
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seller's duty to warn in this commercial and industrial environment is governed 
by Restatement (Second) of Torts section 388 which provides that the seller owes 
a duty to communicate effective cautionary information to these employees or 
other ultimate users, unless it has reason to believe that those persons exposed 
to the product will realize its dangerous condition.271 
Thus, the two crucial inquiries in measuring the manufacturer's duty, if any, 
to warn the remote employee are (1) what reason does the seller have to believe 
that the users will appreciate any product-related risk sufficiently to avoid harm; 
and (2) what confidence may the supplier prudently repose in the ability and the 
willingness of the buyer, or if the two are different, the employer, to communicate 
effectively to the actual users adequate cautionary information. Under a standard 
of informational equivalence these obligations may be recast to state that the 
manufacturer must inquire into what, if any, germane safety-related information 
known to it is likely not to be known to the persons who will actually be using 
the product. If there is such an imbalance between what is known to the man- 
ufacturer and what is known to the employee, the manufacturer must also question 
what are the optimal means for communicating this information to the actual 
users. 
The expertise of the employee in using the product in question is one factor 
in the analysis of whether the supplier discharges its duty by warning the im- 
mediate vendee or the user's employer. The language of Restatement (Second) of 
Torts section 388(b) states that a manufacturer will not have to convey any ad- 
ditional warning to those for whom use of the product is intended, absent a reason 
to believe that those persons will fail to realize the limitations or hazards of the 
product. This would suggest that when the actual user has expertise in such mat- 
ters, it lessens che likelihood that the seller would reasonably believe the user 
would fail to appreciate the risk. It is, nevertheless, noteworthy that in one action 
brought by an ironworker who was injured when a sling manufactured by the 
defendant failed, a jury question existed as to whether the manufacturer's duty 
to warn was present, notwithstanding the plaintiff's conceded expertise in such 
matters. The conflicting evidence in the record showed that the ironworkers pro- 
fessed collective expertise, and that the union had distributed pertinent literature 
to members, but also showed the ironworkers' disclaimer of the knowledge "of 
the working capacity of the sling that was employed," requiring, the court con- 
cluded, submission of the duty to warn issue to the 
n l  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 388(b). 
West v. Bro'derick & Bascom Rope Co., 197 N.W.2d 202, 210-11 (Iowa 1972) ("We are not 
persuaded we shoulcl hold as a matter of law that no duty to warn existed because of the ironworkers' 
expertise." Id. at 211); see Bean, 344 S.W.2d at 24, where the court stated: "We decline to hold, 
as a matter of law, that defendant owed him no further duty to warn merely because he was a licensed 
plumber." 
There will be instances where the practice of one identifiable proportion of the population involves 
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Employer familiarity with the hazard was deemed irrelevant in one action 
brought by former employees of an asbestos insulation products manufacturer. 
The court found that the language of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 388, 
together with state products liability authority, required the conclusion that "the 
manufacturer of an inherently dangerous product has a non-delegable duty to 
provide warnings to the ultimate consumer or user."273 Distinguishing the defen- 
dants' opposing authority that would have limited the seller's liability where the 
buyer knew of the hazard, the court stated that such authority usually involves 
hazards that are either obvious or known to the employee.274 Similarly, Seibel v. 
the relatively safe use of a product, while the practice of another proportion engages in a more 
hazardous, but foreseeable use. Where those engaging in the unsafe practice are suspected to be many 
in number, the manufacturer may have a duty to warn that group to otherwise protect its members. 
This issue is discussed in the interesting decision in Gootee v. Colt Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d 1057 (6th 
Cir. 1983). One issue in the appeal involved the hazards of using the Colt .45 pistol in a half-cock 
position as a substitute for engaging the safety. Appellant on appeal claimed that persons first trained 
on this weapon in the police or in the military learned of this risky use, and that the manufacturer's 
awareness of that widespread use gave rise to its duty to warn. The court stated: 
Where there is a heterogeneous market for a product, a regular practice or use among 
members of a single trade constituting a small fraction of the total users would not nec- 
essarily give rise to a duty to warn or protect against dangers from that use to those not 
members of the particular trade. The facts of this case differ markedly from such a situation, 
however. Those trained by the military or the police represent the vast majority of Colt 
.45 users. 
Id. at 1065. 
n3 Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 368 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd sub nom., 
Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985). The court in Jackson, 
499 F.2d 809, responded sharply to a comparable proposition that employer knowledge of a risk 
extinguished a seller's duty to warn in an action where a painter engaged to paint the inside of certain 
railroad tank cars was injured when the vapors of the highly flammable epoxy paint ignited, and 
stated with respect to the showing of employer, but not employee, familiarity with a risk: 
The most serious error in the challenged instruction is the statement that knowledge of the 
hazard on the part of plaintiff's employer would obviate any duty to warn plaintiff. Besides 
improperly focusing on the knowledge of an individual rather than general or common 
knowledge, this erroneously conceives the community whose common knowledge the jury 
is to ascertain. The seller's duty under 8 402A is to 'the ultimate user or consumer.' 
Id. at 812. 
n4 Neal, 548 F .  Supp. at  369. Analysis under a substantially similar set of factors convinced a 
court in an asbestos-related disease action brought by land-based ship repair workers to reject the 
manufacturers' contention that the asbestos manufacturers satisfied their duty to warn the workers 
of the perils of inhalation of respirable asbestos insofar as the workers' employers, the builders of 
private and public ocean-going vessels, were "aware of the dangers involved in the use of the product." 
Id. at 232. Emphasizing the hazard, intermediary knowledge, and feasibility of direct warning factors 
of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 388 comment n, the court let stand the lower court's refusal 
to grant the manufacturer's requested jury instruction, concluding: 
In this case the product, because it contained asbestos fibers, was very dangerous. The 
burden on the manufacturers in placing a warning on the product was not great. The 
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Symons C ~ r p . ~ ~ '  found liability for failure to warn when the manual accompany- 
ing building material contained some cautionary language, but there was no evi- 
dence that the warning had ever been communicated to the employee. The employee, 
working on the manufacturer's steel concrete forms, fell and was injured when 
a weld broke on a V-shaped end support rod to which he had affixed the lanyard 
of his safety belt. On page three of the 115-page technical manual included the 
following warning: "Do Not Hang Off V-Shaped End Rail Support Rods." There 
was no evidence, however, that the specific or general import of this was com- 
municated to the injured e m p l ~ y e e . ~ ~  The court let stand the jury verdict that 
the employer was negligent in failing to communicate adequately the warning to 
the employee who was the ultimate user of the The court distinguished 
authority which held that the manufacturer's warning conveyed to the employer 
insulates the employer from liability, even when the employer fails to communicate 
the warning to the employee, as arising from factual situations "where either the 
danger is slight or the difficulties of giving the warning are immense."278 
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 388 comment n, offers the most par- 
ticularized guidance for the supplier whose goods are to be used or consumed by 
persons other than the immediate buyer. The two most prominent examples are 
that of the distributor selling goods to the retailer, with knowledge that the goods 
will be purchasrd and actually used by remote buyers, and the manufacturer or 
the contractor making available to the contractor or subcontractor products that 
will be used by the latter party's employees or construction workers. Should a 
warning or other cautionary information be made to the immediate buyer, the 
issue posed is whether such method "gives a reasonable assurance that the in- 
formation will reach those whose safety depends upon their having it."n9 The 
comment suggests that this evaluation comprehends (1) a weighing of the relative 
seriousness of the harm that may occur if the information is not conveyed ef- 
fectively to the remote user, and (2) an assessment of the confidence the seller 
may reasonably repose in the immediate vendee to impart faithfully the infor- 
mation to its servants. Understandably, comment n continues, if the product is 
of such a nature that, if "ignorantly used," is unlikely to cause more than "triv- 
ial" harm, it may be unnecessary for the supplier to do more than to ascertain 
that the vendee is an ordinary business person toward whom no particular scep- 
employer was unaware of the danger until 1964. Finally, once the employer became aware 
of the potentiill danger it failed to convey its knowledge to its employees. 
Id. at 233. 
n5 Seibel v. Symons Corp., 221 N.W.2d 50 (N.D. 1974). 
n6 Id. at 53. 
Id. at 57. 
Id. 
n9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 388 comment n. 
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ticism is \~arranted.~~O If, on the other hand, the actual character of the product, 
taken together with the purpose for which it is to be used, would create a risk 
of serious injury if not used according to warnings or instructions, the supplier 
should consider direct communication to those actually using the product, even 
when there is no reason to believe that the vendee would not exercise due care.=' 
Many of the decisions employing the justifiable reliance standard of Restate- 
ment (Second) of Torts section 388 comment n describe the requirement that the 
manufacturer have a reasonable basis for ascribing to the vendee the responsibility 
for conveying to others the nature of any pertinent product risk. Illustrations of 
circumstances in which confidence was found unjustifiable, as distinct from find- 
ings that failure of the warning to reach the employee is, without more, sufficient 
for imposition of liability, are quite scarce. One informative case involved a lum- 
ber planing device that forcibly ejected a board, kiiing the plaintiff's husband.2s2 
The product was sold equipped with "anti-kickback fingers" designed to protect 
the operator from kickback should a blade hit a knot or a piece of metal in the 
wood. The evidence adduced, however, showed that the very design of the "fin- 
gers" encouraged operators to shove them to the side of the saw pocket or to 
remove them altogether. When the machine's maintenance manual failed to cau- 
tion against the removal of the fingers, the evidence in the aggregate suggested 
to the court that it was foreseeable that the manufacturer's vendee would not 
pass along adequate warnings to the actual users of the 
One insightful treatment holding that a manufacturer's warnings to even a 
highly skilled intermediary may be inadequate to prevent liability arose from an 
action brought by a woman who alleged that she suffered a stroke caused by her 
use of oral  contraceptive^.^ In that action the court recognized that in most 
circumstances involving prescription drugs the manufacturer satisfies its duty to 
warn by conveying the necessary and appropriate information to the treating phy- 
Id. 
"' [I]f the danger involved in the ignorant use of a particular chattel is very great, it may 
be that the supplier does not exercise reasonable care in entrusting the communication of 
the necessary information even to a person whom he has good reason to believe to be 
careful. Many such articles can be made to carry their own message to the understanding 
of those who are likely to use them by the form in which they are put out, by the container 
in which they are supplied, or by a label or other device, indicating with a substantial 
sufficiency their dangerous character. Where the danger involved in the ignorant use of 
their true quality is great and such means of disclosure are practicable and not unduly 
burdensome, it may well be that the supplier should be required to adopt them. 
Id. 
Hopkins, 630 F.2d 616. 
Id. at 621. 
McDonald, 475 N.E.2d 65. 
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s i ~ i a n . ~ ~ ~  It also examined the patient-physician relationship in the administration 
of oral contraceptives in light of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 388 
comment n. The court concluded that in matters of the duty to warn, the man- 
ufacturer's reliance on an intermediary must be reasonable.2s6 The court di>covered 
that unlike the ordinary circumstances of patient-physician consultation common 
to the authorization of most prescriptions, with oral contraceptives there exist (1) 
"heightened par-ticipation of patients relating to use," (2) "substantial risks," (3) 
the ease and practicability of direct warnings from the manufacturer to the user, 
and (4) the limited prescribing ("annual") and oral ("insufficient or . . . scanty 
. . .") contact with the physician to justify reliance on manufacturer communi- 
cation to the medical community alone.287 
Some vestigial authority would provide that a manufacturer's warning to the 
contractor or employer of the risks of use or installation of the product will satisfy 
the seller's duty to warn irrespective of whether the warning reaches the employee 
working with the material. However incongruous such decisions may at first ap- 
pear to be with the policies espoused in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 
388 and comment n, examination of these decisions reveals the typicality of either 
the employee's actual or constructive familiarity with the hazard or the adven- 
turism of the employer or contractor in departing substantially with the warnings 
or instructions provided.288 For example, one action was brought by the employee 
of a construction contractor following the employee's injuries during erection of 
spanned truss joists in construction of a gymnasium which collapsed. The man- 
ufacturer interposed as its defense the several pages of pictorial representations 
of the correct erection of the product, given to the project supervisor together 
with printed information pertaining to erection, bracing, and instability, and cau- 
tioning as to the latter, "[ilf you are not completely satisfied that the joists are 
being installed correctly, call your supplier immediately."2s9 Rather than con- 
tacting the supplier regarding perceived problems, the court observed, the con- 
tractor and work crew "knowingly deviated from those instructions and used a 
2" Id. at 69, ("[tlhe duty of the ethical drug manufacturer is to warn the doctor, rather than 
the patient, [although] the manufacturer is directly liable to the patient for a breach of such duty." 
Id., 475 N.E.2d at 69 (citing McEwen, 270 Or. at 386-87, 528 P.2d at 529) (emphasis in original). 
" 6  Id. at 68. 
"' Id. at 70. Accordingly, the court set forth the manufacturer's duty with regard to the sale 
of oral contraceptives are requiring the manufacturer: "to provide the consumer written warnings 
conveying reasonable notice of the nature, gravity, and likelihood of known or knownable side effects, 
and advising the consumer to seek fuller explanation from the prescribing physician or other doctor 
of any such infornlation of concern to the consumer." Id. at 70. 
* AS to the latter phenomenon, the court in Phillips, 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 proposed 
that where the employer's actions represent only a "minor variation" from the instructions at issue, 
the manufacturer nlay still be liable. 
289 Schmizer v. Truss-Joist Corp.. 540 P.2d 998, 1000-02 (Or. 1975). 
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'shortcut' procedure."2g0 This conduct, in the court's view, was sufficient to deny 
recovery.291 One can quarrel legitimately with such a result that permits the con- 
tractor's cavalier disregard of the seller's instructions to bar the injured employee's 
action against the seller. The correctness of such a decision, however, rests ul- 
timately with the proposition that, regarding products that are not by themselves 
extremely hazardous, the seller should be permitted to discharge its duty to warn 
by conveying adequate safety-related information to the immediate purchaser, 
unless the seller has actual or constructive awareness that the buyer will deviate 
from those instructions or fail to communicate them to the employees. 
Also, some authority that at first seems like a reflexive application of the 
informed purchaser doctrine, with its occasional harsh consequences for the actual 
user of the product, reveals in actuality a substantial user awareness of the risk. 
Not infrequently, the decisions granting judgment to the manufacturer can be 
legitimated on the grounds of the employee's familiarity with the product and 
the risks involved and could support resort to the professional user exception, 
with the same result. A good example of such decisions which may have been 
correctly decided, but under the wrong rationale, is Cruz v. T e ~ a c o . ~ ~ ~  In Cruz, 
representatives of the decedent tow truck driver brought an action against the 
'90 Id. at 1006. 
Id. at 1006-07 (relying on Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 422 S.W.2d 773, 780). 
Such a resolution is arguably wrong, however, in light of the utter absence of evidence that the 
information known to the contractor was known similarly to the injured employee, or could be imputed 
fairly to the injured employee. 
There remain also certain decisions that give weight to the employer's familiarity with the hazard, 
which evidence should normally be an irrelevancy inasmuch as the real issue is whether the manu- 
facturer's warning was adequate to reach the ultimate user or handler of the product as those concepts 
are described under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 3 388 and 5 402A. E.g., \Vilhelm v. Globe 
Solvent Co., 373 A.2d 218 @el. Super. 1977), involving an action brought by the employee of a dry 
cleaning plant against the manufacturers and distributors of cleaning solvent. The court therein gives 
summary judgment to the manufacturer on the failure to warn count on the grounds that "[slince 
the manufacturers . . . had no control over the dry cleaning machines or work area at [the plant] if 
there was a duty to warn it was only to warn . . . plaintiff's employer." Id. at 223. Of course the 
court's focus on "control" here, and the manufacturer's lack of "control" over the vendee's premises, 
misses the mark altogether. Only in unusual circumstances would the supplier have actual or con- 
structive control over the premises of the vendee. The correct inquiry is the feasibility, where ap- 
propriate, of making cautionary information available directly to the actual users or consumers of 
the product. It is seen that the Wilhelm court offers an analysis paying not even lip service to the 
gravity of the risk, trustworthiness of the intermediary, and burden of conveying the warning directly 
to the worker-issues set out in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 3 388 comment n, and withholds 
also any legal or moral solicitude concerning the predicament of workers proceeding in ignorance of 
the hazards inherent in the flammable chemicals surrounding them. Parenthetically, it bears mentioning 
that supportable grounds for the decision of the court might have been found in the fact that the 
solvent manufacturer was a bulk seller, its product being stored in drums at the plant premises, and 
plaintiffs' testimony as to their individual awareness of the flammability of the product. Wilhelm, 
373 A.2d at 220. 
292 Cmz, 589 F. Supp. 777. 
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seller of the truck for failure of the seller to warn that when the truck's winch 
was in use, the truck could become unstable and overturn if used at high speeds 
and towing heavy weights. Decedent's employer was knowledgeable in the use of 
winch trucks and testified at trial that he "did not need any advice as to how 
to operate the [winch] truck" from the seller.293 This evidence, it was submitted, 
was irrelevant to the question of whether the seller discharged its duty to com- 
municate safety-related information to persons likely to use or be affected by the 
hazard. Granting summary disposition to the seller based upon its conclusion that 
the action was "analogous" to Hopkins v. E.I. Du P ~ n t , ~ ~ ~  the court concluded 
simultaneously that the decedent received training in the use of the winch trucks 
by other experienced employees, although there was no reported evidence of this 
by anyone other than the employer. If, nevertheless, one were to accept as true 
the representation of the decedent's specific familiarity with the risk, the result 
in C m  is arguably supportable under the professional user doctrine.29s 
The manufaicturer's dilemma of what, if any, information must be imparted 
to persons other than the immediate purchaser arises as well where the manu- 
facturer sells in bulk. The issue requires resolution of whether the bulk seller for 
resale discharges its duty to warn by conveying adequate information to the dis- 
tributor intermediary. It  extends also to the question of what circumstances rep- 
resent adequate assurance to the initial seller that the intermediary is capable of 
passing along such product information to the latter's customers. 
This question has been treated in actions on claims involving products such 
as chemicals and natural gas, with a resolution that can be stated generally as 
providing that, for products sold in bulk, the wholesaler discharges its duty to 
warn by conveying adequate warning to the immediate purchaser. If, on the other 
hand, the products sold by the bulk seller are already packaged, "ordinary prud- 
ence may require the manufacturer to put his warning on the package where it 
is available to all who handle it."296 
When the manufacturer sells in bulk by means of conveyancing that do not 
involve packages or containers that may readily be labeled, the majority rule is 
that the bulk seller fulfills its duty to warn if it conveys to the immediate purchaser 
sufficient information concerning any pertinent product risks. The manufacturer 
w3 Id. at 779. 
Hopkins, 212 F.2d 623. 
w3 Cruz, 589 F.2d at 779-80. 
296 Jones, 219 Kan. at 637, 549 P.2d at 1393-94. See Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co., 340 F.2d 402 
(manufacturer of insecticide required to place adequate warnings on the bags in which it was sold, 
including, arguably, international symbols of toxicity, such as the skull and crossbones, where the 
evidence showed that English warnings might not be understood by semi-literate farm laborers); Steele 
v. Rapp, 183 Kan. 371, 327 P.2d 1053 (1958) (manufacturer of finger nail polish, sold packaged, 
had duty to label the bottles indicating explosive propensities). 
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must also be reasonably satisfied that the intermediary possesses the ability to 
impart such information to subsequent purchasers.297 
With the bulk natural gas genre of duty to warn limitations should be com- 
pared the contrary conclusion reached in Shell Oil Co. v G~tierrz.2~~ There, a 
worker's injury in an explosion was caused by welding operations in proximity 
to waste, but not altogether empty, drums of the highly flammable solvent xylene. 
The manufacturer and seller of the xylene identified each drum as "highly flam- 
mable," but did not convey to the plaintiff's employer or to the distributor in- 
termediary the importance of proper disposal of waste drums. The appellate court 
turned aside the manufacturer's appeal that it had no duty to provide such in- 
formation to the final users of its product inasmuch as it was sold in bulk carload 
lots by responding: 
[Bleing a bulk supplier in carload lots and not having direct access to the barrels 
does not insulate [the manufacturer] from liability. Labeling is but one of the 
methods which may give adequate warning . . . . Lack of access to the final form 
2w E.g., Parkinson v. California Co., 255 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1958) (an action involving bulk 
sale of propane to transporter, with subsequent sales to a retailer and the plaintiff, who suffered 
personal injuries and property damage as a result of a propane explosion). Concerning the claimed 
duty to warn the ultimate consumer of the possible loss of the fuel's cautionary odorant, the court 
states: 
The propane was delivered to [the transporter] not in containers, but in bulk . . . . When 
it was sold, there was no method by which defendants could warn the plaintiff how it could 
be handled. The gas not being sold in original containers, and as it was not known to 
whom [the retailer] might sell the same, defendants could only warn [the transporter]. [The 
transporter and the retailer] knew of the possible chemical reaction. Warning is required 
to impart knowledge, and if that knowledge has already been acquired, it i s  not necessary. 
Id. at 269 (citations omitted). 
Congruent authority is found in Hendrix v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 203 Kan. 140, 453 P.2d 486 
(1969) "[The manufacturer], having once fulfilled the above duty [to warn], can not be held liable 
for [the distributor's] failure to take advantage of, use, or impart to others such instruction." Id. 
at 496, cited with approval in Jonerr, 219 Kan. at 635, 549 P.2d at 1392, in which the syllabus of 
the court states the general rule: 
The manufacturer of [propone gas] who sells it to a distributor in bulk fulfills his duty to 
the ultimate consumer when he ascertains that the distributor to whom he sells is adequately 
trained, is familiar with the properties of the gas and safe methods of handling it, and is 
capable of passing on his knowledge to his customers. A manufacturer so selling owes no 
duty to warn the ultimate consumer, and his failure to do so is not negligence, and does 
not render the product defective. 
Id. at 627, 549 P.2d at 1383. 
In Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying Idaho law), the 
court concluded that "the adequacy of a bulk manufacturer's warning to those other than its immediate 
vendee is usually held to be a jury question." Id. at 1346. 
Shell Oil Co., v. Gutierez, 119 Ariiz. 426, 581 P.2d 271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978). 
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in which the product reaches the user is simply one of the considerations bearing 
upon the existence and extent of 
The absence of any identifiable reason for the bulk seller to suspect im- 
prudence on the part of its immediate purchaser has been held to insulate the 
manufacturer from a claim of failure to warn adequately, even in a setting where 
the manufacturer accompanied its initial sale with no warnings whatsoever.300 In 
one such case a lacquer thinner manufacturer sold the thinner in bulk to a dis- 
tributor who packaged it to another distributor, who sold it to the retailer. The 
plaintiff used the thinner upon the recommendation that she could clean tar stains 
on her floor, proceeded to use it to clean her entire kitchen floor. The extreme 
flammability of the product caused the ensuing accident in which the plaintiff 
was injured. The warning in question was agreed by the parties to be adequate 
for use of the product as lacquer thinner, but unfortunately the label, for which 
preparation the thinner manufacturer claimed no responsibility, recommended the 
product's utility for removal of tar.301 The court identified the only issue before 
it as whether the manufacturer had a duty to inspect the middleman's package 
or warning for adequacy. The court responded that it did not, explaining that 
''Nt would have been highly unlikely, under the circumstances, however, for [the 
manufacturer] to have foreseen that [the middleman] would add an inappropriate 
use to an otherwise adequate warning 
A different issue is whether the private label manufacturer selling goods to 
the retailer for sale under the name of the retailer alone has a duty to warn the 
ultimate consumer of salient safety and usage information. Such was the object 
of discussion, but not resolution, in Edwards v. Sears Roebuck & Co.303 This 
involved an appeal of an action brought on behalf of a decedent involved in an 
accident in which the automobile's tires had been manufactured by Michelin in 
Europe and sold to defendant for resale under Sears' Allstate trademark. Michelin 
argued that under negligence it had "no duty to warn consumers regarding the 
vagaries of inflation, weights, speeds, and uses involved in driving with tires oth- 
erwise free from defect or danger," a proposition which the court agreed had 
"some merit."304 
Where a manufacturer's product is safe for use by most persons likely to 
come into contact with it, but is likely to create an allergic or highly unusual 
'99 Id. at 434, 581 P.2d at 279 (citing Davk, 399 F.2d 121). 
3m Manning v. Ashland Oil Co., 721 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1983). 
Id. at 194. 
Id at 195. 
'03 Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.. 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975). 
YU Id. at 287. See ako 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN supra, note 70, at $5 8.01-8.05(2). 
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reaction in only a small proportion of the population, special issues arise as to 
the manufacturer's duty to warn the allergic or idiosyncratic individual. 
Several decisions have adverted to the comments to Restatement (Second) of 
Torts section 402A as an aid in defining the standard to be applied to the man- 
ufacturer's duty to warn the unusual, but predictable, allergic or idiosyncratic 
user. One potential guideline found therein is that of comment i, which in its 
narrative regarding the concept of "unreasonably dangerous" states, in part, that 
to be unreasonably dangerous, "[tlhe article sold must be dangerous to an extent 
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who pur- 
chases i t .  . . ."305 This language, with its emphasis on the ordinary consumer, 
has been interpreted by some courts as inviting the conclusion that an allergic or 
hypersensitive reaction to a product is not that of an ordinary or normal con- 
sumer. It, therefore, represents a factor militating against finding that allergic 
reactions can support a finding of unreasonable danger. A second guideline is 
found in comment j which provides that the manufacturer should provide a warn- 
ing where "the product contains an ingredient to which a substantial number of 
the population are allergic, and the ingredient is one whose danger is not generally 
known . . . . 9 ,306 
Illustrative decisions adopting a "substantial" number or an "appreciable" 
number test include Cudmore v. Richardson-Merril, I ~ C . , ~ ~  involving cataracts 
and hair loss linked to the defendant's MER/29. The court stated that "the man- 
ufacturer of a drug for human consumption or intimate bodily use should be 
held liable . . . for injurious results only when such results [were foreseeable] in 
an appreciable number of persons."30s In Kaempfe v. Lehn and Fink Products 
C ~ r p . , ~ ~  the court stated that there exists no manufacturer duty to warn unless 
the consumer is one of a "substantial number or of an identifiable class of persons 
who were allergic to the defendant's produ~ts."3~~ The court in the latter case 
m5 Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 402A comment i (emphasis added). 
306 Id. comment j: 
. . . or if known is one which the consumer would reasonably expect not to find in the 
product, the seller is required to give a warning against it, if he has knowledge, or by the 
application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge, of 
the presence of the ingredient and the danger. 
Id. 
Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert. denied, 
385 U.S. 1003 (1967), disapproved by, Crocker v. Winthrop Lab. Div. of Sterling Drug, Inc., 514 
S.W.2d 427 (Tex. 1974). 
M3 Id. at 644. 
YR Kaempfe v. Lehn &Fink Prods., Corp., 21 A.D.2d 197, 249 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1964), aff'd, 20 
N.Y.2d 818, 284 N.Y.S.2d 708, 231 N.E.2d 294 (1967). 
'I0 Id. at 201, 249 N.Y.S. at 846. See also Presbrey v. Gilette Co., 105 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 435 
N.E.2d 513 (1982), finding no duty to warn where the evidence showed that youth's welts from use 
of an antiperspirant were a systemic antigen-antibody reaction that was idiosynaatic to that user, 
and concluding therefore that the product was not fairly considered injurious to normal users. 
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found that under this standard there should be no recovery where the evidence 
showed only four complaints out of approxiinately 600,000 units of spray deo- 
dorant sold,311 a determination required, the court emphasized, not only by "the 
weight of authority but also by common sense application of the negligence doc- 
trine."312 
Other decisions adopt the "appreciable number" language of Cudmore and 
state that for the product to be considered unreasonably dangerous, and for a 
duty to warn to attach, the adverse reaction must be of such a nature as to affect 
an "appreciable number" of users. Such an approach was adopted by one court 
finding for the defendant manufacturer in an action by a user of its fair coloring 
product for scalp injuries sustained in using the 
Other authority describes the standard to be applied as that of whether the 
product was dangerous to an extent that would not be contemplated by the or- 
dinary consumer purchasing it. This language was also employed by the authors 
Kaempfe, 21 A.D.2d at 203, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 848. In Kaempfe the markings on the deodorant 
specifically stated "safe for normal skin" and "contains aluminum sulfate." The plaintiff, as in Wright 
suffered a severe allergic reaction. In reviewing why the manufacturer had not failed to warn, the 
court analyzed evidence that showed the manufacturer's projection that only one out of every 150,000 
users would experience an adverse reaction. With this small number in mind the court stated this 
view of the law: "P,ccording to prevailing authority the existence of a duty on the part of a man- 
ufacturer to warn depends upon whether or not to his actual or constructive knowledge, the product 
contains an ingredient to which a substantial number of the population are allergic." Id. at 199, 249 
N.Y.S.2d at 845. Finding no liability for want of any "substantial" number of persons who would 
react poorly to the product, the court was impressed additionally by its perception of the lack of 
causation between the seller's conduct and the consumer's injury, observing that a product containing 
a particular ingredient to which the manufacturer knew some were allergic would, by definition, warn 
only those who knew they had an allergy. A warning would therefore, by this argument, be useless 
to those persons such as Mrs. Kaempfe who did not know they had an allergy. 
31Z Id. at 204, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 848. 
"3 Alberto-Culver Co. v. Morgan, 444 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (finding no duty to 
warn in the absence of evidence that the user belonged to an appreciable class of users or potential 
users). One early review of what number of affected persons should be necessary to demonstrate that 
a product is hazardous is Zirpola v. Adam Hat Stores, Inc., 122 N.J.L. 21, 4 A.2d 73 (1939)' which 
involved an allergic reaction to a poisonous dye concentrated in the head band of the plaintiff's hat. 
After several warnings the consumer noticed his normally black hair had turned orange and he began 
to suffer from a skin eruption across his forehead. Judgment at trial went to Mr. Zirpola. On appeal 
the defendant contended that there should be no liability because the evidence demonstrated that only 
a small portion (four or five percent) of persons coming into contact with the dye would suffer injury. 
The court rejected the proposition in these words: 
The mere fact that only a small proportion of those who use a certain article would suffer 
injuries by reason of such use does not absolve the vendor from liability under the implied 
warranty created by statute. Otherwise in every action to recover damages for the breach 
of an implied warranty it would be necessary to show that the article sold whether it be 
food or wearing apparel would be injurious to every user. 
Id. at 23, 4 A.2d at 75. 
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of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A comment i. Under this approach, 
it has been held that a severe allergic reaction to a shampoo in one user was 
insufficient to show the manufacturer's failure to warn upon evidence showing 
that only somewhat more than one millionth of one per cent of the units sold 
had been associated with provable allergic reactions.324 
Even when only a very small proportion of the population is put at risk, the 
severity of the illness or injury to which the warning would be directed is properly 
a factor in determining whether the manufacturer has a duty to warn. Such was 
the logic of the court in Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, I ~ C . , ~ ~ ~  an action involving 
the risk to participants in a mass polio immunization program of contracting the 
disease inoculated against, a risk argued to be only one in a million. Expressly 
rejecting the quantitative approach to determining the manufacturer's duty to 
warn, the court stated the test as being applicable to the law of informed consent 
as to products liability: "When, in a particular case, the risk qualitatively (e.g., 
of death or major disability) as well as quantitatively, on balance with the end 
sought to be achieved, is such as to call for a true choice judgment, medical or 
personal, the warning must be given."316 
The analysis in Davis is congruent with the emphasis given in Wright v. Carter 
Products, Inc.317 Even if the risk is very slight, when the consequences of an 
injury are very grave, the manufacturer may in some circumstances have a duty 
to warn "those few persons who it knows cannot apply its product without serious 
injury.99318 
Mountain v. Procter & Gamble Co., 312 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Wis. 1970). 
n5 Davis, 399 F.2d 121. 
M6 Id. at 129-30. Glynn Davis was a healthy 38 year old man who took the drug as part of a 
nationwide immunization push. Within days he became paralyzed. The manufacturer sought to in- 
troduce evidence of a Surgeon General's report which put the risk of contacting the disease for persons 
over twenty years of age at nine out of every one million. Because of the small number defendant 
urged the court to classify this case as one in which "the personal risk although existent and known 
is so trifling in comparison with the advantage to be gained as to be de minimus." Rejecting this 
argument the court said, "Such treatment would qualify only in situations where sale [of the product] 
is accompanied by proper directions and warnings. Thus we are returned to the problem of a duty 
to warn." Id. at 128-29. The consumer must be given a chance, the court continues, to personally 
balance the benefits and risks of the administration of the drug, and absent a clear indication of the 
risks to him this risk-reward evaluation cannot be made. Particularly in situations involving drugs, 
the court emphasized the need for the consumer to be accurately informed of the risk of adverse 
reactions even if in view of the seller such risk are minimal, concluding "responsibility for choice is 
not one that the manufacturer can assume for all comers . . . it is the responsibility of the manufacturer 
to see that warnings reach the consumer . . . ." Id. at 131. 
)I7 Wright V. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957). 
Id. at 58. (emphasis added). See also Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 
1966) (holding that it is not unreasonable "to expect a manufacturer to foresee that some few customers 
among its many customers will suffer a rare allergic reaction to some ingredient in the product." Id. 
at 85); Gober v. Revlon Inc., 317 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1963) (cosmetic manufacturer's nail base creating 
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Subsequent authority supports the argument in Wright319 that the duty to warn 
cannot in all cases be measured by a quantitative standard,320 and that the man- 
ufacturer will in some circumstances be required to warn even a very few persons 
who cannot use the product without serious injury.321 In agreement is the court 
in Basko v. Sterling Drug, I ~ C . , ~ ~  which, in an action involving blindness caused 
by chloroquine retinopathy, stated: "The manufacturer is obligated to warn in 
cases where the drug may affect only a small number of idiosyncratic or hyper- 
sensitive users, and the obligation to warn attaches regardless of whether the 
number of persons affected can fairly be said to be 'appreciable.' "323 
allergic reaction in some users is sufficient to  create an  obligation to  warn). In Wright, Mrs. Carter 
had used Arrid deodorant for five years without suffering any ill effect but in June 1951, with an 
application of the product, she contracted a rash. She discontinued use of the product and the rash 
subsided. Later upon resumption of use no harmful effects were noticed. Unfortunately, with still a 
later application the rash reappeared, this time in the form of a severe case of contact dermatitis, a 
condition that must be continually treated. At trial, evidence was introduced to show that some 
individuals will experience varying degrees from mild to  extremely severe dermatitis when using al- 
uminate sulfate products, and that in the years 1948 through 1951 the manufacturer had received 373 
complaints of skin irritation caused by Arrid. The trial court found persuasive the fact that 82,000,000 
jars of the product had been sold generating only 373 complaints. Such a miniscule percentage com- 
pelled the court's conclusion that no duty to  warn had arisen. The court of appeals, however, rejected 
the rationale that a small number of injuries always negates a duty to  warn, and stated that while 
the number of persons harmed is properly considered in determining whether the manufacturer had 
knowledge of a danger: 
pV]hen the fact is once established and demonstrated by experience that a certain commodity 
apparently harmless, contains concealed dangers and when distributed to  the public through 
the channels of trade and used for the purpose for which it was made and sold is sure to 
cause suffering to and injure the health of some innocent purchaser even though the per- 
centage of those injured be not large a duty arises to  and a responsibility rests upon the 
manufacturer and dealer with knowledge to  the extent, a t  least, of warning the ignorant 
consumer. 
Wright, 244 F.2d at  58 (quoting Gerkin v. Brodn & Sehler Co., 177 Mich. 45, 60, 143 N.W. 48, 53 
(1913)). 
)I9 Wright, 244 F.2d 53. See Advance Chem. Co. v. Harter, 478 So. 2d 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1985), which involved a person's respiratory injury from use of a cleaning product containing am- 
monia. The defendant therein argued that plaintiff should not recover absent a showing that the 
product was hazardous "to the average person." Id. at  447. The appellate court considered such a 
standard "too great a burden" Id., and determined instead that the court would adopt the rule that 
"if a particular injury is reasonably foreseeable, however rare, the manufacturer or  seller has the 
duty to  warn." Id. ;it 448. Liability may attach, the court continued, even in the absence of prior 
complaints about the product, as in the court's view "if the injury is reasonably foreseeable, even 
if rare, the seller car~not rely on its history of good fortune to exempt itself from liability.'' Id. at 
448 (citations omitted). 
Wright, 244 F.2d at  56. 
Id. at  58. )* Basko, a t  416 F.2d 430. 
'* Id. 
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Other authority supporting the position taken in Wright and involving an 
even more remote risk of allergic reaction is Braun v. Roux Distribution CO.~" 
There, the incidence of a user of the manufacturer's hair dye (which contained 
small amounts of a coal tar derivative) contracting allergic periarteritis nodosa 
was so remote as to have never, to anyone's knowledge, occurred. Notwithstand- 
ing the manufacturer's distribution of tens of millions of applications of the hair 
dye each year without comparable incident, the court found that the jury could 
reasonably conclude that the manufacturer, held to the standard of an expert, 
should have known of the risk and given an adequate warning against it.325 
XI. DUTY TO WARN THE PROFESSIONAL USER 
The rule is stated generally that there is no duty to give a warning to members 
of a trade or profession against dangers generally known to that Ad- 
herence to this approach is demonstrated by decisions holding that there is no 
duty to warn about the dangers of high exposure to benzene when the individual 
exposed to the benzene is a professional tank stripper whose job required contact 
with comparably hazardous cargo;3" and that there is no duty to warn an ex- 
perienced stuntman about the hazards of jumping from a height of 323 feet into 
an air cushion rated for 200 feet.328 
One obvious rationale for distinguishing the so-called professional user doc- 
trine from the doctrines discussed above, concerning the duty to warn about 
known or obvious dangers, is that the product sold to or coming into contact 
with the professional may frequently be sold only to members of that trade. A 
single example will suffice. One can plausibly maintain that the producer of bulk 
quantities of rodenticide, sold only to seed and feed stores in bags not smaller 
than 100 pounds, can expect that the product will see only agricultural use, and 
that the users would have at least a rudimentary acquaintance with the safe use 
of rodenticide. A like supposition can be said to have led one court to conclude 
that a manufacturer should not have to warn a farmer about the dangers of 
drinking concentrated herbicide.329 
1x Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958). 
Id. at 763. 
Lockett v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 1201, 1209 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1394 
(3d Cir. 1975); see, e.g., Martinez, 529 F.2d 457; Collins v. Ridge Tool Co., 520 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 949 (1976); Henderson Brothers Stores, Inc., v. Smiley, 120 Cal. App. 
3d 903, 174 Cal. Rptr. 875 (1981); Ziglar v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 53 N.C. App. 147, 
280 S.E.2d 510 (1981). 
ln Martinez, 529 F.2d at 464. 
1" Bakunas v. Life Pack, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 89, 92 (E.D. La. 1982), aff'd, 701 F.2d 946 (5th 
Cir. 1983). 
1" Ziglar, 53 N.C. App. at 153, 280 S.E.2d at 515. 
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One early articulation of this approach was offered in Helene Curtis Indus- 
tries, Inc. v. P r ~ i t t , ~ ~ O  in which the injured party claimed, among other things, 
that the instructions accompanying the hair preparation inadequately described 
precautions that could have been taken and which would have lessened the li- 
kelihood or severity of the plaintiffs injuries. The manufacturer countered that 
its product was plainly marked "For Professional Use Only," that its warnings 
and other cautionary information was sufficient for the safe administration of 
the product by beauticians, and that it should not be required also to have pre- 
pared information for the audience of, the plaintiff and her friend who assisted 
in the casual home administration of the product. With this latter proposition 
the court agreed, stating: "When these products were marketed, the makers could 
only foresee that they would be applied by a trained beautician. Therefore, the 
directions had to be adequate only for the professional's use."331 
The professional user exception has not been limited to circumstances where 
the injured party has had trade or professional exposure to the product. It has 
also been invoked successfully when the injured individual or individuals have 
had first-hand knowledge of the characteristics of a product, even 'absent direct 
professional experience. One such holding was an affirmed lower court finding 
for a defendant concrete manufacturer in an action brought by two men who 
purchased the defendant's concrete for use as a foundation for an addition to 
their home and suffered chemical bums from contact with the product. Noting 
that "[bloth plaintiffs had experience in working with concrete" and had clothed 
themselves to provide protection from the risk of, among other things, chemical 
burns, the court held that a manufacturer had no duty to warn of risks thus 
known to the 
Similarly, if the experienced worker, knowledgeable of the risks inhering in 
the use of a product not itself inherently dangerous, proceeds incautiously to 
attempt to use the product, it may be found that a later claim of failure to warn 
will be barred for lack of any causal connection between the injuries sustained 
and the lack of warning. Such was the result in Horak v. Pullman, I ~ c . , ~ ~ ~  in 
which a railway workman brought suit against, among others, the manufacturer 
of a gravity outlet gate after he sustained back injuries attempting to work open 
the closed exit chute. Reviewing the record below, the appellate court concluded 
'20 Helene Curtis Indus. Inc., 385 F.2d 841. 
Id. at 858 (citations omitted); see Dahlback v. Dico Co., [I98485 Transfer Binder] Prod. 
Liab. Rep. (CCH) 1 10,195 (Minn. App. 1984), finding no duty to warn for manufacturer of trolley 
boom hoist following injury where hand-held control unit malfunctioned and operator came into 
contact with a power line, as the plaintiff% employer, a sophisticated purchaser familiar with the 
varying types of control units available, was knowledgeable of the risks in such a product. Id. at 26, 
561-63, 26,562. 
n2 Gary v. Dyson Lumber & Supply Co., 465 So.2d 172 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (citing Thornhill 
v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson Inc., 385 So. 2d 336 (La. Ct. App. 1980)). 
333 Horak v. Pullman, Inc., 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 110,585 (5th Cir. 1975). 
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that the plaintiff "knew that excessive force might be required to open the hopper 
car," knew also that the use of such force "could pose a threat of injury to 
him," and, by his admitted disregard of various mechanical assist devices at the 
site, showed that any other warnings or instructions would have been unavailing. 
"Thus," the court decided, "the failure to warn could not have been a producing 
cause of [the plaintiff's] accident."334 
Subsection @) of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 388 has been inter- 
preted as supporting the proposition that no duty to warn exists if the user knows 
or should know of the hazard, especially when the user is a professional who 
should be aware of the characteristics of the product. Illustrative of the decisions 
supporting this rationale is the leading case of Strong v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours 
& Co.335 In Strong, the widow of the decedent, a construction supervisor for the 
public gas company, brought an action for the death of her husband who was 
killed by a gas explosion while investigating a report of gas odor. The explosion 
was attributed to a two-inch plastic pipe, containing a metal insert stiffener, which 
pulled from a compression coupling because of shrinkage in the plastic pipe due 
to cold. The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the manufacturer failed 
to warn that such plastic pipe, when connected to steel pipe by means of compres- 
sion coupling, would not maintain its integrity as the plastic pipe contracted with 
temperature drop. The evidence showed that the coupling in question had been 
installed under the direction of the decedent, and that the decedent was, prior 
to the explosion, aware of at least two other incidents involving similar 
The evidence in Strong also showed that the manufacturer had issued "a 
variety of printed instructions and technical information" to the gas company, 
including advisories on the need for precautionary measures on anchoring pro- 
cedures with plastic pipe. The testimony of gas company employees, however, 
was uniformly that none had read the latest and most timely manufacturer news- 
letter on the Citing subsection @) of Restatement (Second) of Torts 
section 388, the appellate court agreed with substantial precedent that the pro- 
vision has been correctly "interpreted to mean that there is no duty to warn if 
the user knows or should know of the danger, especially when the user is a 
professional who should be aware of the characteristics of the The 
court continued by adding that the alleged lack of warnings could not, in any 
event, be the proximate cause of the fatality when "a user is fully aware of the 
danger which a warning would alert him or her of."339 
Iw Id. at 28,288. 
Strong v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 667 F.2d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 1981). 
336 Id. at 684. 
Id. at 685. 
)I8 Id. at 687. 
3J9 Id. at 688. See Hammond v. Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 204 Neb. SO, 82-83, 281 N.W.2d 
520, 522 (1979). an action arising from the same explosion as that in the principal case, and in which 
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Courts have not, however, reflexively denied recovery to experienced workers 
on the basis of a presumptive familiarity with any hazards associated with their 
trade or craft. 'This is particularly true in a hierarchal trade or craft where the 
contractor or supervisor, by information, experience, or training, may know more 
about the performance characteristics of certain products than the subordinate 
craftsmen. Leading authority has proposed the better rule to be that where the 
pertinent product safety information has not reached the individual who will use 
the product or be exposed to the peril, it is of no moment that the worker's 
supervisor or eniployer may have superior knowledge or information of the haz- 
ard. Thus, in Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer CO.,~~O an action was brought 
by a painter severely burned when the epoxy paint with which he was painting 
the inside of a railway tank car ignited. The evidence showed that while the 
plaintiff's employer may have been familiar with the risk that vapors accumulating 
in a confined area could create the risk of explosion when coming into contact 
with a spark, the plaintiff himself was not. Reversing on the basis of the trial 
court's instruction that knowledge of the hazard on the part of the plaintiff's 
employer would obviate any need for a warning to the plaintiff,344' the court stated 
that "[tlhe adequacy of warnings must be measured according to whatever knowl- 
edge and understanding may be common to painters who will actually open the 
containers and use the paints; the possibly superior knowledge and understanding 
of painting contractors is irrelevant."342 
As in Jackson, the record in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products C0rp.3~3 
required the coriclusion that, however familiar others might have been with the 
the court observed that as the gas company was under a high duty of care concerning its gas lines, 
the manufacturer could assume that it was familiar with the pullout problem, a hazard that was "well 
known throughout the industry." Id. at 86, 281 N.W.2d at 524. In such circumstances, that court 
concluded: "Any negligence on the part of Du Pont in failing to adequately instruct and warn the 
Gas Co. could not have been the proximate cause of the accident if the Gas Co. had actual knowledge 
of the matter." Id. at 86, 281 N.W.2d at 524. See also Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., 
409 F.2d 1263, 1273 (9th Cir. 1969). where the decedent, a manufacturing foreman, was killed when 
a steel strand broke in the preparation of prestressed concrete. The plaintiff alleged inadequate warning 
to the decedent of the hazards of overstressing, but there was testimony of familiarity with the danger 
in the industry, as well as particular knowledge of the hazard by the defendant's production coor- 
dinator and the decedent's supervisor. The court there found only a duty to warn those who would 
be supervising and directing the application of the materials, stating its view of the correct rule of 
law: 
Where a supplier furnishes chattels, the use of which is to be directed by technicians or 
engineers, it is sufficient to insulate the supplier from liability for failure to warn if the 
warnings given are sufficient to apprise the engineers or technicians of the dangers involved, 
or if the technicians have knowledge of the dangers involved. There is no duty to warn 
those who simply follow the directions of the engineers or technicians. 
Id. at 1273 (quoting the trial court's conclusion of law number VI). 
YO Jackson, 499 F.2d 809. 
Id. at 812. 
.U2 Id. at 812-13. 
Y3 Borel, 493 F.2d 1076. 
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hazards of inhalation of respirable asbestos, the dangers of such exposure were 
not sufficiently apparent to insulation workers to relieve the manufacturers of 
the duty to warn.34 
Other authority reiterates that the provider of a warning must adopt methods 
of communication that offer reasonable assurance that the user or consumer will 
be apprised of the information either personally or vicariously. The presumption 
that a skilled contractor or a knowledgeable foreman will act successfully to pro- 
tect employees who are less informed of the risk, or not informed at all, can be 
rebutted by facts showing no communication, or inadequate communication, of 
safety-related information to the employee. One helpful analysis is provided in 
Eck v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & C O . , ~ ~ ~  an action brought by a laborer injured 
by remaining too close to a blast of dynamite detonated by the project's foreman. 
The manufacturer argued that it had provided sufficient instructions for use of 
the explosive by means of flyers in each carton of the dynamite and the invitation 
therein for the purchaser to contact the manufacturer for additional information. 
The evidence at trial, however, suggested that even plaintiff's foreman was not 
familiar with the proper distances to be maintained for safe use of the dynamite. 
Reversing summary judgment for defendant below, the court of appeals held it 
to be a jury question as to whether the manufacturer's practice of providing flyers 
gave "reasonable assurance that the information [would] reach those whose safety 
depends upon it."346 
The professional user exception has not been confined to determination of 
the manufacturer's duty to warn the professional worker in a setting where, for 
example, pertinent inquiry would necessarily comprehend the reasonable reciprocal 
expectations of the professional home painter and the manufacturer of house paint 
whose product is purchased. The doctrine has been interpreted by some courts 
to identify a lesser duty to warn for the manufacturer who sells to a professional 
buyer who may be expected to know of any hazards posed, without regard to 
whether employees or others working at the direction of the buyer are "profes- 
sional users" as that characterization is understood in common usage or in the 
sense of the fairness of a presumed familiarity with any risks. 
Illustrative in this regard is the frequently cited decision in Hopkins v. E.I. 
Du Pont de Nemours & In that action the plaintiff's decedent was killed 
when placing a stick of dynamite in a recently drilled hole in rock the crew was 
blasting. At trial the foreman testified that, while he was unaware of any other 
Id. at 1093. A life long insulation worker would not, for example, be expected to be familiar 
with the documentation, however substantial, in the medical journals of the hazards of asbestosis. 
See id. at 1081-1086. 
YJ Eck V. E.I. DU Pont de Nemours & Co., 393 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1968). 
Id. at 813 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $ 388 comment n). 
Hopkins, 212 2.2d 623. 
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premature explosions caused under similar circumstances, he had learned from 
sources he considered reliable of the nature of the risk and had instructed men 
on his crew to check the temperature of the hole by the crude method of insertion 
of a wooden pole and its later removal and observation. Thus, from the record, 
although the knowledge of the foreman as to the risk was perhaps marginal, there 
was uncontradicted evidence suggesting that the decedent had received specific 
instruction of means of lessening, if not eliminating, the risk.348 
It is seen that the issue of the nature and quantum of warning that will be 
appropriate for the professional user is related closely to the question of when 
the manufacturr:r selling to the professional buyer and providing warnings, where 
appropriate, to the immediate purchaser must proceed in addition to provide 
warnings or other information to the agents or employees of the purchaser who 
will actually use or be affected by the product. For example, the court in Hopkins 
probably erred in concluding that the seller could presume that the foreman was 
familiar with the hazard of premature explosion. From all that can be learned 
from the reported decision, the foreman's knowledge was at best vague and was 
obtained from collateral sources. There would have been, on the other hand, 
sufficient support in the record for concluding that the worker killed was himself 
knowledgable about the risk by virtue of having been instructed in a rudimentary 
procedure for determining whether the drill holes had cooled sufficiently. There- 
fore, in a decision reached prior to strict liability, the plaintiff could have been 
denied recovery on the grounds of contributory negligence. 
Nevertheless, an additional caution concerning reliance on Hopkins is that 
the characterization by the court of the construction firm, the purchaser of the 
explosive, and specifically the foreman of the firm, as the only pertinent "user" 
of the product is insupportable. It is true that the contractor was the purchaser 
of the explosive for the purposes of warranty law and would be the consumer 
of the product if that term is considered to include the person who disposes of 
or directs the disposition of property. It is incorrect, however, to style the con- 
tractor's foreman as the "user" in this instance, disregarding the patent reality 
that it was the decedent who was using the substance and who was mortally injured 
thereby. Moreover, modern authority would reject the invitation to impute the 
negligence or assumption of risk of the contractor or the supervisor to the innocent 
employee.349 
Id. at 625-26. 
Y9 See Hammond, 691 F.2d 646, 652 (imprudence of farm manager or farm owner in ordering 
a tractor without a rollover protective structure should not be imputed to an employee killed while 
using the tractor); Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 11984-85 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. 
(CCH) f 10,'166 (3d Cir. 1984) (an action brought by an Army reservist against the manufacturer of 
a bulldozer for injuries alleged to have been sustained for reason of the bulldozer's lack of a rollover 
protective device, holding that the pertinent authority required that the duty to warn be gauged by 
the users' knowledge, and that any knowledge held by the reservist's Army employer should not 
necessarily be imputed to him.) 
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Accordingly, proper application of the professional user variation on the man- 
ufacturer's duty to warn requires careful restriction of the group considered to 
have notice of the risk, whether that notice is actual, constructive or vicarious. 
No advancement of risk spreading and related policies served by Restatement 
(Second) of Torts sections 388 and 402A is gained by hypertechnical evaluation 
of whether the knowledge of the employer is shared by or imputable to the em- 
ployee. Human experience suggests that only rarely will the employee know what 
is known to the employer. In other legal areas such as, for example, the law of 
evidence, the courts will not impute an employer's statement to signify the assent 
of the employee.3s0 Equally important is countenancing a seller's defense that the 
buyer-employer was a professional user or an expert concerning the safety char- 
acteristics of the product, where the persons to be exposed to the hazard had no 
such superior kno\vIedge. This serves only to cripple the recognized contemporary 
goal that the manufacturer share with the user or consumer such safety-related 
information as is necessary to the reasonably safe use of the product. The in- 
formational burden should be placed on the party with the lowest cost of de- 
tection, usually the manufacturer, rather than on the unknowing employee for 
whom the burden of understanding the propensities of complex chemicals or ma- 
chinery is very substantial, if achievable at all. 
The professional user exception is best reserved for factual settings involving 
an expert buyer of a product that is not available for general consumption. The 
product is to be used or handled either by the buyer exclusively or by those who 
work under the supervision of the buyer and who are already either experienced 
in the use or handling of the product or have been effectively informed concerning 
safe use and handling. A good example of the limited and appropriate application 
of the professional user rule is offered in Martinez v. Dixie Carrier, I r~c. ,~~ '  which 
involved a suit brought by the widow of a shore-based worker who was overcome 
by noxious fumes while stripping a barge empty of all liquids. The barge in 
question had been used most recently to transport a petrochemical mixture con- 
taining a substantial concentration of benzene.3s2 Reversing the trial court's con- 
clusion that the seller's cautionary information had been inadequate, the appeals 
court determined that the warnings were adequate, "[alt least for the limited class 
of professionals to which . . . employees belonged,"353 because (1) there was 
'~4 E.g., Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Center, Inc., 588 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1978) 
(in personal injury action following alleged attack on child by wolf kept by defendant's employee 
and owned by defendant, comments in defendant's corporate minutes admitting attack could not 
operate co-equally as admission of co-defendant employee as "there was no servant, or agency, re- 
lationship which justified admitting the evidence of the board minutes as against [the employee]." 
Id.). 
Martinez, 529 F.2d 457. 
352 Id. at 460. 
Id. at 467 (regarding claim in strict liability). As to the negligence count, the court stated: 
In view of the limited marketing of Hytrol-D to industrial users, Du Pont could reasonably 
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"limited marketing" of the product, only to "industrial  user[^];"^^^ (2) the crew 
on which the decedent worked "was conversant with the hazards and precautions 
necessary for the safe handling of a chemical mixture with a high benzene 
content . . . ;"355 and (3) the barge and its cargo displayed large permanent signs 
about "Dangerous Cargo," a benzene warning card pursuant to Coast Guard 
requirements, and a product identification card promulgated by a national trade 
XII. ADEQUACY OF WARNINGS OR INSTRUCTIONS 
Once there is determined to be a duty to warn, the task of the finder of fact 
is often to evaluate whether the warnings or instructions as were provided were 
adequate. Because the finding of a duty to warn presupposes the existence of a 
disparity between the essential safety-related information known to the seller and 
that known to the buyer in the absence of any warnings whatever, the focus of 
the inquiry into the adequacy is whether the warning provided was sufficient to 
right this imbalance. 
To be sufficient in the legal sense, the warning or instruction must be ade- 
quate, if followed, to render the product safe for its intended and foreseeable 
uses.357 As with the question of whether a failure to warn is a proximate cause 
of the injury is a question of generally the adequacy of warnings or in- 
structions will be a question of fact.3sg Naturally, the publication of a warning 
anticipate that only professionals familiar with the precautions necessary for safe handling 
of benezene and similar petrochemical substances would come in contact with or otherwise 
handle the cargo of the B-29. The Wdsco stripping crew was in fact composed of such 
professionals, and the crew had been made aware of the nature of the liquid residue to be 
stripped from the barge. At least with regard to individuals having such expertise, the 
warnings provided by Du Pont in the form of benzene warning card and the product iden- 
tification card should have been adequate to apprise crew members of the hazards of entering 
the barge's tanks. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court erred to the extent that 
it imposed liability on Du Pont on the basis of negligent failure to warn. 
Id. at 465. 
Id. 
Id. at 467. 
Id. at 462. 
In See generally Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 
Sw. L. J. 256 (1969). 
US E.g., Kavenaugh v. Kavenaugh, 131 Ariz. 344, 641 P.2d 258 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (consid- 
eration of whether prior breaking of safety lever or lack of warning that the self-propelled mower 
could become operative regardless of safety lever, proximately caused serious injury to a child's foot). 
1 5 ~  E-g., Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 136 Ariz. 556, 667 P.2d 750 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) 
(issue of instructions for use of electric saw where risk was of electrocution, when used with non- 
grounded two-prong extension cord); Buley v. Rexnord Process Mach. Div., 105 A.D.2d 965 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1984); Stone v. Sterling Drug, 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 110,580, (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). 
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or instructions must be timely, providing the opportunity for the user or consumer 
to understand and act upon the message.360 
Evaluation of the adequacy of a warning requires a balancing of consider- 
ations that include at least (1) the dangerousness of the product; (2) the form in 
which the product is used; (3) the intensity and form of the warnings given; (4) 
the burdens to be imposed by requiring warnings; and (5) the likelihood that the 
particular warning will be adequately communicated to those who will foreseeably 
use the 
Thus, measuring the adequacy of a warning requires consideration of both 
form and content. The form of the warning label, be it rendered in a separate 
tag or integrated into the printed material on the product's container, must first 
be such that it could reasonably be expected to catch the attention of the rea- 
sonably prudent man in the circumstances of its use. The content of the warning, 
in turn, then must be of such a nature as to be "comprehensible to the average 
user and to convey a fair indication of the nature and extent of the danger to 
the mind of a reasonably prudent p e r s ~ n . " ~ ~ ~ A  warning may be inadequate if (1) 
its physical characteristics, including its size and placement, are so small or obscure 
that the reasonable consumer would not read it; or (2) it fails to inform the 
reasonable consumer of the pertinent hazard and the means for its avoidance.363 
For example, concerning the dual prongs of the latter requirement, if the 
hazard to be avoided is venemous snakes in the grass, a sign saying simply "Keep 
off the Grass" would be inadequate for its failure to describe with sufficient 
impact the nature of the risk as well as for its failure to inform the visitor of 
any means of safe passage. Concerning impact alone, such an understated warning 
would surely fail, in the expression of one court, to convey an "intensity sufficient 
to illuminate the mind of a reasonable [person]."364 On the other hand, if the 
sign said "Use Foot Bridge," it might be adequate in terms of advising the reader 
of the means of avoidance of the risk. Yet it would also fail our hypothetical 
duty to warn again for its failure to impress the reader with the fact that "a 
minor departure from instructions might cause serious danger. . . ."365 Lastly, 
were the sign to state, in an idiom popular in parking regulation, "Don't Even 
Think of Stepping Here!," the message would arguably convey the prohibitory 
YO See Casetta v. United States Rubber Co., 260 Cal. App. 2d 792, 67 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1968) 
(action by injured tire mounter against manufacturer where evidence conflicted as to availability of 
instructional poster prior to accident). 
Dougherty, 540 F.2d at 179. 
J" Harless v. Boyle-Midway Div., American Home Prods., 594 F.2d 1051, 1054 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(action brought in products liability following death of fourteen year old boy who attempted to use 
pressurized propellant recreationally). 
See Brown v. Gulf Oil Co., [ 1984-85 Transfer Binder] ( 10,474 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). 
D'Arienzo v. Clairol, Inc., 125 N.J. Super. 224, 310 A.2d 106 (1973). 
36* Phillips, 269 Or. at 502 n.17, 525 P.2d at 1041 n.17. 
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message to the reader with sufficient emphasis. Again, it would fail as a warning 
for its want of information as to the nature of the risk, or of the means of its 
avoidance. 
The physical characteristics of the warning itself are pertinent to the evaluation 
of its adequacy. The warning's conspicuousness, prominence, and size of print, 
in comparison to the print size employed for other parts of the manufacturer's 
message, must be "adequate to alert the reasonably prudent person."366 Thus, 
for example, a manufacturer's notice, printed on the label of bottles of its fur- 
niture polish in print of size and color identical to that used for the balance of 
the manufacturer's message, was held insufficient to avoid liability for the death 
of an infant who died of chemical pneumonia after ingesting only a small quantity 
of the Additional authority confirms that the evaluation of the impact 
of a warning and its consequent effect on the user or consumer involves 
" '[qluestions of display, syntax, and emphasis.' "M8 
A widely referenced and most particularized model of determination for the 
adequacy of a warning results from an action involving pharmaceuticals. With 
minor modifications, the guidelines apply with equal force to products liability 
actions involving any product having the potential for harm if sold with inad- 
equate warnings or instructions. The standards are: (1) the warning must ade- 
quately indicate the scope of the danger; (2) the warning must adequately 
communicate the extent and the seriousness of the harm that could result from 
the misuse of the product; (3) the physical aspects of the warning must be adequate 
to alert a reasonably prudent person to the danger, and thus, a simple directive 
warning may be inadequate when it fails to indicate the consequences that might 
result from failure to follow it; and (4) the means to convey the warning must 
be adequate to bring the warning home to the user, consumer, or in the case of 
ethical pharmaceuticals, the physician.369 Concerning further the special nature of 
ethical pharmaceuticals, the manufacturer's duty to warn is interpreted to provide 
a warning that "under all of the circumstances . . . reasonably discloses to the 
medical profession all risks inherent to the use of the drug which the manufacturer 
knew or should have known to exist."370 
Kb First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Nor-Am Agric. Prods., Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 84, 537 P.2d 
682, 692 (N.M. App. 1975) (action against manufacturer e f  disinfectant used to treat seed, later 
ingested by a hog, caused injuries to central nervous systems of children eating the meat of the animal). 
Spmill, 308 F.2d 79 (the warning had nothing to attract special attention to it except the 
words "safety note" and the language advising that the product "may be harmful, especially if 
swallowed by children.''). 
363 D'Arienzo, 125 N.J. Super. at 230-31, 310 A.2d at 112, quoted with approval in Stapleton 
v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Inc., 608 F.2d 571, 573 n.4 (5th Cir. 1979), reh'g denied, 612 F.2d 905 
(1980). 
369 Ross, 684 P.2d 1211. 
370 Seley, 67 Ohio St. 2d 192, 423 N.E.2d 831; accord, Ros, 684 P.2d 1211. 
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A leading decision finding manufacturer liability for failure to warn of the 
"extent" and "gravity" of the risks posed by exposure to the manufacturer's 
product is Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Co.371 This was an action by an 
insulation worker against manufacturers of insulation materials containing as- 
bestos to recover for alleged breach of d%y to warn adequately of the risks of 
asbestos-related disease. Reviewing warnings that cautioned, in part, that pro- 
tracted inhalation of respirable asbestos "may" be harmful, and advised workers 
to "avoid breathing [asbestos] dust." The court responded sharply: ''W]one of 
these so-called 'cautions' intimated the gravity of the risk: the danger of fatal 
illness caused by asbestosis and mesothelioma or other cancers. The mild sug- 
gestion that inhalation of asbestos . . . 'may be harmful' conveys no idea of the 
extent of the danger."372 Additional representative examples of actions in which 
the manufacturer's warning has been found inadequate for its failure to convey 
sufficiently the extent or severity of the risk include the failure of a herbicide 
manufacturer to warn of the long-lasting toxic propensities of the chemical and 
the consequent need for safe disposal;373 the failure of a manufacturer of floor 
tile adhesive, while warning of the product's overall flammability, to caution more 
specifically that the fumes or vapors could ignite on contact with a pilot light, 
resulting in a violent explosion;374 the failure of a pharmaceutical manufacturer 
17' Borel, 493 F.2d 1076. 
Id. at 1104. Concerning the manufacturers' request that the workers avoid "breathing the 
dust", the court described it as "black humor" inasmuch as "[tlhere was no way for insulation 
workers to avoid breathing asbestos dust." See also Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 
1958), in which the court states: 
Implicit in the duty to warn is the duty to warn with a degree of intensity that would cause 
a reasonable man to exercise for his own safety the caution commensurate with the potential 
danger. It is the failure to exercise such a degree of caution after proper warning that 
constitutes contributory negligence in a case such as this. 
Id. at 609. 
ln Boyl, 221 F. Supp. 669 (liquid weed killer Triox alleged to have severely and painfully injured 
and sickened user who unwittingly laid down to sun bathe in area in which waste herbicide had been 
earlier discarded). 
Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079 @.C. App. 1976) (The seller or manufacturer 
of a product whose use could result in foreseeable harm has a duty to give a warning which adequately 
advises the user of attendant risks, and which provides specific directions for safe use. The sufficiency 
of a particular warning is ordinarily a question for the jury): 
The particular hazard encountered by appellants in using VICO-102 was that fumes or 
vapors from the product could ignite on contact with a pilot light, resulting in a violent 
fire or explosion. The pertinent cautionary statements on the VICO-102 label were: 'DAN- 
GER! EXTREMELY FLAMMABLE . . . CAUTION: FLAhfh4ABLE MIXTURE. DO NOT 
USE NEAR FIRE OR FLAME . . . USE WITH ADEQUATE VENTILATION.' Given 
the potential for serious injury, we cannot say as a matter of law that this warning adequately 
alerted users of the dangers inherent in the product. Among other things, an ordinary user 
might well not have realized that 'near fire or flame' included nearby pilot lights or that 
fumes and vapors, as well as the adhesive itself, were extremely flammable. Whether more 
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to warn of additional side effects, including the risk of deafness, associated with 
the administration of a drug used post-surgically to combat infection;375 and the 
failure of a manufacturer to fashion the warning on its rider spreader to specify 
the danger created by the agitator and the risk thus posed to life and limb.376 
Warning language that is ambiguous, obtuse, or a hedge of the manufacturer's 
acknowledgement of the hazards associated with the product will be found to be 
inadequate to communicate the extent and the seriousness of the harm. In one 
action implicating a prescription drug in a patient's loss of vision with the potential 
for permanent blindness due to optic neuritis, the warning under review stated 
only that administration of the drug "may produce decreases in visual acuity 
which appear to be due to optic neuritis." That statement, in light of information 
available to the manufacturer indicating a "permanent loss of vision [to patients] 
in a significant number of instances," impressed the appellate court as being 
"highly a m b i g u o u ~ . " ~ ~  
Another good example of a manufacturer's warning that may, by its mildness, 
ambiguity, or internal inconsistency, fail to avoid liability was presented in an 
action brought by a property owner whose building was damaged by fire after 
a tenant warmed hair rollers in a pot of water on an electric stove, but neglected 
to remove the pot when the water boiled away. The printed material on the box 
of rollers included a "cautionary Note" stating that the rollers, when heated in 
a pan of water, "may be inflammable only if left over flame in pan without 
water," but adcled that the rollers were "[oltherwise . . . perfectly safe."37s The 
court on review reversed the judgment for the manufacturer, finding that the 
record presented jury questions concerning the warning's failure to suggest that 
the paraffin rollers could have ignited even when not over "flame" and to inform 
the reader sufficently that such ignition could involve flames of considerable height. 
specific instructions or warnings were required is a question of fact for the jury. 
Id. at 1087 (citations omitted). 
17' Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 548 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), revd. on other grounds, 
561 S.W.2d 801 (1978) (action against manufacturer of Kantrax, used in this instance to combat hip 
infection, both before and after surgery, where initial warnings of the manufacturer failed with suf- 
ficient specificity to warn of the serious ototoxic effect). 
~7~ Palmer v. Avco Distrib. Corp., 82 111. 2d 211, 412 N.E.2d 959 (1980) "Considering this 
principle, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer that the warning was inef- 
fective. The warning itself did not specify the danger by the agitator. It did not detail the extent of 
the risk it posed to life and l ib ."  Id. at 222, 412 N.E.2d at 964. See also JacIcson, 499 F.2d 809. 
(Ignition of paint fumes from static electricity or broken light bulb; sufficiency of warning "Keep 
away from heat, sparks, and open flames. USE WITH ADEQUATE VENTILATION" was a question 
of fact); Tucson Indus. v. Schwartz, 108 Ariz. 464, 501 P.2d 936 (1972) (en banc) (warning inadequate 
to indicate that fumes from contact cement could cause blindness; label stated "DANGER . . . Use 
with adequate ventilation. Keep container closed VAPORS HARMFUL. TOXIC . . . ). 
Ross, 684 P.2d 1211. 
1m Gardner v. Q.H.S. Inc., 448 F.2d 238, 241 (4th Cir. 1971). 
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The court further determined that the manufacturer's "cautionary note," offered 
in a type of the same size as the instructions for use "and unobtrusively made 
part of them,"37g was inadequate. 
In yet another illustration, a plaintiff's physician's testimony that the phar- 
maceutical company's package insert for its polio vaccine product was sufficiently 
"nebulous" to obviate any cautionary mention to the patient formed one basis 
of an appellate court's affirmance of a verdict that the manufacturer failed to 
warn adequately of the risk of contacting polio after administration of oral vac- 
cine. The warning literature, while apparently conceding the risk of paralytic dis- 
ease to the consumer, continued by stating that any causal connection with the 
company's product had not been established, and that any risk, if it existed, was 
no more than one in three million.380 The court was ultimately persuaded that 
the hedging language of the manufacturer's package insert obliterated whatever 
cautionary impact there might have othenvise been to the manufacturer's message, 
where the evidence in that action given by the physician was that the manufac- 
turer's purported "warning" left that individual with the impression "that not 
a single case of vaccine-induced polio had actually occurred and that there may 
be no risk at all."38L 
First aid instructions found to be "internally incongruous" may be found to 
be inadequate, as were the instructions for washing off an industrial strength acid 
coming into contact with the user's eyes or skin in Stone v. Sterling Drug, Inc.382 
In Id. at 243. 
3" Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977). 
Id., at 1343. The insert stated, inter alia: 
Paralytic disease following the ingestion of live polio virus vaccines has been reported in 
individuals receiving the vaccine, and in some instances, in persons who were in close contact 
with subjects who had been given live oral polio virus vaccine. Fortunately, such occurrences 
are rare, and it could not be definitely established that any such case was due to the vaccine 
strain and was not coincidental with infection due to naturally occurring poliomyelitis, or 
other enteroviruses. 
Id. (quoting Plaintiff's Exhibit 71, Exhibit Volume at 80-81). See also Wolf v. Ford Motor Co., 376 
N.E.2d 143 (Mass. 1978): 
A jury question was presented whether the manual and the rating plate were sufficient to 
bring home the danger of a serious accident, which might result from a blowout, to the 
ordinary buyer of the truck who might use it with a camper. The jury's finding that there 
was no adequate warning was well warranted. The recommended gross vehicle weight was 
opaque even as a direction with respect to the load which the truck could carry without 
overloading; nowhere was the weight of the vehicle given so that the user could subtract 
that figure from the maximum gross vehicle weight rating of seven thousand five hundred 
pounds (subtracting also in this case the weight of added optional equipment) to derive the 
weight which could safely be loaded on the t ~ c k .  
Id. at 146 (citations omitted). 
Stone v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 110,580 (N.Y. App. 1985). 
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This action followed injury to a worker who sustained burns to the back of her 
hand when the cleanser splashed during use. The court there reviewed the first 
aid instructions on the product's label, which advised one coming into contact 
with the product to "[wlipe off the acid gently, immediately flood the surface 
with water, using soap freely, then cover with moist magnesia or baking soda."3s3 
On the basis of expert testimony, the court found the instructions to be "woefully 
inadequate" in that they neglected to state that the irrigation with water should 
be sustained for at least fifteen minutes. The instructions were further found to 
be "internally incong~uous" in that they advised fifteen minutes irrigation if the 
cleanser came into contact with a person's eyes, but no minimum amount of time, 
established as necessary by the evidence, for washing with water when the cleanser 
came into contact with the user's skin. This inadequacy, the'court found, had 
in fact aggravated the plaintiff's injury.384 In addition to the responsibility pro- 
viding instructions for the safe use of a product when misuse, such as failure to 
follow instructions, would subject the consumer to serious hazards, the manu- 
facturer must provide "adequate warnings of dangers that might be encountered 
if the instructions given are not followed."385 
When the warnings used are considered sufficient to bring home the nature 
of the risk to a reasonably prudent person, it is, nevertheless, possible for a 
manufacturer to avoid liability if an injury results from the injured person's in- 
sistence on using the product in a manner inconsistent with the warnings. This 
may occur when the manufacturer has communicated to the user or consumer 
the totality of the pertinent information as to risk and the means for safe use 
of the product and avoidance of that risk. One example of such authority was 
the holding in an action involving an industrial strength cleaning compound that 
was capable of causing chemical burns on contact with skin. The compound con- 
tainer announced "Danger," bracketed by two skull and crossbones logos, and 
carried language that, among other things, directed the user to precautions on 
the back of the container. Under the heading "Precautions," the back of the 
container warned against contact with the skin and set forth antidotes for external 
contact. Evidence adduced at trial showed that the plaintiff had used the cleaner 
as directed during her first days on the job, but she became dissatisfied with the 
way her cleaning cloth continued to drip. As a consequence, she commenced to 
wring it with her bare hands and soon sustained severe chemical burns. On appeal 
of a verdict for defendant, the appellate court sustained the judgment for the 
manufacturer on the grounds that the warning was adequate, observing further 
that the injured claimant had misused the 
~ ~ 
Id. at 7 28,271. 
=lu Id. 
x5 Brown, 136 biz. at 564,667 P.2d at 758. "Bland instructions which if followed would involve 
no risk are no substitute for a skull and crossbones warning where the misuse of the product will 
have lethal results." Id., 667 P.2d at 758. 
The paragraph read, in part, "Danger: Corrosive. Fatal if swallowed. Do not breathe vapor 
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Nevertheless, even if the supplier warns of a risk in the most gripping lan- 
guage, including explicit reference to even "severe or even fatal" risk, the warning 
may be found to be inadequate if the generality of the warning as a whole, 
sometimes coupled with the promotion of the product in the most laudatory terms, 
serves to detract from the warning's impact in the perception of the consumer 
or user. Thus, there is authority in some of the swine flu litigation that the impact 
of the government's warning's reference to "severe or potentially fatal reactions" 
was severely undermined by the government's "unprecedented promotional cam- 
paign." Informed consent forms secured from those were thereby invalidated, 
and there was a finding that both the government and the vaccine manufacturer 
breached a duty to adequately warn the ultimate users of the vaccine.387 
Actions taken by the manufacturer or by persons working on its behalf can 
erode the efficacy of an otherwise adequate warning. In Incoilingo v. E w i r ~ g , ~ ~ ~  
the court held that the plaintiff should be able to adduce evidence that "detail 
men" working on behalf of a pharmaceutical manufacturer "overpromoted" the 
attributes of the drug in their presentations to the medical community at large 
and to such an extent as to obscure the impori of cautionary written material 
accompanying sale of the pharma~eut ica l .~~~ Such authority may be harmonized 
readily with the conclusion of another court that it is the duty of the pharma- 
ceutical manufacturer to instruct its detail men "at least, to warn the physicians 
on whom they regularly call of the dangers of which [the manufacturer] has 
learned, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known."390 To like 
effect is the conclusion of one appellate court that a pharmaceutical company's 
providing to a physician a desk calendar advertising a drug, later implicated in 
the patient's contracting aplastic anemia, which could foreseeably serve as "a 
constant reminder to prescribe a drug long after the sample and its warning had 
been removed," might constitute "a form of over promotion which nullified the 
effect of even a valid warning on the package."391 
A product's statement, rendered with great particularity and at substantial 
length, will not necessarily satisfy the seller's informational obligation. For ex- 
or fumes. Produces chemical bums. Do not get in eyes, skin, or on clothing. Contains hydrochloric 
acid . . . " Uptain. 11984-85 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) at f 26,383. 
yn Petty, [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 110.161. 
188 Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971). 
y89 Id. (noting testimony of plaintiff's expert witnesses of the propensity of detail meant to min- 
imize the hazards associated with use of the drug, while emphasizing its effectiveness and widespread 
acceptance). 
lm Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 992 (8th Cir. 1969) (action involving blindness 
allegedly caused by administration of drug Aralen for treatment of rheumatoid arthritis). 
Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1975). See Maize v. Atlantic 
Ref. Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945) (conspicuous display of trade name "Safety-Kleen" on all 
sides of container of cleaning solvent could "lull the user of that fluid so called into a false sense 
of security irrespective of separate warning); Whitley v. Cubberly, 24 N.C. App. 204,210 S.E.2d 289 
(1974). 
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ample, a container may carry an arguably sufficient warning and a comprehensive 
description of the uses to which the product may be put, but still be found to 
be in breach of the seller's duty to warn if the information fails to instruct the 
user as to how the product may be used safely. Such was the gist of the holding 
in an action brought by a laborer whose duties included the care of a golf course 
and who was sickened by exposure to an insecticide containing arsenic. Liability 
was found against the manufacturer who, while providing a warning employing 
the skull and crossbones and setting forth with "extreme particularity how, where, 
and for what purpose to use the product as an insecticide," nevertheless, failed 
to tell the user how to use the product in safety. The warning specifically failed 
to state that in applying the insecticide a respirator and protective clothing must 
be 
Also, if the product is technically complex and its use requires some degree 
of assembly by the consumer, the guides or instructions for such preparation by 
the consumer must be sufficient to permit the user to avoid conditions or cir- 
cumstances that would render the product unreasonably dangerous. An example 
of an action in which the manufacturer's instructions for such a product were 
found to have fallen short of this informational goal involved a refracting tel- 
escope requiring home assembly.393 The telescope conveyed a warning against its 
use to look at the sun without a special filter,394 but had no pictorial display for 
installation of that filter. A child undertook to use the telescope with the sun 
filter, but through incorrect assembly, unwittingly screwed it in in such a way as 
to permit injurious sunlight to leak around the sun filter into his eye. The appellate 
court found that the court below erred in rejecting the plaintiff's proposed in- 
structions on failure to warn. In the words of the appellate court, "a product 
requiring assembly and use in conformity with the supplier's directions is defective 
if the supplier fails to warn adequately of conditions and circumstances created 
by such assembly or use which would render the product dangerous to the user."39s 
392 Edwards, 245 So. 2d at 264-65. See also McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 11 N.Y.2d 
62, 181 N.E.2d 430, 226 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1962), where the manufacturer of "Redi-Heat Blocks", ad- 
vertised and sold for the purpose of restoring normal body heat to persons in a state of shock or 
comparable condition. Manufacturer defended an action brought on behalf of child burned by admin- 
istration of the blocks. The court found manufacturer liability because the only caution stating that 
an insulating medium should be used between the person and the block was in small print in the 
final sentence of the instructions on the back of the product's container. 
19) Midgley v. S.S. Kresge Co., 55 Cal. App. 3d 67, 127 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1976). 
JW The warning provided: "CAUTION: Please refrain from looking up [at] the sun without 
attaching the sun glass". Id. at 70, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 219. 
19' Id. at 74, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 221. The court continued: 
[Tlhe defendant herein marketed a technically complex product intended for use by tech- 
nically unsophisticated consumers, to be assembled and used by them in accordance with 
instructions prepared and supplied by the technically knowledgeable supplier. Failure to 
assemble or use the product in accordance with these directions may well cause physical 
injury and thus constitutes a potential danger. It begs the obvious to say that the supplier 
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It is well established that the compliance of a label, a warning, or instructions 
with guidelines or regulations imposed by a state or other body do not preclude 
a finding that the manufacturer is liable for failure to provide more explicit or 
effective warnings. One rationale of the decisions so holding is that seldom, if 
ever, do the statutes or regulations establishing requirements for warnings or la- 
beling imply that the implementing body intended that the regulation affect the 
seller's common law duty to warn.396 The Restatement (Second) of Torts supports 
this position, confirming that compliance with a legislative or administrative en- 
actment "does not prevent a finding that a reasonable man would take additional 
precautions. "397 
Consistent conclusions have been reached in actions pertaining to warning or 
labeling requirements of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic the Federal In- 
secticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide and comparable state statutes.400 Sim- 
knows or reasonably should know that the directions furnished by him will form the un- 
sophisticated consumer's only guide to assembly and use. Thus a product requiring assembly 
and use in conformity with the supplier's directions is defective if the supplier fails to warn 
adequately of conditions and circumstances created by such assembly or use which would 
render the product dangerous to the user. Therefore, the supplier is strictly liable for injury 
proximately resulting from composing and furnishing a set of instructions for assembly and 
use which does not adequately avoid the danger of injury. 
Id., 127 Cal. Rptr. at 221. 
On the issue of proper jury instructions and the general rule that liability for failure to warn 
may be found only where the defendant is shown to have had actual or constructive knowledge of 
the hazard, the court states further that "in these circumstances the duty to warn is not conditioned 
upon such knowledge where the defectiveness of a product depends on the adequacy of instructions 
furnished by the supplier which are essential to the assembly and use of its product." Id., 127 Cal. 
Rptr. at 221. 
Burch, 366 A.2d 1079 (floor tile adhesive's labeling compliance with requirements of the 
Federal Hazardous Substances Act does not preclude a finding of negligence in manufacturer's failure 
to also warn of the particular hazard of ignition or explosion by contact of vapors with a pilot light. 
The court further observed "the overwhelming majority of courts presented with similar arguments 
in product liability cases have held that compliance with federal and state requirements for the man- 
ufacture and sale of products does not immunize a manufacturer or seller from liability.." Id. at 
1085.). 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 288C comment a thereto explains: 
Where there are not special circumstances, the minimum standard prescribed by the leg- 
islation or regulation may be accepted by the triers of fact, or by the court as a matter 
of law, as sufficient for the occasion; but if for any reason a reasonable man would take 
additional precautions, the provision not preclude a finding that the actor should do so. 
Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973) (en banc) 
(the warnings required by federal regulation, "may be only minimal in nature and when the man- 
ufacturer or supplier knows of, or has reason to know of, greater dangers not included in the warning, 
its duty to warn may not be fulfilled." Id. at 65, 507 P.2d at 661, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 53. 
'59 Hubbard-Hall Chern. Co., 340 F.2d 402; Gonzalez v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 239 F. 
Supp. 567 (E.D.S.C. 1965). 
a Hill, 54 Mich. App. 17, 220 N.W.2d 137. 
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ilarly, a warning label's compliance with industry standards may be relevant to 
the manufacturer's due care, but will not be dispositive of the absence of lia- 
bility ."O1 
In the context of cigarette products liability, important authority to the con- 
trary, holding that compliance with warning and labeling requirements pertaining 
to that product will preclude failure to warn tort recovery against a cigarette 
manufacturer, is found in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.402 This action was 
brought initially by, and later on behalf of, a cigarette smoker who alleged a 
manufacturer's failure to provide adequate warnings, and that such warnings as 
were provided were robbed of impact by the manufacturer's overall promotional 
practices. Review of the Federal Cigarette and Advertising Labeling Act led the 
appellate court to conclude that "the Act represents a carefully drawn balance 
between the purpose of warning the public of the hazards of cigarette smoking 
and protecting the interests of national economy."403 Because permitting state law 
liability actions alleging manufacturer duties other than those prescribed in the 
federal legislation would "[tip] the Act's balance of purposes," the litigant's claims 
of failure to warn adequately were, the court determined, preempted by federal 
law.404 
XIII. THE CONTINLTING DUTY TO WARN 
A post-sale duty to warn may attach even if the product was, at the time of 
manufacture and sale, reasonably safe for use (or arguably so), but through use 
or operation, has betrayed hazards not earlier known to the seller, or to other 
sellers of like products. 
When the allegation of failure to warn is grounded in tort, as one court has 
observed, "the duty to warn is continuous and is not interrupted by manufacture 
or sale of the In a case illustrative of such authority, a claim was 
brought by the widow of a man killed in the explosion of a propane gas water 
heater.& The court identified the governing law, that the duty of the manufacturer 
to effect such post-sale warnings, turns upon the actual or constructive knowledge 
of the product danger and stated further that a manufacturer may be put on 
notice as to dangers in the use of a product by varying means, including "ad- 
"' "Assuming appellees established conformance with the industry practice, such evidence is 
relevant but not conclusive in assessing whether reasonable care was exercised. 'Even an entire industry 
. . . cannot be permitted to set its own uncontrolled standard."' Burch, 366 A.2d at 1087 11.23 (ci- 
tations omitted). 
a Cipolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986). 
40' Id. at 187. 
Id. 
a Bly, 713 F.2d at 1046. 
a Young v. Robertshaw Controls, Inc., 104 A.D.2d 84, 481 N.Y.S.2d 891 (1984). 
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vancements in the state of art" or "later accidents involving dangers in the prod- 
uct."4'" 
The earliest modem decisions in which a post-sale duty to warn was imposed 
upon the manufacturer involved product defects that, left uncorrected, posed a 
risk of loss of life or serious bodily harm. The leading and innovative decision 
of Cornstock v. General Motors Corp."OS involved the alleged failure of the au- 
tomobile manufacturer to take remedial measures after learning, soon after the 
model was put on the market, of its propensity to lose its brakes. A personal 
injury claim was brought by a mechanic at an automobile dealership who suffered 
severe injuries when a car rolled unimpeded into him in a service bay. The court, 
after first describing the manufacturer's general duty to warn at the point of sale, 
stated that "a like duty to give prompt warning exists when a latent defect which 
makes the product hazardous becomes known to the manufacturer shortly after 
the product has been put on the market."409 Following Cornstock, like holdings 
were rendered in several actions arising from aviation accidents.410 
In strict liability, a continuing duty to warn exists only if the product, when 
initially introduced into commerce was defective, albeit presumably unknown to 
the seller. Such interpretation would seem to be required by the proviso to Res- 
tatement (Second) of Torts section 402A comment g that limits application of 
the rule to "where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a 
condition not cont'emplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably 
Id. at 894 (quoting Cover, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 461 N.E.2d 864, in which that 
court continues: "Although a product be reasonably safe when manufactured and sold and involve 
no then known risks of which warning need be given, risks thereafter revealed by user operation and 
brought to the attention of the manufacturer or vendor may impose upon one or both a duty to 
warn." Id. at 274-75,461 N.E.2d at 864,473 N.Y.S.2d at 378. The court states also that the plaintiffs 
allegation that the manufacturer was engaged in an international and ongoing scheme to conceal the 
harm posed by its flawed controls stated a cause of action in fraud). 
(OS Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959). 
Id. at 632. 
A helpful exposition of this is provided in Jackson v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 166 N.J. 
Super 448, 400 A.2d 81, 90 n.3, cert. denied, 81 N.J. 330, 407 A.2d 1204 (1979), where the court 
states: 
Our review of these cases leads us to conclude that this phrase has been used most often 
to describe no more than the obligation imposed where a manufacturer or seller, believing 
that it has sold a non-defective product, subsequently learns that its product was, in fact, 
defective when placed in the stream of commerce. In these circumstances, saying that there 
is a 'continuing duty to warn' is, of course, a tacit recognition that the duty existed in the 
first instance. Such an obligation is not at all synonymous, however, with the claim-made 
here by plaintiff-that where a product is free from all defects when sold, the seller, never- 
theless, has a duty to monitor changes in technology and notions of safety and, either 
periodically or othenvise, notify its purchasers thereof. For where, as here, no initial duty 
to warn exists, none can be said to continue.' 
Id. at 466 n.3, 400 A.2d at 90 n.3. 
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dangerous to him."411 Thus, for there to be a defect in a product, be it of a 
design, manufacture, or informational nature, the defect has to have existed at 
the time of initial sale. Without such an antecedent flaw, and a consequent initial 
duty to warn, there can be no continuing duty to warn.412 When, on the other 
hand, the coml~lainant proceeds under a negligence theory or in a jurisdiction 
that applies negligence principles to allegations of failure to warn irrespective of 
the presentation of such claims under any other theory, the sufficiency of the 
complaint will be judged by, inter alia, the allegation that the supplier had knowl- 
edge of or had reason to know of the product-related hazard.413 Consistent with 
this expression of the law, an appellate court reversed and remanded for trial an 
action brought on behalf of two steelworkers fatally injured by falling material. 
It cautiously approved the trial court's instruction that the manufacturer is held 
to the degree of skill and knowledge existing in the industry at the time the product 
was manufactured, but suggested that the trial court "may wish to review this 
instruction on remand, inasmuch as a manufacturer also has a responsibility to 
warn of a defective product at any time after it is manufactured and sold if the 
manufacturer becomes aware of the defect."414 Other authority has held for the 
defendant Postal Service in an action arising from the rollover of a jeep sold to 
the public as a used vehicle. The evidence showed that the Service "had neither 
knowledge or reason to have knowledge of a rollover problem."415 
As is equally true of the duty to warn at the point of sale, the doctrinal 
underpinning of the manufacturer's post-sale informational obligations is the com- 
mitment to remedying the asymmetry of information held by the seller, on the 
one hand, and by the consumer on the other. The object, in general terms, is to 
encourage manufacturers to impart to consumers that information the manufac- 
turers receive in the ordinary course of their business, germane to product safety 
'I1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A Comment g. 
'I2 See DeVito v. United Air Lines, 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951) (involving, among other 
things, the failure of the manufacturer to communicate to the camer information concerning the 
problem of excessive carbon monixide in the cabin); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 
411 F.2d 451 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969) Involving the manufacturer's failure to warn 
or initiate remedial action following revelation of an engine hazard, and in which the court states 
this standard for a manufacturer's post-sale duties: 
It is clear that after such a product has been sold and dangerous defects in design have 
come to the manufacturer's attention, the manufacturer has a duty to either remedy these 
or, if complete remedy is not feasible, at least give users adequate warnings and instructions 
concerning methods for minimizing the danger. 
Id. at 453. See generally Royal, Post Sale Warnings: A Review and Analysis Seeking Fair Compen- 
sation Under Uniform Law, 33 DRAKE L. REV. 817 (1983-84). 
E.g., Shirey v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 1251 (D.S.C. 1984), in which the District Court 
confirms that "[ulnder a negligence theory of failure to warn, the duty is continuous and is not 
interrupted by the manufacture or sale of the product." Id. at 1258 n.17 (citing Bly, 713 F.2d 1040). 
'I4 Smith, 754 F.2d at 877. 
Shirey, 582 F. Supp. at 1261. 
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and technological advances416 and to the performance and accident histories of 
those products sold and in use. 
Particularly with regard to manufacturers of ethical pharmaceuticals, the courts 
have interpreted the duty to warn as extending to a "continuous duty" to remain 
apprised of new Scientific and medical developments and to inform the medical 
profession of pertinent developments related to treatment and side effects.417 This 
continuing informational obligation imposed upon the manufacturer even after 
the marketing of the product is not confined to the passive interpretation of 
scientific, medical, or technical advances or revelations explored by third parties. 
Under certain circumstances the manufacturer's continuing post-sale duties have 
been found to include the initiation of further investigations, studies or tests of 
its 
The assignment of a continuing manufacturer duty to remain current with 
scientific or other advancements pertinent to safety has been found applicable to 
industries other than manufacturers of prescription drugs. Thus, in an automobile 
products liability action it was alleged that the manufacturer failed, among other 
things, to warn users of its product about an allegedly defective design in an 
accelerator spring. The manufacturer was said to be responsible for warning buy- 
ers and users of dangers in the use of the product which came to the manufac- 
turer's knowledge after sale by means, among others, of "advancements in the 
state of the art, with which it [was] expected to stay abreast."419 
The author of Comment, The Manufacturer's Duty to Notify of Subsequent Safety Improve- 
ments, 33 STAN. L. REV. 1087, (1981) introduces discussion by observing: 
The duty to inform previous purchasers of technological advances rests on the assumption 
of an asymmetry of information between producer and consumer. The producer obtains 
information about technological advances in the ordinary course of doing business, but the 
customer who might act upon such information would have to expend extraordinary amounts 
of time to obtain and understand it. The same asymmetry forms the basis of the duty to 
warn customers of product-related dangers at the time of purchase (point-of-sale warnings). 
The purpose of product warnings is to have the manufacturer give customers the information 
it can best provide, instead of forcing the consumer to attempt to obtain the information 
independently. 
Id. at 1090 (citation omitted). 
'I7 Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, (8th Cir. 1970) (applying Arkansas law) 
(identifying a "continuous duty . . . to warn physicians of the dangers incident to prescribing the 
drug, [and] to keep abreast of scientific developments touching upon the manufacturer's product and 
to notify the medical profession of any additional side effects discovered . . . " Id. at 922), and 
adding: "A drug manufacturer's compliance with such rule enables physicians to balance the risk of 
possible harm against benefits to be derived by their patients' use of such drugs. In considering the 
alternatives of treatment, the prescribing physician is entitled to make an informed choice." Id. See 
ako Basko, 416 F.2d at 426 (2d Cir. 1969); Davis, 399 F.2d at 130; O'Hare v. Merck & Co., 381 
F.2d 286, 290-291 (8th Cir. 1967); Johnston v. Upjohn Co., 442 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Mo. App. 1969); 
Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1967). 
See Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984). 
Cover, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 274, 461 N.E.2d 864, 871, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 385. 
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Thus, the manufacturer's duty to warn users and consumers of risks inhering 
in the use of its products attaches both to risks that are apparent at the time of 
sale, as well as to any risks that arise after marketing. While "warning" provides 
a convenient characterization of the manufacturer's post-sale obligations, the man- 
ufacturer's responsibility may range from providing the buyer with a corrective 
device,420 to the simple sending of a letter."' 
As is true of the seller's point-of-sale informational duty, this post-sale duty 
to warn has been interpreted to require the manufacturer to convey warnings or 
hazard-related information to purchasers in the stream of distribution beyond the 
manufacturer's immediate buyers. For example, in Comstock v. General Motors, 
the court concluded that the manufacturer should have done more than alert its 
dealers to the defect, leaving any remedial effort to them. To discharge its duty 
in such a situation, the court advised, the manufacturer should have conveyed 
effective warnings to all individual purchasers of its automobiles equipped with 
power brakes.422 
There is also authority suggesting that a manufacturer must advise its buyers 
of safety improvements in its In addition, when the manufacturer has 
actual or constructive knowledge that its product has been subject to widespread 
Kg.,  Rebalc, Inc., v. Frank Hrubetz & Co., 261 Md. 141, 274 A.2d 107 (1971), where it was 
held as a matter of law that an amusement ride manufacturer's delivery of a letter to a purchaser 
of a ride, stating the manufacturer's intent to install a new part on a particular ride, and also supplying 
the buyer with the new part, constituted an adequate warning. 
E.g., Nishida v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 245 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 
355 U.S. 915 (1958), an action arising from the deaths and illnesses of cattle fed soybean meal 
manufactured by a process of oil extraction by a chemical solvent developed by du Pont, holding 
that the personal delivery of a letter from the manufacturer to the soybean producer was sufficient 
to exempt the manufacturer from liability. See general& LaBelle v. McCauley Indus. Corp., 649 F.2d 
46 (1st Cir. 1981); Rodriguez v. Besser Co., 115 Ariz. 454, 565 P.2d 1315 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); 
docanto v. Ametek, Inc., 367 Mass. 776, 328 N.E.2d 873 (1975); Braniff Airways, 411 F.2d 451. 
Compare Nishida, 245 F.2d 768 with Miller Indus. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 733 F.2d 813 
(11th Cir. 1984) (involving allegations that the manufacturer discovered, subsequent to sale, that certain 
gears in its marine engines might fail within the first 200 hours of operation. The seller's post-sale 
initiative consisted of sending service letters to dealers, instructing them on how to repair the defect). 
The appellate court concluded that due to the foreseeability that dealers would not take the suggested 
remedial measures, and in recognition also that the defect posed a danger that vessels might become 
disabled at sea, "a single form letter to . . . dealers concerning [the] defect did not constitute a 
reasonable effort to warn that a potentially dangerous engine was in need of repair before installation 
aboard a seagoing vessel." Id. at 822. 
4P Comstock 11. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959). 
E.g., Gracyalny, 723 F.2d at 1318-19. But see Kozlowski v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 87 
Wis. 2d 882,275 N.W.2d 915 (1979) (distinguishing mass consumer products from industrial machines, 
and whiie recognizing some continuing duty on the part of manufacturers to warn of dangers in their 
products, finding no duty to advise of safety improvements achieved a substantial time after the initial 
sale). See also Conunent, supra note 415, at 1090-93. But see Jackson, 166 N.J. Super. 448, 400 
A.2d at 89. 
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modifications by users, and there is information suggesting that such modifications 
create a risk of injury to persons or damage to property, the manufacturer's 
obligation to issue post-sale warnings will turn on the foreseeability of harm that 
may be occasioned by such  modification^.^^^ 
Evaluation of the efficacy or adequacy of any post-sale warning is similar, 
but not identical to that pertaining to point-of-sale warnings. As with point-of- 
sale warnings, the seller's duty is owed generally to foreseeable product users or 
to intermediaries who can reasonably be expected to pass on the warning.4s How- 
ever, when the prudence of a warning following sale is evaluated, the decisions 
appear to be in agreement that the questions as to both the nature of the warning 
and to whom it should be given are guided properly by evaluation of the harm 
that may follow from use of the product without notice, the reliability of any 
intermediary who may be enlisted to convey the warnings to the current user; 
the burden on the vendor or manufacturer in locating the persons to be warned; 
the attention that a notice of the type contemplated will likely receive from the 
ultimate recipient; the nature of the product involved; and the corrective actions, 
if any, taken by the manufacturer or vendor in addition to the post-sale warning.426 
There is no bright line standard for the point in time, if one exists, when a 
manufacturer will no longer be found legally liable for deficiencies in inadequate 
warnings concerning products no longer in use. Such a question applies to liability 
under the diverse state laws governing products liability and the duty to warn, 
and leaves unaffected the independent obligations of product sellers that attach 
by virtue of the substantial product hazard reporting requirements under Section 
15 of the Consumer Product Safety Act.4n There is no general agreement in the 
E.g., in Perry v. Rockwell Graphics Systems, Inc., [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. 
Rep. (CCH) '810,445 @. Mass. 1985). involving injuries sustained in 1982 on a cardboard cutting 
machine manufactured by defendant in 1914, the court states that the manufacturer's "actual or 
imputed" knowledge of "widespread modification" of its presses in the cardboard industry "could 
be the basis for liability for failure to warn of hazards discovered after manufacture of the machine." 
Id. at 27,719. 
W. PROSSER, supra note 54, at 647. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 388 comment n 
(method of warning should give "reasonable assurance that the information will reach those whose 
safety depends upon their having it"). 
426 Cover, 61 N.Y.2d at 276, 461 N.E.2d at 872, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 386; see genera& Rekab. Inc., 
261 Md. 141, 274 A.2d 107: Comstock, 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627; Kozlowski, 87 Wis. 2d 882, 
275 N.W.2d 915; Labelle, 649 F.2d at 49; Jones v. Bender Welding & Mach. Works, 581 F.2d 1331, 
1334-1335 (9th Cir. 1978) (failure to advise of design change); Pan-Alaska Fisheries v. Marine Constr. 
& Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1137 (9th Cir. 1977) (warning of immediate purchaser and dealer of 
fuel filter defect held inadequate); Noto v. Pico Peak Corp., 469 F.2d 358, 360-361 (2d Cir. 1972) 
(evidence created jury question as to whether hazard of chair lift bull wheel bearing defect was 
adequately warned against by manufacturer's letter and instruction pamphlet to operator). 
4n 15 U.S.C. 8 2064. See generally Madden, supra note 12. 
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state law authorities as to the length and breadth of such an obligation.428 Lan- 
guage suggesting that the manufacturer's post-sale duty to warn is not inex- 
haustible is offered by one court, construing Texas law, in finding that the 
manufacturer of a teller stool implicated in the injury of an office worker, and 
sold to the plaintiff's employer "years" before, should not be found liable for 
failure to warn or recall the product.429 
XIV. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK 
An injured party's dismissal or disregard of manufacturer's cautioning may 
be of such a nature and degree as to relieve the manufacturer of liability for 
failure to warn. An injured party's affirmatively incautious conduct has been held 
to bar recovery even when the claimant is not the owner of the product or the 
employee of the owner, but is instead a guest430 or a bystander.431 
Compare Bell Helicopter Co. v. Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979) (finding 
a duty to warn or to recall products upon later production of a design safer than that on the marker) 
with Comment, Products Liability: Manufacturer's Liability for Products Not Unreasonably Dan- 
gerous When Originally Marketed, 12 St. MARY'S L.J. 494, 522 (1980), where the author states: 
No authority is cited by the court, and none exists for the proposition that, once a man- 
ufacturer designs and markets an improved component for its new products, it then assumes 
a duty to complete the remedy by causing the substitution of the improved component in 
used products that are already on the market. 
Id. 
Syrie v. Knoll Int'l, 748 F.2d 304, 310-312 (5th Cir. 1984), the court commenting: "Texas 
courts have apparently not established a cause of action for failure to warn about hazards discovered 
after a product has been manufactured and sold." Id. at 311. See Kozlowski, 87 Wisc. 2d 882, 275 
N.W.2d 915, which conveys the suggestion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court that it would create an 
unreasonable and impracticable burden on manufacturers to require manufacturers to warn consumers 
and to advise them of product modifications for a period of time in excess of a few years after initial 
sale. The court there stated: 
[Wle do not in this decision hold that there is an absolute continuing duty, year after year, 
for all manufacturers to warn of a new safety device which eliminates potential hazards. 
A sausage stuffer and the nature of that industry bears no similarity to the realities of 
manufacturing and marketing household goods such as fans, snowblowers or lawn mowers 
which have become increasingly hazard proof with each succeeding model. It is beyond 
reason and good judgment to hold a manufacturer responsible for a duty of annually warn- 
ing of safety hazards on household items, mass produced and used in every American home, 
when the product is 6 to 35 years old and outdated by some 20 newer models equipped 
with every imaginable safety innovation known in the state of the art. It would place an 
unreasonable duty upon these manufacturers if they were required to trace the ownership 
of each unit sold and warn annually of new safety improvements over a 35 year period. 
Id. at 901, 275 N.Mr.2d at  923-24. 
E.g., Van Dike v. AMF. Inc., 146 Mich. App. 176, 379 N.W.2d 412 (1985), where in an 
action brought by the guest of the owner against the manufacturer of a trampoline for injuries 
sustained while attempting a sophisticated flip on the product in the owner's backyard, recovery was 
Heinonline - -  89 W. Va. L. Rev. 326 1986-1987 
An injured claimant's contributory fault will excuse a seller who has failed 
to give adequate product warnings only if the claimant's negligent conduct, rather 
than the allegedly inadequate warning, constitutes the proximate cause of the 
injury. The showing required for that type of contributory fault described as 
assumption of the risk is that the person voluntarily exposed himself to a known 
and appreciated danger.432 The claimant's awareness of the general risk associated 
denied where evidence showed that the guest had not read the manufacturer's cautionary label advising 
use only by trained and qualified participants under supervised conditions, and further evidence that 
the injured party had been warned prior to the accident to cease use because of the hazard. As stated 
by the court in Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 598 n.12, 495 A.2d 348, 356 n.12 
(1985): 
Failure to read or follow instructions . . . involves conduct that may be considered [con- 
tributorily] negligent [or an assumption of the risk] . . . . If a product unreasonably dan- 
gerous can be made safe for foreseeable uses by adequate warnings or liability will be 
avoided, and the focus such cases is generally upon the adequacy of the notice. If the 
warnings or instructions are adequate the product is not defective, and the plaintiff cannot 
recover under a theory of strict liability in tort. The cause of the injury in such cases is 
the failure to read or follow the adequate warnings or instructions, and not a defective 
product. One who reads the warning and then proceeds voluntarily and unreasonably to 
encounter the danger thereby made known to him will assume the risk of that danger. 
The accepted criteria for proof of the defense of assumption of risk are the subjective showing that 
"(1) the plaintiff actually knew and appreciated the particular risk or danger created by the defect; 
(2) the plaintiff voluntarily encountered the risk while realizing the danger; and (3) the plaintiff's 
decision to encounter the known risk was unreasonable." Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. 
614, 626 n.11, 440 A.2d 1085, 1092 n.11 (1982), aff'd, 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 (1983). 
RE~ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 496A comment d elaborates, stating: 
In theory the distinction between the two (contributory negligence and assumption of risk) 
is that assumption of risk rests upon the voluntary consent of the plaintiff to encounter 
the risk and take his chance . . . A subjective standard is applied to assumption of the 
risk, in determining whether the plaintiff knows, understands, and appreciates the risk. 
Consistent herewith, it has been held that a plaintiff's "inadvertence, momentary inattention, or 
diversion of attention" should not constitute assumption of the risk. Elder v. Crawley Book Mach. 
Co., 441 F.2d 771, 774 (3d Cir. 1971). See also Alexander v. Conveyers and Dumpers, Inc., 731 F.2d 
1212 (5th Cir. 1984), where the court approved a "knew or must have known" standard for plaintiff's 
appreciation of risk sufficient for applicability of the assumption of risk defense. 
The defense of contributory negligence is not available to the defendant on a count alleging 
strict liability for failure to warn, but contributory negligence may be a bar to the same count pred- 
icated on negligence. See Struder v. Riddell Co., [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 
q10,060 renn.  Ct. App. 1984). affirming verdict for manufacturer on negligence and strict liability 
counts in failure to warn claims of action for injuries sustained by the user of a football helmet. 
Note that the subjective standard enunciated in the defense of assumption of risk is the opposite of 
the objective evaluation for coniributory negligence. Sheehan, 50 Md. App. at 625 n.lO, 440 A.2d 
at 1091-92 n.lO. 
'3' Brown v. Link Belt Corp., 565 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1977) (involving worker injured by a crane 
with poor visibility and no warning devices). 
4n Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916 flex. Ct. App. 1976) (involving a fatal injury when the 
telescopic sleeve hoist used to raise and lower the bed of a dump truck failed, crushing plaintiff's 
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with the use of a product will ordinarily not be considered sufficient to show 
that the risk was assumed, unless there is evidence that he knew of and proceeded 
in the face of the specific danger that caused the injury.433 
A representative example of when the plaintiffs awareness of the risk has 
been held sufficient to bar the claim of failure to warn was described in the 
decision entered by a Louisiana trial court in Bakunas v. Life Pack, Inc.434 It 
was held there that the manufacturer of an air-inflated device known to be de- 
signed to absorb the impact of a falling human body from a height of 200 feet 
was not under a duty to warn of the hazards of jumping into it from a height 
of over 300 feet. In the action brought for the death of this individual, a profes- 
sional stunt man, the court held that recovery was barred on all grounds, including 
the allegation of' failure to warn, because the decedent had "certain knowledge" 
of the risks.435 A claimant may also be found to be barred from recovery if he 
decedent who was working beneath). The action alleged, among other things, that the manufacturer 
failed to provide bracing instructions. The appellate court reversed the verdict below for plaintiffs 
and remanded for a nevr trial on the basis of evidence that decedent may have known of the danger 
by virtue of a warning from his brother, irrespective of the manufacturer's failure to warn, concluding 
that knowledge of the risk, from whatever source derived, may provide a basis for the defense of 
assumption of risk. 
433 E.g., Haugen, 15 Wash. App. 379, 550 P.2d 71, in which the claimant was injured by the 
flying piece of a grinding wheel that stmck him in the eye. To defendant's argument that the plaintiff's 
failure to wear safety goggles constitutes assumption of the risk, the court countered that such conduct 
assumed, at most, "the risk of having dust or small particles" injure the eye, not of having a sub- 
stantial portion of the wheel itself disengage and injure him. Id. at 385, 550 P.2d at 76. The appellate 
court a f fmed  the trial court's characterization of the specificity of the claimant's awareness necessary 
for invocation of the defense of assumption of the risk in these words: "It is not enough to bar 
recovery by the plaintiff on the defense of assumption of the risk that the plaintiff knew that there 
was a general danger connected with the use of the product, but rather it must be shown that the 
plaintiff actually knzw, appreciated, and voluntarily and unreasonably exposed himself to the specific 
defect and danger whkh caused his injuries." Id. at 382-83, 550 P.2d at 75 (quoting jury instruction 
18). See also Kerns v. Engelke, 54 Ill. App. 3d 323, 369 N.E.2d 1284 (1977) aff'd in part and rev'd 
in part, 76 Ill. 2d 154, 390 N.E. 2d 859 (1979) (holding that the plaintiff's knowledge that a part 
of the machine could be removed was not the equivalent of knowledge that it was hazardous not to 
do so). 
a Bakunas v. Life Pack, Inc., 531 I?. Supp. 89 (E.D. La. 1982), affd,  701 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 
1983). 
435 Id. at 92. See Mico Mobile Sales & Leasing Inc. v. Skyline Corp., 97 Idaho 408, 546 P.2d 
54, (1975) ([Ilf the danger is obvious, or if the danger is known to the person injured, the duty to 
warn does not attach." Id. at 44, 546 P.2d at 60); Garrett, 84 N.M. 16, 498 P.2d 1359 (recovery 
of damages by experienced gymnast familiar with trampoline use and injured in execution of one 
and three quarters front flip barred on strict liability for failure to warn count where showing that 
the risk was actually known to the claimant). 
A succinct criticism of the applicability of the plaintiff conduct defenses ab initio to failure to 
warn claims is offered in D i a r d  & Hart, supra note 13 at 163, the authors stating: 
Though these time-honored defenses are frequently invoked to defeat recovery, they are 
theoretically inapplicable when the defendant's breach of duty is based on a failure to warn. 
To allow these defenses is to indulge in circular reasoning, since usually the plaintiff cannot 
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has entered a clear, fair, and unequivocal agreement to hold the manufacturer 
or operator harmless for injuries occasioned by use of the product.436 
The contributory negligence of a plaintiff in failing to heed a warning will 
bar, if at all, only the cause of action in negligence. With respect to plaintiff's 
claim, if any, in strict liability for failure to warn, it has been held that the 
defendant's assertion of the defense of plaintiff's contributory negligence will raise 
a jury question as to the adequacy of the warning.437 
If the conduct of the injured party has been careless or somewhat negligent, 
the prevalent authority is that such behavior may suggest, but will not prove, 
that the plaintiff would have behaved similarly even had a better warning been 
provided. The latter proposition was rebuffed in one action in which the plaintiff, 
who worked on an assembly line making pacemakers, inadvertently spilled some 
resinous substances on her hand and shortly thereafter brushed the side of her 
face with her hand.438 A component of the substance caused a severe chemical 
burn to her face. The court upheld a jury verdict that the warning provided by 
the substance's manufacturer as to the risks of dermal contact was inadequate, 
in light of, among other things, a much stronger warning proposed by the per- 
tinent national trade association. It rejected the manufacturer's claim that caus- 
ation was broken on the logic that, if the plaintiff was careless with the warning 
already in place, she would behave identically even with a stronger warning. The 
court concluded, to the contrary, that it was at least possible that a clear warning 
as to the risk of severe chemical bums might cause a reasonably prudent person 
to be more careful than she would be if the only known risk was minor. 
Similarly, if the warning that a manufacturer does issue is inadequate on its 
face, evidence that the injured plaintiff did not read or follov~ the warning that 
be said to  have assumed a risk of which he was ignorant or to have contributed to  his 
own injury when he had no way of reasonably ascertaining that the danger of injury existed. 
On the other hand, if the plaintiff knew of the danger from an  independent source, the 
manufacturer's failure to  warn would not be the proximate cause of the injury. 
436 Hulsey v. Elsinore Parachute Center, 168 Cal. App. 3d 333, 214 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1985) (par- 
achutist injured when flight brought him into contact with power lines; held: recovery precluded by 
claimant's entry prior tQ jump into hold harmless agreement that was clear on its face and not 
unconscionable). 
4n Slapleton, 608 ~!?d a t  573. This action was brought against a motorcycle manufacturer for 
damages caused when a motorcycle tipped over in the home, and the fuel spill was ignited by a pilot 
light. The product's owner's manual stated, at  page 13 and in ordinary type, that if the fuel switch 
was "on," gas would spill freely if the machine were tipped to  its side. The plaintiff's son testified 
that he had glanced at  the manual to look for anything "exceptional." On the basis of which evidence 
the appellate court states: "The jury could conclude that the danger posed by gas leakage was suf- 
ficiently great that the warning should have been presented in a way immediately obvious to  even a 
casual reader." Id. 
Billiar v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240, 246-247 (2d Cir. 1980) (citations 
omitted). 
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was offered should not necessarily bar recovery for the injuries sustained. This 
was one of the issues raised in the action of Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical C O . , ~ ~ ~  
which was brought by an agricultural worker, alleging that he contracted pul- 
monary fibrosis due to long-term exposure to the herbicide paraquat. The label 
under review therein warned about immediate and perhaps severe skin irritation 
from exposure to the chemical, but did not convey "persuasively . . . that users 
whose skin comes into contact with the herbicide should be concerned about other 
possible consequences of skin exposure . . . particularly the specter of long-term 
lung disease culminating, perhaps, in death."440 However, the evidence in that 
action showed that the plaintiff, who died during the course of the proceeding, 
probably did not even read the label that was provided, predicting the manu- 
facturer's argument on appeal that if the decedent did not "read the label that 
was provided, . . . a more detailed label . . . would have done nothing to prevent 
E s ]  injuries."441 The court, however, observed that the evidence showed that 
even though the plaintiff did not himself read the notice, the elements of any 
cautionary information would have been communicated to him, in any event 
through the means of workplace contact between supervisors and workers and 
between the workers inter se. This phenomenon, the court was persuaded, "is a 
typical method by which information is disseminated in the modem workplace." 
For these reasons, the court held, the failure of the manufacturer to provide an 
adequate warning could still be treated as a proximate cause of decedent's in- 
Similarly, in some circumstances a plaintiff's use of a product in a manner 
inconsistent with its express warnings may itself become the proximate cause of 
any consequent injury, precluding liability for the m a n ~ f a c t u r e r . ~ ~  The plaintiff's 
disregard of or ignorance of a warning, will not, however, relieve the manufacturer 
of liability if the plaintiff can claim plausibly that the manufacturer was negligent 
in communicating the warning and should have employed better means of bringing 
the message to the attention of the user. One helpful example of such reasoning 
is offered in the appeal of an action in which the plaintiff was injured when 
battery acid exploded in his face as he used a match to aid his examination of 
a dead automobile battery. Although the battery casing was embossed with an 
extensive and vigorously worded warning against this hazard and others, the plain- 
tiff claimed that the manufacturer should have used more effective means of 
Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 545 
(1984). 
* Id. at 1537. 
Id. at 1538. 
" Id. at 1538-1539. 
"' E.g., McCleskey v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 127 Ga. App. 178, 193 S.E.2d 16 (1972) 
(fire triggered by plaintiff's employee's pouring of the oxidant chemical HTH into a bucket containing 
soap residue and other foreign matter, notwithstanding extensive and explicit written caution to avoid 
bringing oxidant into contact with soap or cleansers for risk of fire). 
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communication, "such as phosphorus paint that would be visible at night, ad- 
vertising through the media, and verbal warnings issued by the seller."444 Reversing 
summary disposition below on the plaintiff's claim of negligent failure to warn, 
the appellate court found that notwithstanding the plaintiff's failure to read the 
warning, inasmuch as plaintiff had not had the opportunity to read the warning 
in sufficient lighting, and had no experience in handling this battery, the plaintiff 
should be permitted to present proof that the manufacturer was "negligent in 
not attempting to convey the risks in a more effective manner."445 
Another important limitation upon the defendant's use of the plaintiff's con- 
duct in a duty to warn action is recognized in some jurisdictions. The defense 
of assumption of the risk will not be available for injuries that occur in the 
workplace where the injured individual "is an employee working at an assigned 
task on an industrial machine."446 This exception represents recognition of the 
reality that in the workplace environment and, potentially, in other circumstances, 
the employee directed to work on or near a hazardous instrumentality may have 
no meaningful a l t e rna t i~e .~~  
In duty to warn jurisprudence, the defenses based upon the plaintiff's conduct 
suffer from the tenuousness of the defendant's proposition that the plaintiff would 
have proceeded foolishly even had a prominent and adequate warning been given 
and the actual allegedly inadequate or nonexistent warning was not, in any event, 
connected causally with the injury. However, the dominant profile of liability in 
decisions among the contributory fault cases is that the seller will not be relieved 
for a failure to adequately warn even if it can be shown that the claimant pro- 
ceeded with inadequate circumspection. In this disposition the decisions can be 
seen as declining to excuse the failure of the seller to discharge its duty to com- 
municate effectively safety-related information not known to the user or con- 
sumer, on the fortuity that the conduct of a user of the product could be described 
Rhodes v. Interstate Battery System of America., 722 F.2d 1517, 1518-1519 n.2 (11th Cir.), 
reh'g denied, 727 F.2d 1116 (1984). 
us Id. at 1520.. 
Colella v. safwiy Steel Prods., 201 N.J. Super. 588, 592, 493 A.2d 634, 636 (1985). 
447 See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 167 n.5, 406 A.2d 140, 148 
n.5 (1979), in which the court observed: "an employee engaged at his assigned task on a plant machine 
as in Bexiga has no meaningful choice." Id., 406 A.2d at 148. The Court added, "We are herein 
not passing upon other situations wherein an employee may similarly be held to have had no mean- 
ingful choice." Id., 406 A.2d at 148. In Colella, the injured plaintiff asserted that his injuries sustained 
in a fall from a workplace scaffold used occasionally as a ladder for ascent to and decent from a 
platform that was defective in that its appearance invited its use as a ladder, claiming both a design 
defect and a failure to warn. The court declined to follow the plaintiff's suggestion that the authority 
of Suter precluded application of the defense of contributory negligence, however, on the basis of 
its observation that the instrumentalities involved in the industrial machine exception were ordinarily 
ones over which the employee had only "limited control", while the scaffold involved in this accident 
"afford[ed] the worker greater control and direction of its use." Colella, 201 N.J. Super. at 592, 
493 A.2d at 636. 
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as contributorily at fault. The exceptions to this general rule, as reflected above, 
are that recovery may still be denied on the basis of the plaintiff's conduct (1) 
when the facts show that the injured party's knowledge of the hazard was so 
entire as to make the unfortunate conduct brazen in the extreme, and (2) when 
an arguably adequate safety-related communication from the seller was read and 
disregarded. 
XV. CONCLUSION 
The decisional injunction to product sellers is that they timely and clearly 
state to product users and consumers germane product safety related information 
known to them that they have no reason to believe is known to those who will 
encounter the product. The duty to warn attaches, therefore, "whenever a rea- 
sonable man would want to be informed of the risk in order to decide whether 
to expose himself to it.""8 The product seller's discharge of this duty can be said 
to be fulfilled when the information conveyed alleviates the asymmetry between 
the safety-specific information known to the seller and that known to the user 
or consumer. 
This abbreviated means of demarcating the seller's duty to warn does not 
have the breadth of other and earlier protocols of decision. Most prominent of 
these is Professor Kidwell's identification of ten indicia courts have used in eval- 
uating a duty to warn."g An asymmetry analysis is, in fact, derived from two of 
the aforementioned longer list of criteria and could not reasonably be advanced 
as a replacement of its forerunners. Isolated from the cluster of other criteria, 
however, what it does provide is an efficient and accurate barometer of when a 
duty to warn is likely to exist, as well a suggestion of the nature and quantum 
of information that is likely to satisfy that duty. More specifically, absent evidence 
of a limited number of particular circumstances associated with a product trans- 
action, such as (1) sales in bulk, (2) a product capable of only trivial harm, or 
(3) a workplace from which the seller is completely foreclosed from communi- 
cation, an injured party's showing that the seller did not communicate pertinent 
safety-related information to users or consumers, when there was no reason to 
know they would have a particularized knowledge of the specific risks involved, 
should satisfy the claimant's prima facie case of a breach of the duty to warn. 
This article commends the fairness of a principle that places upon the man- 
ufacturer the burden of ensuring that persons who will use, consume, or be af- 
fected by a product will receive in an understandable form that germane, safety- 
related information held by the manufacturer which will permit them to make 
an informed decision as to whether to encounter the risk. If a product-related 
Jamens, 463 So.2d at 251. 
449 See Kidwell, supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
Heinonline - -  89 W. Va. L. Rev. 332 1986-1987 
19861 PRODUCTS LIABILITY 333 
injury occurs and the user or consumer's lack of safety-related information is the 
cause in fact of the injury, it is proposed further that the plaintiff's prima facie 
case, absent special circumstances, will be satisfied by proof that the manufacturer 
held safety-related information regarding warning of a risk or instructions for 
safe use, but did not succeed in communicating this information to the plaintiff 
or the members of the plaintiff's class. Definitionally, a plaintiff's showing is 
that of an asymmetry between such information known to the manufacturer and 
that known to the user or consumer or, conversely, the lack of informational 
parity or equilibrium. 
Product-related injuries will never be eliminated, for, among other reasons, 
"[nlo one has developed a system to match the creativity of the consumer in 
finding new and sometimes unsafe ways to use The most attainable 
and estimable goal of products liability law, however, is the achievement of a 
commercial environment, judicially encouraged as necessary, in which product 
sellers prepare and present to consumers product safety-related information as 
readily and unselfconsciously as they prepare a bill of sale. 
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